An Effective US-Mexico Security Framework Requires Cooperation

Security, Organized Crime, and Drug Trafficking

The United States and Mexico have rarely seen eye to eye on security or public safety, particularly when it comes to combatting organized crime (OC). Criminal organizations, dozens of which operate in Mexico and have active cells in the United States, have been a constant thorn in the binational relationship, contributing to some of the lowest points in bilateral cooperation, especially regarding the issue of drug trafficking.

The United States is the largest illegal drug market in the world, and Mexico has been the staging area for much of the supply chain — from production to cross-border trafficking to broad bulk distribution — of psychotropic substances in the U.S. The two governments often talk past one other on these important issues. While the United States has increasingly labeled Mexico’s OC groups as a major threat to its public safety and security, with a focus on the supply side, Mexico has emphasized the demand side of the illegalized drug chain and more recently argued that the United States is the primary source of powerful weapons that provide OC groups with their firepower.

In general, security issues have been a point of significant tension in the binational agenda. One such moment was the torture and assassination of Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent Enrique Camarena Salazar in 1985 in Guadalajara, Jalisco, Mexico. At the same time, security concerns have also provided moments of close cooperation, such as during the tenure of Mexico’s former President Felipe Calderón Hinojosa (2006–12). This cooperation, although more controlled and less public, continued under the Obama (2008–16) and Peña Nieto (2012–18) administrations.

Recent History of Binational Security Cooperation

The advent of the first Trump administration in 2017 and the election of Andrés López Obrador in 2018, however, came to change the dynamic of the binational relationship. Washington and Mexico City focused primarily on two issues:

1. Cooperating to stem the flow of migrants and asylum seekers toward the U.S.-Mexico border.
2. Renegotiating the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), formerly known as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

Cooperation on security was largely off the agenda, prompting complaints from U.S. law enforcement agencies. Mexico’s strategy took a course of nonaction against OC groups. López Obrador, president between 2018 and 2024, explicitly spoke of not taking any action against OC groups, leaving them instead to operate freely throughout the country. This strategy known as “Abrazos, no Balazos” — or “Hugs, not Bullets” — was meant to reduce crime and violence in the country, largely by ending all open confrontation with members of drug cartels and other criminal groups. The strategy failed, and OC groups have now gained enormous power and influence in Mexico, intensifying U.S. law enforcement agencies’ concerns and allowing Mexico to fall into a spiral of crime and violence that has far surpassed the country’s material capacity to combat it.

Mexico’s new administration under Claudia Sheinbaum (2024–30), faced with a mounting challenge from OC groups throughout the country and a degraded institutional capacity to address crime and violence, appears to have suspended the “Abrazos, no Balazos” strategy. Instead, the administration has launched a new security initiative, which resembles that of the Calderón and Peña Nieto administrations by leaning toward binational cooperation and countering OC groups.

However, an important tension exists between the Sheinbaum administration’s new security strategy, led by Secretary of Security and Civilian Protection Omar García Harfuch, and the National Regeneration Movement (MORENA) party-led governing coalition’s preference for a more passive approach to the challenge of organized crime. It is unclear which of the two approaches will prevail, but the Sheinbaum administration may no longer have the luxury of a Washington preoccupied with immigration, the recovery after the COVID-19 pandemic, and the intensifying U.S.-China geostrategic rivalry. The reelection of Donald Trump to the U.S. presidency now poses more serious challenges to the Mexican government.

Current Status of Binational Security Cooperation

As of late January 2025, this is the state of affairs: Trump, who had threatened to designate Mexican OC groups as terrorist organizations, has now made good on that promise. Within hours of taking office on Jan. 20, he officially declared these groups terrorist organizations. This declaration would enable U.S. law enforcement agencies to conduct operations deep in Mexican territory. While it would be preferable to do so with Mexico’s cooperation, this designation certainly permits the U.S. to carry out certain operations without Mexico’s consent, especially if the Sheinbaum administration were to refuse to come to the table with a new framework for cooperation against criminal organizations.

The Trump administration’s declaration, however, may give Sheinbaum just the excuse she needs to overrun MORENA and López Obrador’s preferred strategy of “Abrazos, no Balazos.” The Mexican government faces a serious degradation of its institutional capacity to face organized crime, as evinced by unyielding homicide and violence statistics, as well as a worrisome number of missing persons. In fact, because these organizations are truly transnational, and given Trump’s high-stakes political pressure, Sheinbaum may have no choice but to engage Washington in a new strategy. What is true is that the status quo — largely ignoring the problem of OC groups as an important issue for both countries — will no longer be possible.

Recommendations for a New Security Cooperation Framework

Given the current fluidity of security issues in both countries, it is possible that both Washington and Mexico City will entrench their positions, with Mexico articulating a more nationalistic stance and the United States conducting unilateral operations. Addressing a joint problem under this logic is ineffective. While the Mérida Initiative may have been responsible for adding fuel to the violence in Mexico and the Bicentennial Framework became Mexico’s way of stalling security cooperation with the United States, a new framework is required — one that will recognize the many dimensions of a joint problem.

Some of the key components of a new strategic framework to reduce drug trafficking and help Mexico restore law and order are evident, as follows.

Recognizing Drug Trafficking as a Transnational Issue

Both countries should recognize their responsibility in drug trafficking as a transnational problem. The United States should accept that more resources are needed to address the demand side in the country, and Mexico should acknowledge its important role in supplying illegal drugs and the failure of its inaction strategy, which has increased violence and crime within the country itself. Recognition of this joint problem’s existence should serve as the basis on which to build a new cooperative relationship.

Combating OC Groups Through a Systemized Approach

The problem of OC groups should be treated as various important components rather than a singular issue, although different parts may be a priority to each government. For the United States, a key component is to reduce the trafficking of fentanyl, among other illegal narcotics. To aid in this work, Mexico should:

• Deploy a strategy to stem the flow of precursor chemicals at its ports.
• Identify and destroy laboratories where fentanyl is processed.
• Use intelligence and law enforcement operations to dismantle organizations dedicated to drug trafficking.
• Share actionable intelligence to track and freeze OC groups’ financial resources.

These actions can also apply to OC groups’ operations that have expanded to human smuggling and human trafficking.

An important lesson of past efforts is that these operations should be the product of collaborative intelligence gathering and targeted discrete operations, rather than an all-out confrontation with these groups. These are essential concerns for Washington, and they should be continuously highlighted by the second Trump administration.

Strengthening Mexico’s Resources Through Cooperation

Simultaneously, the United States should deploy a plan to strengthen Mexico’s institutional capacity to combat OC groups. This plan should include: 

• Intelligence sharing on the operations of OC groups.
• Anti-corruption surveillance targeting compromised police departments and law enforcement agents.
• Resources and equipment to conduct operations against OC groups.

Additionally, Washington should acknowledge that American weapons fuel the firepower of OC groups and should escalate its operations against arms trafficking along the U.S.-Mexico border. Increasing institutional capacity and the material wherewithal of the Mexican government as well as stemming the flow of guns south of the border will be an important priority to Mexico City.

Organizing a Comprehensive, Cooperative Operation

These operations, however, should be framed as a comprehensive initiative, rather than individual bilateral or unilateral operations. Establishing an agreement to articulate lines of cooperation, deploy resources, and setting the parameters of individual and joint operations is key to ensure that binational trust is built over time, and a degree of effectiveness is achieved for the benefit of both peoples.

Thus far, the reactions in both the United States and Mexico have been largely composed of aggressive unilateral statements and defensive stands. Trump’s idea that the issue can be solved through unilateral action is largely misguided. Mexico’s idea that defending OC groups is protecting national sovereignty is also mistaken. These stances do not align with the objectives of either the United States’ or Mexico’s government.

The need to establish a joint working group to frame the problem, define principles of cooperation, determine the level and use of resources, and evaluate results is urgent and should be a priority within weeks, if not days, following the installation of the new U.S. administration.

New Security Framework Is Crucial for US-Mexico Cooperation

The United States’ inability to obtain Mexico’s agreement on a new effective framework for cooperation, coupled with Mexico’s more ideological and nationalistic approach to crime and violence, has created a situation harmful not only to Americans but also Mexican citizens. This cannot be the path to reduce OC groups’ drug and arms trafficking on both sides of the border.

Both sides should collaborate to develop a regional strategy that fosters a cooperative relationship, which can then extend to other areas of mutual benefit, including freer and fairer trade, orderly and legal labor market integration, and overall regional prosperity.

Without a new security framework for binational cooperation, tensions are likely to rise, and unilateral actions could create a more acrimonious relationship, making the region less equipped to address the greater challenges both countries face on the global stage.

This publication was produced on behalf of Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy. Wherever feasible, the material was reviewed by external experts prior to its release. Any errors are the responsibility of the author(s) alone.

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