Unpacking the Rhetoric Behind Mexico’s Judicial Reform

Mexico’s Judicial Reform and Its Implications

On Sept. 15, 2024, a constitutional reform significantly reshaping Mexico’s judiciary branch took effect. The reform calls for the replacement of all sitting judges — nearly 7,000 across the country — with new ones elected by popular vote and the establishment of a popularly elected Judicial Discipline Tribunal to oversee and sanction the court’s personnel, without the possibility of appeal. The first judicial elections will be held on June 1, 2025.

In recent months, scholars and human rights defenders have dedicated significant efforts — e.g., compiling English-language analyses, policy documents, and press releases — to explain how this reform may constitute an overreach of the judicial branch by the executive branch and is unlikely to improve Mexican citizen’s access to the courts and legal resources. In countries where democratic institutions face challenges, changes in how judges are appointed or removed can raise concerns about judicial independence. In Mexico, where the executive and legislative branches now hold primary authority over judicial candidate selection, the potential for judicial capture and greater political influence on the courts has drawn increased scrutiny. In line with this view, both the United Nation’s Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights have emphasized that the reform’s core elements could raise concerns about international human rights standards and judicial independence in the Mexican context.

While the judicial reform’s potential risks are well-documented, the wide-reaching narratives used to justify it have received less attention. Arguments in favor of the reform have been advanced by former President Andrés Manuel López Obrador and echoed by members of the National Regeneration Movement party (Movimiento de Regeneración Nacional, MORENA), senior officers — including current President Claudia Sheinbaum — and allied voices.

Rhetorical Strategies Surrounding the Judicial Reform

Identifying what MORENA’s narratives may obscure or oversimplify is crucial to achieving an informed democratic discourse. In doing so, this brief dissects the three rhetorical strategies that have gained a prominent presence in the public conversation surrounding the judicial reform. The following strategies have been used by MORENA and its allies to justify the judicial reform in Mexico.

1. A popular mandate authorizes an “unlimited power of constitutional reform”; therefore, the passage of López Obrador’s proposals — including the judicial reform — are justifiable even if, in practice, they dismantle accountability institutions and independent oversight on executive power.
    
2. The Supreme Court bears significant responsibility for the long-standing issues related to Mexico’s overall administration of justice, thus, necessitating the judicial reform.   
    
3. Public deliberation and the implementation of a major constitutional reform, such as the judicial reform, can be achieved in just a few months.

Setting aside the merits of electing judges, this brief’s main claim is that unpacking these rhetorical strategies and the potential political motivations undergirding them will help move Mexico toward a reasoned, meaningful public debate on the future of its constitutional democracy.

1. Popularity Means an Unlimited Power of Constitutional Reform

Popular Mandates Versus Constitutional Reforms

MORENA’s broad victory in the 2024 general elections serves as the basis for its assertion that the electoral outcome grants the party a mandate to adopt the constitutional amendment proposals that former President López Obrador's presented in February 2024. The ruling party and its pundits have invested significant efforts to promote the premise that their popularity authorizes them to implement constitutional changes as they see fit.

While MORENA secured a clear majority win, the question is whether such a victory can be claimed as a mandate to introduce constitutional reforms that, among other aspects, dismantle accountability institutions and independent agencies overseeing co-equal branches of government. This brief finds that such a claim does not align with Mexico’s Constitution and is questionable, particularly given the conditions under which the judicial reform was adopted.

Insufficient Majority of Votes

First, if holding the necessary majority to pass constitutional amendments were sufficient authorization to reconfigure a branch of government, MORENA would not have the power to amend the Constitution.

MORENA did not win the qualified majority to pass constitutional reforms, despite the election’s results coming close to the required number. MORENA secured an overrepresentation in Congress through a disputed decision issued by the National Electoral Institute (Instituto Nacional Electoral, INE) and ratified by the Electoral Court. Despite the constitutional 8% cap of overrepresentation, the electoral authorities allocated 364 out of 500 seats to MORENA in the Chamber of Deputies, which represents 73% of that legislative body.

Even with the bypassing of the Constitution’s overrepresentation limit, MORENA’s electoral results did not reach the qualified majority needed in both chambers of Congress. MORENA’s coalition was three votes short in the Senate, yet three converts originally from opposing parties helped the ruling party secure enough votes. Sens. José Sabino Herrera and Araceli Saucedo from the Party of the Democratic Revolution (Partido de la Revolución Democrática, PRD), who won their seats as part of said party, inexplicably switched to the MORENA shortly before taking office in early September 2024. This left the ruling party only one vote short of the required 86 votes in the Senate to reach the qualified majority to pass constitutional amendments.

Days after the two senators’ switch, it was uncertain whether MORENA and its allies would be able to secure enough votes to pass the president’s proposed judiciary reform. Following reports by members of the opposition alleging intimidation to vote in the reform’s favor and the idea of passing the amendment with 85 votes, the missing vote came from an unexpected source: Sen. Miguel Ángel Yunes Márquez of the National Action Party (Partido Acción Nacional, PAN) and the political dynasty in the state of Veracruz, and son of one of President López Obrador’s longtime opponents.

Several members of the Yunes family, including Sen. Yunes Márquez and his father Miguel Ángel Yunes Linares, the former governor of the State of Veracruz and senator substitute for his son, were criminally indicted for public corruption and other serious crimes. Until Sept. 11, 2024, the Yunes family maintained that these accusations were politically motivated by the governor of Veracruz, a member of MORENA. However, after Sen. Yunes Márquez voted in favor of the judicial reform, the charges against him and his family members were dropped, leading to speculation about a potential connection between his vote and the withdrawal of the charges. Additionally, on Feb. 18, 2025, five months after his contentious vote in favor of the judicial reform, Sen. Yunes Márquez officially joined MORENA.

These tactics enabled MORENA to advance the judicial reform despite not having a qualified majority or broad-based consensus. The reform’s approval was strongly influenced by MORENA’s narrative of their popularity, as well as the party shifts that occurred within the legislature. Additionally, the rushed process to pass this reform at both congressional houses — with venue changes, unexpected alliances, and massive civil protests — demonstrates a circumstantial majority rather than a genuine mandate from the Mexican people.

Increasing Pressure on Oversight Institutions

Second, the judicial reform did not happen in a vacuum. It is the product of a repeated narrative by former President López Obrador that questioned limitations placed on the exercise of executive power and interrogated accountability institutions.

During his term, President López Obrador consistently argued that the current judiciary was “largely corrupt,” using similar rhetoric in cases where the judicial branch ruled against his initiatives. Across his 1,359 morning press conferences from 2019 to June 2023, López Obrador made statements — unsupported by evidence — challenging the judiciary’s legitimacy on 312 occasions, while also questioning the separation of powers. 

President López Obrador’s prior attempts to pass constitutional and legal reforms focused on dismantling institutions charged with public accountability were not approved. For example, his electoral reform that sought to disband INE, was called “Plan B” following his administration’s unsuccessful attempt to authorize this reform through a constitutional amendment. After the Supreme Court’s ruling against the “Plan B” in 2023, the idea of the popular election of judges took hold in MORENA circles.

Another important example of López Obrador’s attempt to curtail constitutional checks on the exercise of executive power is the proposal to move the National Guard (Guardia Nacional) — the federal body in charge of public safety — under the control of the Ministry of Defense through standard legislation. Such a maneuver was deemed unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 2023 for violating Article 21 of the Constitution as well as international human rights standards that require public security institutions to be civil in nature. 

The common factor in these two examples is the participation of the Supreme Court fulfilling its role as a constitutional tribunal — i.e., acting as a check on the exercise of public executive power. In this context, the judicial reform seems to be driven by political considerations instead of the broader public interest to improve the system of administration of justice.

2. Supreme Court Is at the Core of Justice System Shortcomings

Questioning the Court’s Authority

While a thorough, balanced review of Mexico’s justice system should be prioritized, structural obstacles to accessing justice — e.g., insufficiently funded police, prosecutors, and public defenders, and cumbersome judicial processes — were not addressed in President López Obrador’s judicial reform. Instead, his proposals oversimplified the broader, pressing problems of the justice system by challenging judges’ authority, particularly Supreme Court Chief Justice Norma Lucía Piña Hernández.

In line with the López Obrador administration’s rhetoric questioning the judiciary’s legitimacy, one of the main talking points used to justify the judicial reform was to portray Chief Justice Piña as a pivotal figure whose lack of leadership and called for the overhaul of the judicial branch. The narrative purported by his administration painted Chief Justice Piña as overlooking the judiciary’s faults and not offering an “alternative” reform. While also lacking evidence to support these assertations, the López Obrador administration also claimed that Piña did not stand in deference to the president during the commemoration of the Constitution in February 2023 in order to call for confrontation between the branches of government.

This narrative misrepresents the responsibilities of the chief justice of a constitutional court, whose duty is to uphold the law impartially and not engage in political maneuvering. For example, the fact that former Chief Justice Arturo Zaldívar aligned with the executive — eventually stepping down from his post to join the political campaign of then-candidate Sheinbaum — warrants careful examination in the context of a constitutional democracy. While some exceptional instances of collaboration may occur, it is essential that the judiciary and executive branches maintain the necessary separation to check and balance power. While Chief Justice Piña may have mishandled aspects during and after the judicial reform’s passage — e.g., the handling of the court proceedings regarding the constitutional challenge against the judicial reform — criticizing her for keeping distance from political strategies is akin to asking her to neglect the very duties of her role.

Portraying Chief Justice Piña as ineffective and partisan can be seen as the culmination of President López Obrador’s prolonged strategy to significantly reshape the judiciary. As academics and independent human rights experts have shown, President López Obrador systematically engaged in intimidation and “defamation” toward judges in his daily press conferences. This has continued after his departure in 2024 with the installation of the Sheinbaum administration.

Working with the idea that the Supreme Court contributed to ongoing issues with Mexico’s justice system, the López Obrador administration created the expectation that the Court would be responsible for producing its own reform proposal. However, when the Court presented its proposal in September 2024, MORENA and its allies did not appear to engage in a constructive dialogue.

Concerns Over a Constitutional Crisis

The judicial reform was brought to the Supreme Court in abstract review in October 2024. In an exercise of transparency, the Court published its draft opinion, which outlined the unconstitutionality of some of the judicial reform core features.

In the days leading up to the proceedings where the case was to be decided, MORENA’s criticism of the judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court, increased. Building on the premise that MORENA’s majority authorized the judicial reform, President Sheinbaum accused the Supreme Court of “overstepping its functions” attempting to rework what “the people” had already decided. She also suggested that the government may not comply with the Court’s ruling and that if the justices were to oppose the judicial reform, they would be responsible for causing a constitutional crisis.

In the end, the Supreme Court dismissed the case, avoiding the possibility of contempt of court. Nevertheless, President Sheinbaum’s potential defiance of the decision, rather than the decision itself, would have likely resulted in an overreaching of executive power and, thus, a disruption in the constitutional order. However, by questioning Chief Justice Piña’s and the Supreme Court’s authority, the ruling party continued their criticism of the judiciary, which could be viewed as a distraction from their attempts to increase executive power.

3. Time for Public Deliberation of the Reform Was Sufficient

Throughout the judicial reform process, MORENA and allies emphasized that Mexican citizens and relevant stakeholders had sufficient time to carefully consider and question President López Obrador’s judicial reform proposal. However, political leaders, stakeholders, and the public had little time to organize and participate in meaningful dialogue with the government to offer modifications or recommendations to the reform.

The timeline reveals that the judicial reform emerged during a period of intense political activity in the country. When the proposal was made official in February 2024, President López Obrador simultaneously advanced 20 structural bills, 18 of which were constitutional amendment proposals. Additionally, the public agenda was focused on the general elections in June, and the public consultations organized by the government in August were largely considered by stakeholders as a “simulation.”

A constitutional or large-scale reform should be the result of proper and careful consideration, debate, and assessment within both the public and Congress. Given the rushed timeline, the judicial reform lacked the chance for dialogue and mutual collaboration. For example, the Mexican government publicly acknowledged before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights that the judicial reform rested on “no diagnosis.” Another example of the lack of consideration that the government gave to its own proposal is that the new constitutional text provides a new system to appoint the chief justice per Article 94 of the Constitution; however, they did not abrogate the previous appointment system provided by Article 97 of the Constitution. These instances illustrate significant aspects of the reform that appear to have been quickly drafted and overlooked and, perhaps, could have been addressed given a proper review and sufficient timeline.

Despite the hurried process, a very diverse set of social groups and stakeholders voiced their positions before the reform’s approval in September, either opposing the reform or requesting thorough public engagement: students, bar associations, universities, constitutional scholars, chambers of commerce, human rights organizations, international human rights bodies, local judiciaries, the U.S. ambassador to Mexico, and foreign legislators, among others. Nevertheless, MORENA did not respond to calls for discussion and pushed the president’s judicial reform through Congress and local legislatures in only a few hours with a precarious majority behind it. Asserting that civil society had a fair chance to substantially participate in the discussion of the judicial reform would be an misrepresentation — e.g., when students and judicial workers took to the streets to demand that legislators consider their thoughts, their calls went unheeded.

Furthermore, the rushed timeline will likely have negative implications on the election of judges that is to be held in June 2025. The INE is now required to organize these elections with very limited resources and against a tight schedule. Given that the upcoming judicial elections in June 2025 will be similar in size to the federal election of 2024 — 881 elected judgeships versus 629 elected representatives — one might assume that the projected budget for the former was comparable to that of the latter.

President Sheinbaum’s surprised reaction after learning the sum of INE’s project budget to properly organize and hold the election demonstrates the lack of consideration of both the judicial reform’s implications and the necessary steps to ensure free and fair elections. In the end, the budget approved by the Chamber of Deputies in December was 67% less of what the INE had projected it would require. With the reduced budget, the INE anticipates that voting centers rather than polling stations will be installed and that there will be no electoral participation by Mexicans abroad. This would significantly affect the citizens’ access to vote in the judicial election.

Why Dissecting MORENA’s Rhetorical Strategies Matters

The three rhetorical strategies of portraying popularity as authorization, centering the justice system issues on the Supreme Court, and claiming a sufficient timeline for deliberation have been central to MORENA and its allies’ justification of their actions. While this brief focuses on the case of judicial reform, similar discursive strategies were used by the ruling party to rationalize the elimination of autonomous oversight and regulatory bodies, including the National Institute for Transparency, Access to Information, and Protection of Personal Data (Instituto Nacional de Transparencia, Acceso a la Información y Protección de Datos Personales, INAI).

Notably, these oversimplifications are not merely a matter of political disagreement — an expected, necessary component of any democracy — but reflect impoverished conceptions of the internal checks and deliberative processes that sustain constitutional democracies. Regardless of which political party employs these rhetorics, they remain fundamentally misaligned with the principles of limited government, separation of powers, and democratic debate.

A viable path for sustaining Mexico’s constitutional democracy involves parting ways with the following narratives:

1. Popular mandates as authorization for “an unlimited power of constitutional reform”: Democratic societies are inherently pluralistic, and while the majority rule is important, it is not the only value that matters. Presenting a circumstantial majority as a full mandate from the people is misleading.   
    
2. Hostility toward judges: Achieving the constitutional goal of equal access to justice for all requires an open, inclusive deliberation process that, in addition to the judiciary, includes police forces, prosecutors, public defenders, human rights ombudspersons, and all relevant federal and state government bodies.   
    
3. Rushed public deliberation: Fast-tracked constitutional amendments, particularly those involving narrow and questionable alliances, should be met with significant skepticism as they pose risks to democratic processes.

Recognizing and unpacking these rhetorical strategies is essential not only to understand the ongoing reshaping of Mexico’s judiciary and its impacts on the country’s constitutional democracy, but also to gain insights into other instances of democratic erosion across the Americas.

This publication was produced on behalf of Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy. Wherever feasible, the material was reviewed by external experts prior to its release. Any errors are the responsibility of the author(s) alone. 

This material may be quoted or reproduced without prior permission, provided appropriate credit is given to the author(s) and Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy. The views expressed herein are those of the individual author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy.