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I. Introduction

The U.S.-China relationship is fraught with strategic ambiguity. The two countries are neither enemies nor allies. Their relationship is marked by both cooperation and competition in the economic and diplomatic arenas. While outright military conflict is improbable, there are a number of flash points—a collapse of the regime in North Korea or an escalation of tensions between Beijing and Taiwan—that could lead to a clash of arms. In the longer term, Sino-American relations are likely to be shaped by the two countries’ contrasting roles in the international system.

The United States is the world’s preeminent state facing almost certain, if slow, relative decline. China, in contrast, is an emerging superpower finding its way in an international order still centered around the United States. Beijing and Washington share a broad range of interests, a number of them in the energy arena. They have found areas for fruitful collaboration. But elites in both countries remain deeply suspicious of each other.

The ambiguity of the Sino-American relationship is likely to endure, given the truly historical trends underway. After all, we are talking about a dramatic redistribution of global power, akin to the shift from Paris and London to Washington and Moscow beginning in World War II. Even under the best of circumstances, the United States will be reluctant to yield its dominant position in world affairs; China will be similarly unlikely to accept junior status among great powers. The history of international systems in accommodating new great powers is a very mixed one. The rise of Germany and Japan during the last half of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century ended in international disaster. Conflict may not be inevitable; but neither is cooperation. Given this uncertainty, both Washington and Beijing are likely to hedge their strategic bets. This will be as true in the energy sector as elsewhere.

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