Ukraine’s Electricity Sector: Urgency and Resilience in a Time of War

Introduction

Ukraine's electricity system faces severe challenges from persistent Russian attacks, which Moscow has significantly intensified in 2024. More than 100 cruise and ballistic missiles and at least as many Shahed kamikaze drones have struck thermal power plants, hydroelectric plants, and high-voltage substations. As Ukraine prepares for the upcoming winter, it is crucial to develop a resilient next-generation electricity system. A resilient electricity supply is certainly critical for humanitarian reasons in the near term, but longer-term global competitiveness, not to mention nation-rebuilding, is impossible without a stable supply of electrons. With that vital strategic task in mind, it is critical to outline the current challenges, short-term solutions, and long-term strategies for Ukraine's energy sector, all of which highlight the need for international support and investment. 

To begin, decentralization is a point of emphasis, especially in the short term. Ukraine’s Soviet-legacy extremely centralized power infrastructure footprint offers a plethora of high value targets for the Russian military using cruise missiles, drones, and ballistic missiles.[1] Ukraine’s military survived Russia’s early onslaught and successfully resisted in part because commanders dispersed forces before Russian strikes at war’s outset. Now, dispersion logic is also needed for the power sector. Dispersed generation capacity must be able to collectively scale up to gigawatt production levels and do so affordably. Diesel power can help Ukrainian civilians survive the coming winter and perhaps also the next but is significantly more expensive than natural gas. The cost disparity is especially meaningful in a country like Ukraine with domestic gas production that could flexibly supply a substantial portion of domestic power generation. Accordingly, gas turbines, gas piston-engines, and diesel generators whose replacement cost is insured by the US and partner governments are thus core to the solution. They can be fueled from the existing gas pipeline system and Ukraine’s highly resilient, widely distributed wartime diesel supply chain.  

A successful deployment of distributed diesel and gas-fired assets hardens Ukraine against future Russian aggression—an unfortunately likely prospect[2]— and provides critical support for Ukrainians living in wartime stress.  It also provides a blueprint for longer term deployment of other distributed assets, such as small modular nuclear reactors, that can provide the energy density needed to support an industrial base. Perhaps most importantly for now, gas can be installed fast and, in many cases, access high pressure systems. And with much of Ukraine’s coal-fired capacity already destroyed by Russia, each megawatt of gas-fired generation installed will emit half the carbon of its coal predecessor—meaning that by default, distributed generation will help Ukraine build back better and cleaner.

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Notes

[1] Gabriel Collins, “An Electricity Strategy for Long War in Ukraine.” Collins Research Portal, July 2, 2024, https://collinsresearchportal.com/2024/07/02/an-electricity-strategy-for-long-war-in-ukraine/.

[2] Gabriel Collins and Steven R. Miles, “Why Is Europe Not Replacing Russian Pipeline Gas With Long-term LNG Contracts?” (Houston: Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy, September 13, 2023), https://doi.org/10.25613/3FRC-FA56. 

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