Gabriel Collins, “Wars and Pipelines: How Armed Conflict Has Driven Oil Logistics Diversification,” Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy, April 9, 2026, https://doi.org/10.25613/VSN3-ZT23.
Recent hostilities have produced the largest oil supply disruptions in history, demonstrating Iran’s ability to virtually close the Strait of Hormuz and exposing the vulnerability of roughly 20 million barrels per day (bpd) of regional exports. This working paper argues that armed conflict is a primary driver of oil logistics diversification, illustrated through four historical precedents, including the WWII Big Inch and Saudi Arabia’s East-West Pipeline. Under kinetic pressure, the geography of logistics is periodically rewritten, and this could be another such period.
Route diversity is essential to hedge against future disruptions, whose cumulative impact can exceed $1 billion per day. Maintaining bypass capacity helps preserve both revenue continuity and consumer confidence in Gulf supply reliability.
To address chokepoint risk, this paper proposes a Gulf Super Express Pipeline: twin 56-inch lines with a combined capacity of 10 million bpd, terminating on Oman’s Arabian Sea coast. AI-assisted modeling estimates total capital expenditure (CAPEX) at approximately $55 billion, including $10.1 billion for defense and hardening. Multiple pipeline projects will likely be implemented, targeting ports on the Mediterranean and Arabian Seas. This analysis focuses on what a “maximum project” that could serve as an oil aggregator for multiple key Gulf producers would look like.
View the full paper (PDF).
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