Nathan P. Jones, “Sovereignty Strengthens US-Mexico Security Ties,” Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy, October 16, 2025, https://doi.org/10.25613/VD87-G116.
The Trump administration is at an important inflection point in its relationship with Mexico. The administration has placed significant pressure on the Mexican government to engage in a more confrontational strategy against drug cartels or criminal armed groups (CAGs). Examples of cooperation between the U.S. and Mexico include two large-scale transfers of imprisoned Mexican cartel members to U.S. custody for prosecution in August 2025. However, recent collaboration will also carry potential costs, and these ripple effects require specific attention.
At the same time, the Trump administration’s rhetoric of pressure on the Mexican government could be considered politically motivated. If continued, U.S. demands may potentially lead to the infringement of Mexican sovereignty, particularly in the case where American troops are deployed on Mexican soil without the country’s permission. As a result, this pressure could manifest itself in the form of reduced or halted Mexican cooperation with U.S. law enforcement in the future. A similar reaction could also occur following the end of the Trump administration’s tenure, as building tensions come to the fore. To avoid this potential divide, both countries should work together to confront organized crime while strengthening rule of law institutions.
The U.S.-Mexico security relationship provides important opportunities for both countries. Importantly, security cooperation helps to maintain an important economic relationship. Bilateral trade totaled roughly $900 billion in 2024. A sudden cessation of trade would be detrimental to both countries’ economies, though Mexico’s would experience more significant challenges.
Also economically, Mexico offers an important opportunity for nearshoring or friendshoring, as the United States attempts to pivot from East Asia after supply chain disruptions during the COVID-19 pandemic revealed vulnerabilities.
Altogether, both countries share interests in addressing transnational organized crime (TOC), which include:
Mexico has a long history of territorial infractions at the hands of the United States. While these breaches primarily ended following the Mexican-American War (1846–48), the memories of the Punitive Expedition in Mexico or Pershing Raid (1916–17) still run deep in Mexico City and other core population centers of the country, though less so in peripheral areas, such as northern Mexico. Notwithstanding, northern Mexico is not economically peripheral in many ways but is central; in this context, the reference pertains to geographically peripheral northern zones.
However, numerous examples of successful bilateral U.S.-Mexico law enforcement cooperative operations illustrate how these efforts are grounded in a mutual respect for sovereignty. All follow the general framework of honoring Mexican sovereignty through agreements and partnerships. More specifically, this work was accomplished by U.S. collaboration with Mexican law enforcement, or military acting in a law enforcement capacity, on Mexican soil through intelligence sharing and coordinated security efforts.
Several of these successful cooperative operations and their frameworks are described below, as well as a brief discussion of one compromised operation.
Operation United Eagles was a 2000’s cooperative agreement between U.S. and Mexican law enforcement that successfully weakened and fragmented the Tijuana Cartel or Arellano Félix Organization (AFO). It involved U.S. law enforcement agencies (LEAs) wiretapping the radio dispatch system of the AFO in Tijuana from the U.S. and a trained Mexican fugitive apprehension team on the U.S. side of the border.
The specially vetted Mexican unit stayed on U.S. soil and was disconnected from all communications, including their own families in Mexico. This prevented family members from being subject to kidnappings to leverage the agents for information and also prevented leaks.
Once intelligence was garnered on cartel leader locations, the team rapidly crossed the border and made arrests. The Mexican team allowed the U.S.-Mexico cooperation to avoid violating Mexican sovereignty. Some version of this type of cooperation has been the winning formula in many high-value apprehensions in Mexico.
Similarly, the 2014 capture of Joaquín Guzmán Loera, or “El Chapo,” was the result of cooperation between U.S. LEAs — including the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) — and the Mexican Marines, which operate under the auspices of the Mexican Navy (Secretaría de Marina, SEMAR). The book “Hunting El Chapo” by retired DEA agent Andrew Hogan, along with Douglas Century, describes the cooperative operation in-depth.
The operation involved significant coordination between the U.S. LEAs and Mexican Marines. Additionally, U.S. LEAs in the United States provided intelligence to trusted teams of Mexican Marines who successfully captured high-value targets (HVTs) and used incoming intelligence until it culminated in the 2014 capture of ‘El Chapo’ in Mazatlán.
Compromised operations have also occurred in this model, which are largely attributable to intelligence leaks as well as the perennial issue of corruption. According to reporting by ProPublica, in 2011, a specially vetted unit leaked intelligence exposing U.S. government informants inside the Los Zetas Cartel. In retaliation, the Zetas led a three-day act of devasting violence against the people of Allende in Coahuila, Mexico, because they were perceived as family members of or connections to the informants.
Despite instances of intelligence leaks, such as that in Allende, this model of U.S.-Mexico cooperation that mutually honors sovereignty, on net, yields effective results and should be continued and deepened. The U.S. and Mexico stand to gain greatly if cooperation is maintained by promoting security improvements across North America and the Western Hemisphere and fomenting the diffusion of democratic and rule of law norms.
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