The Trump Corollary: An Expansive Vision of US Influence

The new NSS’ tone and threat perception deviates considerably from past editions, particularly with its geopolitical focus away from Asia, Europe, and the Middle East, and its pivot to the Western Hemisphere as the region that poses the primary risk to U.S. interests and security. 

US ‘National Security Strategy’

Background

In December 2025, the Trump administration released a new “National Security Strategy of the United States of America” (NSS).^[1] The document’s primary purpose is to articulate how the president views the U.S.’ role in the world, its interests, and the means to accomplish its national security goals, along with the guiding principles and priorities for both foreign and domestic policies. While most U.S. presidents produce a NSS during their first term in office, events can change the strategy’s trajectory as the 9/11 attacks did for the George W. Bush administration, which published a “National Strategy for Homeland Security” before it issued a NSS.^[2] Even so, the George W. Bush administration’s NSS was not a major departure from previous editions, whether produced by both Democratic and Republican administrations.

Since the beginning of their annual circulation in 1987, NSSs have typically expressed the U.S.’ long-standing interests in supporting democracy, promoting free trade, and fostering international cooperation to confront threats whether it be from communism during the Cold War or transnational terrorism after 9/11.^[3] Even the first Trump administration’s “America First”-focused NSS published in 2017 continued similar themes, which included addressing risks in the Indo-Pacific region posed by China’s military and economic expansion, as well as Russia’s threat to NATO nations in Europe after its annexation of Crimea in 2014.^[4]

US Focus on Western Hemisphere

The new NSS released under Trump’s second term (2025–29), however, is a significant departure from previous versions. The new NSS’ tone and threat perception deviates considerably from past editions, particularly with its geopolitical focus away from Asia, Europe, and the Middle East, and its pivot to the Western Hemisphere as the region that poses the primary risk to U.S. interests and security. While Latin Americanists have long argued that the United States has overlooked the region at its own expense, this turn may not necessarily be a welcome reprieve.^[5]

Rather than reflecting a deliberate strategic assessment of U.S. interests in the Latin American region and realigning policies to foster greater investment, security cooperation, and regional integration, the second Trump administration’s NSS views the Western Hemisphere as its sphere of influence. More specifically, it largely promotes a new era that places an emphasis on U.S. military intervention and expansion, likely at the expense of other’s sovereignty and self-determination — important concepts in U.S.-Latin American relations. Importantly, the NSS calls for a “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, drawing parallels to the Roosevelt Corollary of 1904.^[6] Thus, as other experts have noted, it raises the prospect of a renewed era of American imperialism — meaning the use of economic leverage, diplomatic pressure, and/or territorial intervention beyond its borders — in the Western Hemisphere.^[7]

The Monroe Doctrine

In 1823, President James Monroe provided an address to Congress during his second term, articulating a vision for the Western Hemisphere free from European recolonization. The position became known as the Monroe Doctrine.^[8] Written by Monroe’s Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, the address’ original intent was to promote regional support for newly independent states’ self-determination and nonintervention, as they seceded from British, French, Spanish, and Russian colonial rule.^[9] Adams, wanting to address other nations’ fears that echoed concerns over U.S. imperialism in the region, convinced Monroe to strike a less aggressive tone in his speech, arguing that it was in U.S. interests to foster free and independent states and to champion democracy over monarchy.^[10]

Adams viewed the sentiment of the Monroe Doctrine to be aspirational, as the United States then lacked the military power to enforce it. Nor did he want to see the United States drawn into Spanish-American wars of independence.^[11] Having fought two wars against Great Britain during his lifetime, Adams was not interested in potentially confronting any European or newly independent Latin American nations in the Western Hemisphere. Rather, he argued that U.S. foreign policy was not to “go in search of monsters to destroy.” Ultimately, he cautioned against the United States becoming the “dictatress of the world,” warning that this would lead to the country being “no longer the ruler of her own spirit.”^[12]

Over time, however, future presidents would cite the Monroe Doctrine as justification of U.S. intervention in the Western Hemisphere, including the war with Mexico in 1846 and then Spain in 1898.^[13] This would only fuel friction between the United States and many Latin American states that saw U.S. interventionism growing in parallel with its ability to enforce its influence on the continent’s governments.

The Roosevelt Corollary

Establishment

Moving into the 20th century, Latin America’s concerns regarding U.S. intervention were not without basis. In an address to Congress in 1904, President Theodore Roosevelt claimed the Monroe Doctrine justified U.S. intervention as an “international police power,” in cases where nations in the Western Hemisphere experienced “[c]hronic wrong-doing, or an impotence which results in the general loosening of the ties of civilized society.”^[14] This point of Roosevelt’s speech refers to states, such as Venezuela, defaulting on their debts to European powers, which would lead to those powers intervening in the region to collect those dues.^[15] Supported by the Monroe Doctrine, Roosevelt asserted that the United States had a legal right to intervene in these states and should exercise this right in order to prevent such action from European nations.

Importantly, before the Roosevelt Corollary’s establishment, the United States under Roosevelt’s presidency negotiated with Colombia to construct a canal through Panama in early 1903. However, the Colombian Senate rejected the treaty. In response, Roosevelt sent U.S. warships to Panama City, which effectively blocked Colombian suppression of the Panamanian revolution for independence. Later that same year, Panama seceded from Colombia with U.S. support and granted the United States rights to build the Panama Canal as well as control the territory.^[16]

US Interventions in Latin America

The first test of the Roosevelt Corollary took place in the Dominican Republic in 1905. At the time, the United States was concerned about Germany’s rising military power and threat to seize the Dominican Republic’s customs houses and extract payment for debts. In response, the United States unilaterally intervened to prevent Germany from doing so by imposing U.S. appointed customs collectors.^[17] Shortly thereafter, under the Roosevelt Corollary, the United States enacted what came to be called “Gunboat Diplomacy” with the “Great White Fleet” sailing throughout the Caribbean from 1907 to 1909, exerting Roosevelt’s “Big Stick” diplomacy of a more aggressive foreign policy in the region.^[18]

During William Howard Taft’s presidency, the United States followed with a series of military and political interventions in the Latin American region. These actions began in 1912 in Nicaragua to support the overthrow of José Santos Zelaya’s regime, which was viewed as threatening U.S. economic interests.^[19] U.S. Marines would remain in Nicaragua for thirteen years, during the U.S.’ first intervention in the country.^[20] The United States also intervened in Mexico in 1913, in what is known as “The Pact of Embassy.” In this instance, U.S. Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson negotiated a treaty between warring factions during the Mexican Revolution (1910–20), which led to the overthrow and murder of the elected president, Francisco Madero.^[21]

Under Woodrow Wilson’s administration, another U.S. military intervention — the Tampico Affair in 1914 — took place, where the U.S. occupied Veracruz in response to Mexico’s detainment of nine U.S. sailors.^[22] In turn, Mexico’s opposition to U.S. interventions and the increased political instability during the Mexican Revolution — to include the Columbus, New Mexico raid by Pancho Villa in 1916 — led to the unsuccessful Pershing Expedition of 1916–17.^[23]

Legacy

Across Latin America, the legacy of the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine was an increased distrust of the United States and its pronounced goal of seeking Pan-American unity in the Western Hemisphere. Rather than being seen as promoting a new American identity shared by the recently independent nations in the region and protecting these nations from European intervention, the United States was largely viewed as a neocolonialist power, exercising its economic and political policies to expand its influence over another region and replacing European powers in the process.^[24] This sentiment was encapsulated by José Ingenieros, an Argentine physician and writer, who speaking in Mexico City in 1922 stated:

“We are not, we no longer wish to be, we no longer can be pan-Americanists. The famous Monroe Doctrine, which for a century seemed to be a guarantee of our political independence against the threat of European conquests, has gradually proved to be a declaration of the American right to protect us and to intervene in our affairs. Our powerful neighbor and meddlesome friend, having developed to its highest level the capitalist mode of production, during the past war has attained world financial hegemony. … Among the ruling classes of this great state, the urge to expand and conquer has grown to the point to where the classic “America for the Americans” actually means ‘America—our Latin America—for the North Americans.’”^[25]

The history of the 20th century is thus dotted with sporadic U.S. interventions in many countries in the Americas, including operations openly engaged in regime change, such as Guatemala in 1954 and Chile in 1973, among others.^[26] These activities only intensified Latin American discontent toward the United States and its interests in the Western Hemisphere. Although grievances ebbed and flowed, they did not completely dissipate. This history remains the context behind the 2025 NSS’ “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine today.

The Trump Corollary

Primary Objectives

The 2025 NSS asserts that the United States is now reinvoking the Monroe Doctrine in the Western Hemisphere: “This ‘Trump Corollary’ to the Monroe Doctrine is a common-sense and potent restoration of American power and priorities, consistent with American security interests.”^[27]

The Trump Corollary section significantly diverges from comments made by former Secretary of State John Kerry, who declared the end of the Monroe Doctrine at the 2013 Organization of American States meeting. Kerry stated, “The relationship that we seek and that we have worked hard to foster is not about a United States declaration about how and when it will intervene in the affairs of other American states. It’s about all of our countries viewing one another as equals, sharing responsibilities, cooperating on security issues, and adhering not to doctrine, but to the decisions that we make as partners to advance the values and the interests that we share.”^[28] In fact, the Obama administration had sought to clarify U.S. relationships with nations in the Western Hemisphere as a partnership shaped by inspiration, rather than intimidation: a return to the Good Neighbor Policy of the Frankin D. Roosevelt era, rather than the “Big Stick” diplomacy of the Theodore Roosevelt presidency.^[29]

The Trump Corollary states two primary objectives in the Western Hemisphere: 

1. Enlist nations to support U.S. interests and its agenda of “thwart[ing] illegal and other unwanted migration” and combatting narcoterrorism.
2. Expand the U.S. military presence and economic leverage in the region to meet these threats.^[30]

Per the corollary, the United States will reward nations who support its policies through economic investment and will impose tariffs or other punitive measures on countries who interfere with or do not follow these objectives.

Interventionist Acts and Assertions

The Trump administration’s current military buildup in the Caribbean nearby the coast of Venezuela is reminiscent of Roosevelt’s “Gunboat Diplomacy.”^[31] Additionally, the Trump administration conducted a military intervention in Venezuela at the start of 2026, while also threatening Colombia and Mexico with such actions if they do not address the administration’s order to confront transnational criminal organizations, which the U.S. government recently labeled as foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs).^[32]

The Trump Corollary also articulates the goal of “[e]stablishing or expanding access in strategically important locations.”^[33] While not directly noted in the 2025 NSS, President Trump’s prior statements regarding his intent for the United States to regain control of Panama Canal should not be overlooked. During his campaign and current presidency, Trump has repeated his assertion to “take back” the canal as a sovereign U.S. territory, notwithstanding the commitments made under the Torrijos-Carter Treaties in 1977.^[34]

In a similar vein, the Trump Corollary states that the United States has a right to access critical resources in the Western Hemisphere and prevent other nations from obtaining those resources in order to protect America’s supply chain. In the words of the 2025 NSS, “The United States must be preeminent in the Western Hemisphere as a condition of our security and prosperity—a condition that allows us to assert ourselves confidently where and when we need to in the region.”^[35] This statement echoes Trump’s threats to gain control of Greenland due to its strategic security location and mineral assets, which Denmark and the EU continue to counter.^[36] In addition to outrightly speaking of annexing Canada, Trump has intensified his focus on the country due to perceived security concerns in the Arctic.^[37]

Chinese Influence in Latin America

While the 2025 NSS does not specifically mention China by name in the document’s Western Hemisphere section, the Trump Corollary is meant to address Latin America’s changing geopolitical landscape due to China’s growing influence in the region. For example, the 2025 NSS states: “Non-Hemispheric competitors have made major inroads into our Hemisphere, both to disadvantage us economically in the present, and in ways that may harm us strategically in the future. Allowing these incursions without serious pushback is another great American strategic mistake of recent decades.”^[38] While Mexico and Canada remain the U.S.’ major trading partners in North America, China has made significant economic gains in Latin America and now ranks as South America’s leading trading partner.^[39] Through its Belt and Road Initiative, China has invested heavily in infrastructure, energy, space, and information sectors across the region, assuring access to strategic resources, such as lithium. China is also increasing its diplomatic, cultural, and military ties by expanding its use of comprehensive strategic partnerships, which include the sale of Chinese military equipment. Through these relationships, China has gained political leverage to push its aim of isolating Taiwan, with many Latin American countries supporting China’s claims to the island in international fora.^[40]

Implications for US-Mexico Relations

In a former 17th century monastery in the town of Churubusco, south of Mexico City, there is the Museo Nacional de las Intervenciones (National Museum of the Interventions). It was the site of one of the Mexican-American War’s final battles (1846–48). The museum holds artifacts from the war, including captured U.S. battle flags and maps, one which shows the territorial borders of Mexico before the war. While visiting the museum in the 1980s, I recall a father explaining the map to his son stating, in the present tense: “This is Mexico.” Yet, in a markedly insensitive statement, the White House recently lauded the U.S. victory over Mexico in the Mexican-American War, celebrating the expansion of U.S. territory.^[41] Mexico’s President Claudia Sheinbaum responded, “You already know what my opinion is. We’re not [like] Santa Anna. We always have to defend [Mexico’s] sovereignty.”^[42]

Today, Mexico faces significant pressure on its national security interests from the United States. During both his first and second administrations, Trump has repeatedly used the language of “invasion” to characterize Mexican immigration in speeches, campaign messaging, and policy.^[43] This rhetoric is now compounded by new U.S. threats of intervening in Mexico to combat drug cartels, now labeled as FTOs. More recently, the administration has designated fentanyl as a “chemical weapon” and referred to it as “a weapon of mass destruction,” intensifying the perceived justification behind potential interventionist actions.^[44]

Mass deportations of undocumented Mexican migrants also add considerable strain on Mexico’s economy due to the loss of foreign remittances.^[45] This is coupled with Trump’s largely misguided tariffs on many of Mexico’s exports to the United States.^[46] Moreover, the future of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) is uncertain, even though consultations for its review and revision are ongoing in all three member countries.^[47] U.S. threats to militarily survey shipping in both the Caribbean and Pacific waterways under the pretense of counter-drug operations could further constrain Mexico’s economy as well as international trade.^[48]

After months of threatening to expand its military action in the Caribbean to attacks in Venezuela, the Trump administration followed through on those statements with an unprovoked military raid on Jan. 3, 2026, to capture Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores.^[49] The brief U.S. military action targeted Venezuelan military sites and Maduro’s compound, reportedly killing 32 Cuban military and intelligence officials, and at least 100 members of Venezuelan military and civilian casualties.^[50] President Trump also declared that the United States would seize Venezuela’s oil production facilities and turn them over to U.S. oil companies, stating that the United States will “run” the country, at least temporarily.^[51]

If Trump’s military actions against Venezuela prove successful without sustained international reproach and action, Colombia and Cuba could likely follow a similar course due to the administration’s tensions with these countries’ leaders.^[52] Colombia will hold a presidential election in May 2026, and, like in Argentina in 2025, President Trump may try to influence the results with endorsements and financial support.^[53]

What is yet unclear is how Mexico will be a focus of the Trump Corollary, especially given that most fentanyl entering the U.S. comes from Mexico and not Venezuela.^[54] Could the U.S. declare Mexico a state-sponsor of terrorism due to its shortcomings in curtailing the violence perpetrated by transnational criminal organizations? Could Trump claim that interventionist actions in Mexico are justified since U.S. oil access was withdrawn in 1938, when then President Lázaro Cárdenas nationalized the country’s oil companies?^[55] Moreover, Mexico will be further isolated in Latin America, if Venezuela’s government falls and more Latin American governments transition to right-wing leadership, as has already happened with half of South America.^[56] Under these circumstances, Mexico’s recent humanitarian assistance — largely fuel — to Cuba has been paused, potentially due to U.S. pressure.^[57]

Thus far, Mexico’s choice has been to appease Washington. On many demands, the past López Obrador and current Sheinbaum administrations have largely conceded to U.S. pressures, most recently by imposing tariffs on China and agreeing to water access.^[58] If Trump insists on conducting anti-cartel operations on Mexican territory through the U.S. military, the Mexican government may be under increased pressure to respond more aggressively, especially given Mexico’s sovereign-laden rhetoric and past history of U.S. intervention.^[59] The Mexican military, particularly their army, is considerably nationalistic and would be expected to defend the nation against any unilateral U.S. military action in the country.^[60] A response to a potential U.S. action could also lead to a distressing alliance between Mexico’s military and the cartels against a common opponent.^[61] Under these circumstances, 2026 is set to be a complicated year for Mexico.

Conclusion

The 2025 NSS signals a major shift in U.S. foreign policy. With its focus on the Western Hemisphere as a U.S. sphere of influence, analysts have posited that it largely cedes Europe to Russia, Asia to China, and the Middle East to autocratic regimes.^[62] Moreover, under the stated objectives in the Trump administration’s NSS, the United States has deemphasized its interest in being the leader of the free world as well as its global responsibility to maintain the liberal international order it helped create after World War II. Instead, the 2025 NSS places more weight on justifying U.S. interventionist actions in the Western Hemisphere, and if the NSS’ stated aims are fulfilled, this could lead to a return of U.S. imperialism. This would be a welcomed policy shift for China and Russia, with the diminishment of liberal democracy.

For other nations, the 2025 NSS’ pronounced focus on pursuing U.S. strategic interests in the Western Hemisphere will likely come under increasing scrutiny from regional governments, including Canada. Prime Minister Mark Carney’s comments at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, in January 2026, were the most direct challenge to the Trump administration’s view of U.S. dominance in the Western Hemisphere made by a U.S. ally thus far. Carney’s remarks were particularly significant, given their attention to Trump’s designs on Greenland and the threat to the future of the transatlantic alliance.^[63]

Meanwhile, the genuine threats in the Western Hemisphere, such as Haiti’s insecurity and humanitarian crisis, could fuel a major migrant exodus reminiscent of 1994, which caused the U.S. Southern Command to hastily erect migrant centers in Panama and Suriname as the security situation deteriorated in Haiti.^[64] Additionally, strategic errors could be made if acting in a rushed fashion; for example, the United States could mistakenly strike a boat full of migrants, suspecting that it is a drug-trafficking vessel. Such an accident in America’s war on drugs occurred in Peru in 2001, when a Peruvian air force pilot struck a small private aircraft suspected of carrying drugs. However, the plane was flown by U.S. missionaries, killing Veronica Bowers and her infant child. In 2008 the CIA reprimanded 16 employees for the negligence of the Airbridge Denial Program and lack of accountability, which led to the downing of 15 suspected drug-trafficking aircrafts during a six-year period.^[65] From September 2025 and the beginning of February 2026, the United States has exceeded that number in the Caribbean over less than a six months’ time, destroying 37 vessels and killing over 120 people per current publicly released reports.^[66]

In his 2023 book, “The Ecology of Nations: American Democracy in a Fragile World,” John Owen argues that states shape the international environment to foster the survival of their own species.^[67] In the case of the United States, this ecosystem engineering — to borrow Owen’s phrasing — meant creating international institutions and supporting governments that promoted liberal democracy and free-market capitalism. Owen argues that today, China is the builder of a new ecology that promotes the advancement of its species through a new global economy favoring China’s model of social and political control.^[68] For example, their state-owned Belt and Road Initiative is creating a networked infrastructure of ports, rail, and markets, likely based on authoritarian principles of power rather than ones of liberal democracy.

However, while the United States adopts policies — such as the Trump Corollary — claiming that it counters China’s advances in the Western Hemisphere, these policies, in fact, could significantly erode the environment that the United States created and maintained through the liberal international order. Instead of fostering an environment that encourages nations to move toward democratic governance over authoritarianism, the Trump administration is promoting policies which, in the end, will likely lead to greater insecurity, particularly in the Americas.

Notes

^[1] The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, November 2025, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf. Subsequent references to the second Trump administration’s National Security Strategy of the United States of America will appear as NSS 2025 in the notes.

^[2] Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security, July 2002, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/nat-strat-hls-2002.pdf.

^[3] “National Security Strategy,” Historical Office, Department of Defense, accessed January 2026, https://history.defense.gov/Historical-Sources/National-Security-Strategy/.

^[4] The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Trump White House Archives, December 2017, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.

^[5] Jorge Heine, “Death Knell for the Summit of the Americas?,” Responsible Statecraft, November 6, 2025, https://responsiblestatecraft.org/us-policy-failures-underwrite-americas-summit-collapse/.

^[6] NSS 2025, 15–9.

^[7] Charles A. Kupchan, “Venezuela and Beyond: Trump’s ‘America First’ Rhetoric Masks a Neo-Imperialist Streak,” Council on Foreign Relations, January 7, 2026, https://www.cfr.org/articles/venezuela-and-beyond-trumps-america-first-rhetoric-masks-neo-imperialist-streak; Zachary B. Wolf, “Trump’s New Imperialism Recalls a Dark Period of US-Leg Regime Change,” CNN, January 6, 2026, https://www.cnn.com/2026/01/06/politics/regime-change-maduro-venezuela-noriega-panama-analysis; Aamer Madhani, “After Maduro Capture, Trump’s Tough Talk Evokes a Return to the Days of American Imperialism,” AP News, January 5, 2026, https://apnews.com/article/trump-maduro-american-imperialism-1a42ccc7036ce7add7a0ba402ac6f48e; and Kanishka Singh, “Trump’s Foreign Policy Called Imperialist by Experts,” Reuters, January 15, 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/trumps-foreign-policy-called-imperialist-by-experts-2026-01-15/.

^[8] “Monroe Doctrine (1823),” National Archives, last reviewed May 2022, https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/monroe-doctrine.

^[9] Robert H. Holden and Eric Zolov, “The Monroe Doctrine,” in Latin America and the United States: A Documentary History, 2nd ed. (Oxford University Press, 2011), 13–6.

^[10] Holden and Zolov, 14.

^[11] Nicholas Guyatt, “The Adams Doctrine and an ‘Empire of States,’” Diplomatic History 47, no. 5 (2023): 823–44, https://doi.org/10.1093/dh/dhad052. 

^[12] “JQA’s ‘Monters to Destroy’ Speech, Full Text,” John Quincy Adams Society, accessed January 2026, https://jqas.org/jqas-monsters-to-destroy-speech-full-text/.

^[13] Krister Knapp, “The Return of the Monroe Doctrine,” Newsroom, Washington University, January 9, 2026, https://source.washu.edu/news_clip/the-return-of-the-monroe-doctrine/.

^[14] Holden and Zolov, “The Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine,” 96–8, 97; “Theodore Roosevelt’s Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine (1905),” National Archives, last reviewed February 2022, https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/roosevelt-corollary.

^[15] Simon Romero, “Dancing Dictator and Bankers in Chains: The Other Venezuela Blockade,” New York Times, December 27, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/12/27/world/americas/venezuela-blockade-1903-us.html.

^[16] David McCullough, The Path Between the Seas: The Creation of the Panama Canal, 1870–1914 (Simon and Schuster, 1977); “Building the Panama Canal, 1903–14,” Office of the Historian, accessed January 2026, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1899-1913/panama-canal. In 1977, during Jimmy Carter’s presidency, the United States and Panama signed treaties to end U.S. control of the canal after 1999.

^[17] Holden and Zolov, 96–7.

^[18] Robert Longley, “Gunboat Diplomacy: Teddy Roosevelt’s ‘Big Stick’ Policy,” Thought Co., last modified April 16, 2022, https://www.thoughtco.com/gunboat-diplomacy-4774988; Sidney Milkis, “Theodore Roosevelt: Foreign Affairs,” Miller Center, University of Virginia, accessed February 2026, https://millercenter.org/president/roosevelt/foreign-affairs.

^[19] This period under President William H. Taft that was meant to move away from Roosevelt’s “Gunboat Diplomacy” was referred to as “Dollar Diplomacy.” Yet Taft still used U.S. military intervention to support his policies. Holden and Zolov, “Dollar Diplomacy and Social Darwinism,” 111–3, 111.

^[20] “U.S. Intervention in Nicaragua, 1911/1912,” U.S. Department of State Archives, accessed January 2026, https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/ip/108629.htm.

^[21] Holden and Zolov, “The Pact of the Embassy,” 101–3.

^[22] James M. Lindsay, “TWE Remembers: The Tampico Incident,” Council on Foreign Relations, April 9, 2013, https://www.cfr.org/articles/twe-remembers-tampico-incident.

^[23] General John J. “Black Jack” Pershing led an expeditionary force of 6,000 soldiers into Northern Mexico, failing to find Pancho Villa. The United States withdrew due to its entrance into World War I (Magdalena Mieri, “General Pershing’s Mexican Expedition to Capture Pancho Villa Predates His World War I Career,” National Museum of American History, March 9, 2016, https://americanhistory.si.edu/explore/stories/general-pershings-mexican-expedition-capture-pancho-villa-predates-his-world-war-i).

^[24] For a Latin American perspective on the United States as a neocolonial power, cited by Hugo Chavez and other leftist political leaders, see Eduardo Galeano, Open Viens of Latin America: Five Centuries of the Pillage of a Continent (Monthly Review Press, 1997). 

^[25] Holden and Zolov, “An Argentine Denunciation of Pan-Americanism,” 116–8, 117.

^[26] Matthew Willis, “A Private Coup; Guatemala, 1954,” JSTOR: Daily, December 29, 2024, https://daily.jstor.org/a-private-coup-guatemala-1954/; James Doubek, “The U.S. Set the Stage for a Coup in Chile. It Had Unintended Consequences at Home,” NPR, September 10, 2023, https://www.npr.org/2023/09/10/1193755188/chile-coup-50-years-pinochet-kissinger-human-rights-allende.  

^[27] NSS 2025, 15.

^[28] John Kerry, “Remarks on U.S. Policy in the Western Hemisphere,” U.S. Department of State Archives, accessed January 2026, https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/11/217680.htm; “The End of the Monroe Doctrine,” EBSCO Knowledge Advantage, 2022, https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/diplomacy-and-international-relations/end-monroe-doctrine.

^[29] “Good Neighbor Policy, 1933,” Office of the Historian, accessed January 2026, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1921-1936/good-neighbor.

^[30] NSS 2025, 16–7.

^[31] Ben Finley and Konstantin Toropin, “Death Toll from US Strikes on Alleged Drug Boats Reaches 126 People,” AP News, January 26, 2026, https://apnews.com/article/boat-strikes-military-death-toll-venezuela-20cef307b035c386f390df846b6056b7; Lazaro Gamio et al., “Tracking U.S. Military Killings in Boat Attacks,” New York Times, last modified Feb. 6, 2026, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2025/10/29/us/us-caribbean-pacific-boat-strikes.html.

^[32] Regina Carcia Cano et al., “US Plans to ‘Run’ Venezuela and Tap Its Oil Reserves, Trump Says, After Operation to Oust Maduro,” AP News, January 3, 2026, https://apnews.com/article/venezuela-us-explosions-caracas-ca712a67aaefc30b1831f5bf0b50665e; Yan Zhuang, “Trump Suggests U.S. Could Take Actions Against More Countries,” New York Times, January 4, 2026, https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/04/us/politics/trump-cuba-greenland-colombia.html; Herb Scribner, “Trump Hints at More Military Invasions. Here Are the Countries to Watch,” Axios, January 5, 2026, https://www.axios.com/2026/01/05/trump-mexico-greenland-colombia-venezuela-invade; Jesús Sérvulo González, “Trump Insists ‘Cartels Are Running Mexico’ and Announces Ground Operations: ‘We Are Going to Start Hitting Land,” El País, January 9, 2026, https://english.elpais.com/usa/2026-01-09/trump-insists-cartels-are-running-mexico-and-announces-ground-operations-we-are-going-to-start-hitting-land.html; and White House, “Designating Cartels and Other Organizations as Foreign Terrorists Organizations and Specially Designated Global Terrorists,” January 20, 2025, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/designating-cartels-and-other-organizations-as-foreign-terrorist-organizations-and-specially-designated-global-terrorists/.

^[33] NSS 2025, 16.

^[34] Samantha Waldenberg and Michael Rios, “Trump Reiterates Threat to Retake Panama Canal ‘or Something Very Powerful’ Will Happen,” CNN, February 2, 2025, https://www.cnn.com/2025/02/02/americas/panama-china-belt-and-road-initiative-rubio-visits-intl-latam.

^[35] NSS 2025, 17.

^[36] Danika Kirka and Stefanie Dazio, “Why Greenland Is Strategically Important to Arctic Security,” AP News, January 7, 2026, https://apnews.com/article/greenland-denmark-security-trump-arctic-north-6066195d0c6b9e1bbe6da27d55b26ece; Will Weissert et al., “Trump’s Greenland Threats Spark Outrage from EU and Test Longtime NATO Alliance,” AP News, January 20, 2026, https://apnews.com/article/denmark-greenland-trump-bessent-davos-ab05ebfaae6a413d1f8125cb9726a4c5; and Geir Moulson et al., “Denmark and Greenland Say Sovereignty Is Not Negotiable after Trump’s Reversal on Tariffs,” AP News, January 22, 2026, https://apnews.com/article/denmark-greenland-trump-arctic-security-nato-d74c0ffcf1db904a2a9c3b2c5c5b8d03.

^[37] Callum Sutherland, “Does Trump Still Plan to Annex Canada and Make It the 51st State? Here’s What to Know,” Time, June 29, 2025, https://time.com/7297490/trump-plan-to-annex-canada-51st-state-mark-carney/; Katherine Doyle et al., “Trump’s Latest Western Hemisphere Fixation: Canada,” NBC News, January 18, 2026, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/trumps-latest-western-hemisphere-fixation-canada-rcna254552.

^[38] NSS 2025, 17.

^[39] Diana Roy, “China’s Growing Influence in Latin America,” Council on Foreign Relations, last modified June 6, 2025, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-influence-latin-america-argentina-brazil-venezuela-security-energy-bri.

^[40] Roy.

^[41] The White House, “America 250: Presidential Message on the Anniversary of Our Victory in the Mexican-American War,” February 2, 2026, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2026/02/america-250-presidential-message-on-the-anniversary-of-our-victory-in-the-mexican-american-war/.

^[42] “Trump’s Message Celebrating 1847 Invasion of Mexico Draws Defiant Response from Sheinbaum,” Mexico News Daily, February 4, 2026, https://mexiconewsdaily.com/politics/trump-message-invasion-mexican-american-war-sheinbaum/.

^[43] The White House, “Protecting the American People Against Invasion,” January 20, 2025, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/protecting-the-american-people-against-invasion/; The White House, “Trump’s Historic Border Victory: From Open Borders to Total Control,” December 15, 2025, https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/2025/12/trumps-historic-border-victory-from-open-borders-to-total-control/; Brian Fung, “Trump Has Run Over 2,000 Facebook Ads Warning of ‘Invasion,’” CNN, August 6, 2019, https://www.cnn.com/2019/08/06/politics/trump-invasion-facebook-ads; and Joel Rose, “Historical Precedent: Courts Wrestle with White House’s ‘Invasion’ Claim,” NPR, May 16, 2025, https://www.npr.org/2025/05/16/nx-s1-5387536/historical-precedent-judges-invasion-claim.

^[44] The White House, “Designating Fentanyl as a Weapon of Mass Destruction,” December 15, 2025, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/12/designating-fentanyl-as-a-weapon-of-mass-destruction/; Alexander Ward, Lara Seligman, and Michael R. Gordon, “Secret U.S. Memo Authorizing Drug-Boat Strikes Cites Chemical Weapon Threat,” The Wall Street Journal, November 15, 2025, https://bit.ly/3ZS6HbG; and Brian Mann, “Will U.S. Military Strikes Slow Drug Overdose Deaths? Experts Say No,” NPR, December 11, 2025, https://www.npr.org/2025/12/11/nx-s1-5639205/drug-cartels-will-shrug-off-u-s-military-strikes-on-smuggling-boats.

^[45] “Remittances Dropped 4.6% in 2025, the Biggest Annual Decline in 16 Years,” Mexico Daily News, February 3, 2026, https://mexiconewsdaily.com/news/remittance-biggest-decline-in-16-years/.

^[46] David A. Gantz, “Mexico’s Economy Under US Tariffs and Trade Uncertainty,” Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy, August 13, 2025, https://doi.org/10.25613/6ZWW-XZ77.

^[47] Bo Erickson and David Shepardson, “Trump Says USMCA Is Irrelevant to US,” January 13, 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/trump-says-us-does-not-need-usmca-trade-deal-2026-01-13/; Gantz and Tony Payan, “Strategic Priorities for the 2026 USMCA Review,” Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy, December 2, 2025, https://doi.org/10.25613/9xk5-6g95.

^[48] Brenda Estefan, “Washington’s Sharpening Stance on Mexico,” Americas Quarterly, January 26, 2026, https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/washingtons-sharpening-stance-on-mexico/. 

^[49] Ben Finley et al., “A Timeline of U.S. Military Escalation Against Venezuela Leading to Maduro’s Capture,” PBS, January 3, 2026, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/a-timeline-of-u-s-military-escalation-against-venezuela-leading-to-maduros-capture.

^[50] Andrea Rodríguez, “Cuba says 32 Cuban officers were killed in US operation in Venezuela,” AP News, January 4, 2026, https://apnews.com/article/cuba-us-venezuela-maduro-e66899b41f0b84cf83f77a69d399b486; Emma Bubola, “Venezuelans Decry Civilian Causalities. Pentagon Says It’s Unaware of Any,” New York Times, January 8, 2026, https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/08/world/americas/venezuela-strikes-dead-cuba.html.

^[51] Kayla Epstein, “Trump Claims US oil firms Could Be ‘Up and Running’ in Venezuela Within 18 months,” BBC News, January 6, 2026, https://www.msn.com/en-us/money/markets/trump-claims-us-oil-firms-could-be-up-and-running-in-venezuela-within-18-months/ar-AA1TFmgZ; Regina Garcia Cano et al., “US Plans to ‘Run’ Venezuela and Tap Its Oil Reserves, Trump Says, After Operation to Oust Maduro,” AP News, January 3, 2026, https://apnews.com/article/maduro-venezuela-caracas-us-a3607a328dbecaa30edc69ae6cc238ee.

^[52] Bianna Golodryga, “Exclusive: Cuba Says It’s Ready to Talk to US, But Not About Regime Change, as Trump Ramps Up Pressure,” CNN, February 5, 2026, https://www.cnn.com/2026/02/04/americas/cuba-us-talks-trump-regime-change-latam-intl; Uriel Blanco et al., “From Clash to Dialogue: Petro Arrives in Washington for Key Encounter with Trump after Year of Tension,” CNN, February 2, 2026, https://www.cnn.com/2026/02/02/americas/colombia-petro-president-trump-meeting-latam-intl.

^[53] Bubola, “Milei’s Win in Argentina Was Rebuke of the Past, Aided by Trump,” New York Times, last modified October 30, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/10/27/world/americas/argentina-milei-election.html.

^[54] Mariel Ferragamo, “How Does Fentanyl Reach the United States?,” Council on Foreign Relations, last modified November 21, 2025, https://www.cfr.org/articles/how-does-fentanyl-reach-united-states.

^[55] “Mexican Expropriation of Foreign Oil, 1938,” Office of the Historian, accessed January 2026, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/mexican-oil.

^[56] Brian Winter, “Latin America’s Revolution of the Right: The Forces Reshaping the Region in the Age of Trump,” Foreign Affairs, December 16, 2025, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/south-america/revolution-right-brian-winter.

^[57] María Verza and Dánica Coto, “Mexican President Says Her Country Has Paused Oil Shipments to Cuba,” AP News, January 27, 2026, https://apnews.com/article/mexico-cuba-oil-shipments-trump-venezuela-fb5f082572ee12144908f45802448f67; “Sheinbaum Promises Continued Humanitarian Aid for Cuba — Just Not Oil,” Mexico News Daily, February 2, 2026, https://mexiconewsdaily.com/politics/sheinbaum-humanitarian-aid-trump-cuba-oil/.

^[58] Karina Suárez, “Mexico Completes Its Trade Shift with the Entry into Force of Tariffs on China and Countries Without Trade Agreements,” El País, January 1, 2026, https://english.elpais.com/economy-and-business/2026-01-01/mexico-completes-its-trade-shift-with-the-entry-into-force-of-tariffs-on-china-and-countries-without-trade-agreements.html; “Mexico Agrees to Make More Predictable Water Deliveries to the US,” AP News, February 3, 2026, https://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/mexico-agrees-make-predictable-water-deliveries-us-129836533.

^[59] “Mexico’s Week in Review: Sheinbaum’s Sovereignty Narrative Faces Its Toughest Test Yet,” Mexico News Daily, January 31, 2026, https://mexiconewsdaily.com/news/mexico-week-in-review-sheinbaum-sovereignty-narrative/.

^[60] Richard J. Kilroy Jr., “Crisis and Legitimacy: The Role of the Mexican Military in Politics and Society” (PhD diss., University of Virginia, 1990), https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA217151.pdf.

^[61] I served as an exchange officer to the Mexican army, attending their Escuela Superior de Guerra as an exchange student in the 1990s. They would routinely conduct classroom exercises involving an attack on Mexico by, what they referred to as, “el León del Norte,” which liked alluded to the United States (Abelardo Rodríguez Sumano and Kilroy Jr., “Avoiding Conflict?: United and Mexico Future Security and Defense Scenarios,” August 5, 2020, Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy, https://doi.org/10.25613/0ycd-da23).

^[62] Philip H. Gordon and Mara Karlin, “The Allies After America: In Search of Plan B,” Foreign Affairs, December 16, 2025, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/allies-after-america-gordon-karlin.

^[63] “Davos 2026: Special Address by Mark Carney, Prime Minister of Canada,” World Economic Forum, January 20, 2026, https://www.weforum.org/stories/2026/01/davos-2026-special-address-by-mark-carney-prime-minister-of-canada/.

^[64] “Haiti: Violence and Displacement Driving Humanitarian Crisis as Funding Needs Go Unmet,” United Nations News, July 23, 2025, https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/07/1165478. I served in US Southern Command from 1994–98, involved in planning for a migrant influx due to Haiti’s human rights violations and an eventual U.S. military intervention (“Human Rights Watch World Report 1995 – Haiti 1995,” January 1, 1995, https://www.refworld.org/reference/annualreport/hrw/1995/en/92815).

^[65] Kimberly Dozier, “CIA punished 16 in 2001 Peru plane shootdown,” NBC News, November 1, 2010, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna39958738.

^[66] Finley and Toropin; Gamio et al.

^[67] John M. Owen IV, The Ecology of Nations: American Democracy in a Fragile World (Yale University Press, 2023).

^[68] Owen, 142–72.

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