What Happened to the Good Neighbor Policy?
Table of Contents
Author(s)
Share this Publication
- Print This Publication
- Cite This Publication Copy Citation
Richard J. Kilroy Jr., “What Happened to the Good Neighbor Policy?,” Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy, February 11, 2025, https://doi.org/10.25613/FGQV-5J17.
Good Neighbor Policy
In March 1933, President Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) stated in his first inaugural address: “In the field of world policy I would dedicate this nation to the policy of the good neighbor — the neighbor who resolutely respects himself and, because he does so, respects the rights of others.” This came to be known at the “Good Neighbor Policy,” which was particularly directed at the Americas, where the United States had a history of aggression and military intervention, underpinned by Theodore Roosevelt’s 1904 Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine of 1823.
With the Good Neighbor Policy, FDR sought to change the narrative around American policy toward the Western Hemisphere, where the United States was viewed as an aggressive power that perceived the region as falling under its sphere of influence. In December 1933, at the Montevideo Conference, Secretary of State Cordell Hull supported a declaration by nations in the Western Hemisphere that stated, “No state has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another.”
American foreign policy toward Latin America fluctuated between these two approaches for the rest of the 20th century. However, there are new concerns in Washington about China’s slow but steady incursions in Latin America, especially in light of an emerging geostrategic competition between the United States and China. It is not surprising then that Latin America is drawing new attention from the second Trump administration.
Trump’s New Foreign Policy
Prior to his second inaugural address in January 2025, then President-elect Donald Trump articulated a new policy directed toward the Americas in which his administration would pursue a policy of economic retribution, territorial expansion, and possible military action toward Canada, Mexico, Panama, and Greenland. While there may not be a clearly defined Trump doctrine other than “America First” — which explained his previous administration’s foreign policy strategy — Trump’s rhetoric and actions illustrate his intent to pursue something akin to the opposite of a Good Neighbor Policy in his second term.
During his first term in office, Trump’s rhetoric was often confrontational toward many countries in the Western Hemisphere. For example, he insulted Mexico, blamed undocumented immigrants for crime, drug trafficking, and homicide, and vowed to build an “impenetrable” wall along the entire 2,000-mile border of Mexico.
Trump’s recent treatment of Canada and former Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, calling the country “the 51st state” and referring to Trudeau as “Governor” rather than prime minister, has contributed to a strengthened sense of Canadian nationalism and a firm response to his rhetoric. Trump’s renewed interest in purchasing or occupying Greenland, which is already part of North America, has unsettled Denmark and other NATO allies, raising concerns about his views of territorial expansion. Denmark, in particular, has been one of America’s staunchest allies on numerous global causes.
During his second inaugural address, Trump even called for the United States to retake the Panama Canal from Panama, contradicting the Torrijos-Carter Treaties ratified in 1978, which ceded control of the then termed “Canal Zone” to Panama and maintained neutrality of the canal. While the treaties’ negotiation received opposition at the time, the United States continued to support the principles of the Good Neighbor Policy by withdrawing its military forces from Panama on Dec. 31, 1999, and turning over all U.S. bases in the Canal Zone and operation of the Panama Canal Commission to Panama, as promised. Trump has not ruled out using military force to retake the Canal Zone from Panama.
Also, during his second inaugural address, Trump reiterated his controversial stance, promising he would issue an executive order renaming the Gulf of Mexico, the “Gulf of America.” That same day, an executive order was signed. In response to Trump’s earlier comments made before his inauguration, Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum quipped that parts of the United States should be renamed “Mexican America,” since that was the name used in 1814, before the annexation of Texas and the Mexican-American War, which seized half of Mexico’s territory. Exchanges of this nature at the highest level, whether in Washington or Mexico City, are unlikely to strengthen binational relations or restore the principles of the Good Neighbor Policy.
First Trump Administration and Latin America
Although much of Trump’s rhetoric and vision of an expansionist foreign policy may seem exaggerated and more akin to political theater than concrete policy, the irony is not lost on those who have studied U.S.-Latin American relations and have long argued that neglecting the region could be detrimental to the United States. Currently, much of the attention Latin America is receiving in Washington is driven more by China’s activities on the continent than by efforts to sustainably improve U.S. relations with its neighbors.
During his first administration, other than Mexico, Trump showed minimal interest in Latin America or the Western Hemisphere in general. He did not attend the 8th Summit of the Americas in Lima, Peru in 2018, sending Vice President Mike Pence in his stead. His selections for secretaries of state during his first term, Rex Tillerson and Mike Pompeo, showed little interest in Latin America, focusing mainly on advancing Trump’s anti-immigration agenda. Also in 2018, before visiting five countries in the region, Tillerson delivered a speech at the University of Texas at Austin, praising the 1823 Monroe Doctrine and calling it “as relevant today as it was the day it was written.”
Second Trump Administration and Latin America
Some of Trump’s most troubling positions involve his views on using U.S. military force against transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) in Mexico, with or without Mexico’s consent. On Jan. 20, Trump signed an executive order permitting the designation of TCOs in Mexico as terrorist organizations. Calling TCOs terrorist organizations and criticizing Mexico’s lack of capacity or will to address the threat could justify the Trump administration’s decision to potentially designate Mexico a “state sponsor of terrorism.” In doing so, this would lead to Mexico being added to the U.S. Department of State’s list, which includes: Cuba, North Korea, Iran, and Syria. Even though President Joe Biden signaled his intent to remove Cuba from this list days before he left office, the Trump administration reversed this action. This move aligns with the stance of Trump’s Secretary of State Marco Rubio, a Cuban-American U.S. senator from Florida, who has taken a hard line toward Cuba and supported policies, such as Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, and opposed the Obama Administration’s restoration of diplomatic relations with Cuba.
If the United States were to undertake military operations in Mexico without the consent of the Mexican government, it could lead to serious diplomatic and security challenges. The Mexican military is protective of the country’s sovereignty and would likely respond to such incursions.
It is unlikely that anyone in the Trump administration will take heed of the lessons from the failed Punitive Expedition in Mexico (1916–17), when U.S. Gen. John J. “Blackjack” Pershing led an unsuccessful chase of Mexican revolutionary Pancho Villa after his raid on Columbus, New Mexico. In this instance, U.S.-Mexico diplomacy successfully prevented a more expansive conflict between the two countries. To avoid repeating history, the United States and Mexico should explore alternative strategies to address drug trafficking and organized crime — often referred to as a “soft invasion” — rather than the current approach of labeling TCOs as terrorist organizations, which could set the stage for unilateral military operations against them.
Trump’s recent threats to impose tariffs on Colombia in response to President Gustavo Petro’s refusal to allow U.S. military aircraft carrying deported migrants highlights a shift away from the principles of the Good Neighbor Policy. The potential counterproductive effects of such tariffs are apparent to those who supported years of U.S.-backed counterdrug efforts in Colombia, which aimed to curb coca cultivation and replace it with alternative industries, such as the flower trade — an area in which Colombia is now the world’s second-largest exporter.
Returning to a Good Neighbor Policy
During his first term, many of Trump’s more concerning foreign policy impulses were tempered by his Cabinet members and staff. However, those guardrails may not be present in a second Trump administration. His Cabinet selections — including Pete Hegseth for secretary of defense, Kristi Noem for secretary of homeland security, Pam Bondi for attorney general, and Mike Walz for national security advisor — suggest a willingness to support strained relations not only with Mexico, Canada, and Panama, but also NATO allies in Europe and other nations in the Western Hemisphere.
If Trump continues to pursue policies that diverge from the principles of the Good Neighbor Policy, his “America First” agenda could shift to “America Alone” in his second term, given an increasingly volatile global landscape, which presents nations alternatives to the United States for trade and security. Returning to a Good Neighbor Policy could offer a way for U.S. foreign policy to be guided by ideals rather than impulse, and inspiration rather than intimidation.
This publication was produced on behalf of Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy. Wherever feasible, the material was reviewed by external experts prior to its release. Any errors are the responsibility of the author(s) alone.
This material may be quoted or reproduced without prior permission, provided appropriate credit is given to the author(s) and Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy. The views expressed herein are those of the individual author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy.