Syrian Refugees in Türkiye: Prospects for Return or Integration?

Overview

Despite the fall of Bashar Assad’s regime, ongoing instability in Syria suggests that many refugees may remain in exile for at least the next few years. This issue brief explores the evolving situation in Syria, refugees’ return intentions, and the prospects for local integration of Syrian refugees in Türkiye, with a focus on social cohesion. Research conducted in mid-2024 among Syrian refugees and Turkish host communities suggests that a path forward — whether returning to Syria or remaining in Türkiye — presents significant challenges.

Syrian Refugees in Türkiye

Syrians began seeking refuge in Türkiye following the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011, largely settling in communities near the border. The Turkish government initially established well-equipped camps to house the refugees, providing high-quality accommodations and services. However, the number of arrivals soon outpaced the capacity of the camps, and today, less than 70,000 Syrians live in these camps. Of the 3.2 million registered refugees, about half now live in cities outside the border region.

The Turkish government has provided Syrians with access to education and health care, although language barriers, cultural differences, and lack of information can limit full access. In 2024, UNICEF reported that while almost a million Syrian refugee children were attending Turkish schools, some 400,000 remained out of school. While Syrians are not recognized as full refugees, most have temporary protected status. As of August 2024, over 3.1 million Syrians hold temporary protected status in Türkiye, with approximately a million additional unregistered refugees. Close to 250,000 Syrians have acquired Turkish citizenship.

In addition to hosting millions of Syrian refugees, Türkiye is also coping with the aftermath of a natural disaster. On Feb. 6, 2023, a 7.8 magnitude earthquake struck southeastern Türkiye near the Syrian border, causing significant loss of life and widespread destruction. Many communities in the region, which have hosted refugees over the past decade, were directly impacted by the disaster.

This brief explores the situation of Syrian refugees in Türkiye, focusing on their impact on social cohesion. It draws from an earthquake-related study, a survey of Turkish citizens, and an analysis of recent events.

To Return or Not Post-Assad?

The long years of conflict in Syria displaced well over half of the country’s population. Today, some 6 million refugees, mostly in neighboring countries, and 7.5 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) within Syria are considering returning to their communities. The countries hosting refugees are also evaluating their return. Following the fall of the Bashar Assad regime in Syria on Dec. 8, 2024, European governments quickly announced a pause in processing Syrian asylum-seekers and called for the large-scale return of Syrians to Syria.

However, the internal situation in Syria remains unsettled, and it is unclear what type of government will emerge or how minority rights will be protected. In March, for example, violence against Alawite communities led to new refugee movements of some 7,600 Syrians to Lebanon. Another major concern is the extensive reconstruction effort needed due to widespread destruction of infrastructure and housing. Syria’s GDP has shrunk to half of its prewar levels, 80% of the country’s energy capacity has been lost, and 40–50% of Syrian children are not in school. Nearly a million homes have been either damaged or completely destroyed.

Current conditions in Syria are not conducive to large-scale refugee returns and are unlikely to be for some time. Guidance from UNHCR, the U.N. refugee agency, recommends that states “grant civilians fleeing Syria access to their territories, uphold the right to seek asylum, and ensure full respect for the principle of non-refoulement.” In other words, UNHCR encourages governments to refrain from initiating large-scale return programs at this time. Nonetheless, Syrian refugees have indicated plans to return when conditions stabilize.

A flash UNHCR intentions survey in February found that 80% of Syrians living in Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan and Egypt intended to return to Syria someday, up from 57% in April 2024. Of those, 27% said they planned to return within a year. Most refugees surveyed indicated they would like to evaluate conditions back home before making the decision to return permanently. Some refugee-hosting governments, such as Türkiye and Germany, have implemented regulations allowing Syrians to visit Syria temporarily without losing their protected status. In contrast, other countries, such as Jordan, have stated that Syrians who leave for Syria cannot return to Jordan.

Premature large-scale returns could pose challenges for the still-fragile government of President Ahmed Al-Sharaa. Returning refugees would require access to schools, electricity, and clean water — all of which remain in short supply in present-day Syria. Restoring livelihoods in agriculture and industry is crucial, but land mines must first be cleared to make fields and other land usable. Since Assad’s fall, at least 140 people — including more than 20 children — have been killed by landmines and unexploded ordinance, many of them returnees seeking to reclaim their land.

Despite the obstacles, some refugees are returning. According to UNHCR figures:

• Nearly 300,000 Syrian refugees had returned by late February from neighboring countries (Türkiye, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, and Iraq), as had more than 800,000 IDPs.
• An estimated 1.5 million refugees and 2 million IDPs are projected to return to their communities in 2025.

The Bonn International Center for Conflict Studies (BICC) recently issued several recommendations regarding returns, including:

• Provisions to allow refugees to travel to Syria to prepare their return.
• Targeted support for those who need to return soon.
• Transitional measures to support returns.
• Engagement with diaspora communities to facilitate and promote safe returns.

Funding Gaps Hamper Aid and Reconstruction Efforts

The pace of returns will be influenced by the rate of large-scale reconstruction, which depends on the international community’s willingness to raise the $250–$400 billion in estimated rebuilding costs. In 2024, 65.5% of funding for urgent humanitarian needs in Syria went unmet, and subsequent cuts in U.S. foreign aid have added to the existing challenges.

In 2023, Türkiye received $190 million in assistance from the U.S., primarily for earthquake relief. Of this, $78.9 million was channeled through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and $97 million through the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM). Partial data suggests the U.S. aid fell to $23.5 million in 2024, with projections indicating a further decline in 2025 following President Donald Trump’s suspension of foreign aid. Many Turkish nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and U.N. agencies have had to scale back or halt operations in the country due to the suspension of U.S. aid, although it remains unclear whether any have been able to obtain waivers for provision of life-saving activities.

Long-Term Challenges Facing Refugee Hosts

Even if UNHCR’s return projections prove accurate, around 4 million refugees are likely to remain in host countries, either awaiting the possibility of return or seeking long-term integration. After Türkiye, the main host countries for Syrians are Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, and Egypt. While conditions vary, all host governments are concerned about the economic, political, and social costs of incorporating millions of refugees. These governments face two key refugee-related issues: local integration and social cohesion.

Role of Local Integration

Local integration of refugees involves granting legal rights, economic opportunities, and social inclusion in host countries. When studying local or refugee integration, researchers often focus on how individual refugees or immigrants adapt to or become part of the host society. Some also view integration as a two-way process, examining the attitudes of host community members toward refugees.

As many governments in the Global North close their borders to asylum seekers and the number of refugees living in protracted displacement continues to rise, local integration is receiving more attention as a long-term solution. Traditionally considered one of three solutions for refugees — alongside voluntary repatriation and resettlement in third countries — local or refugee integration allows refugees to remain in their host country, typically a neighboring nation, with access to basic human rights and, in the best cases, a path to citizenship.

Governments of host countries with large numbers of refugees have often been reluctant to acknowledge refugees as permanent residents, insisting on their eventual return, even when the refugees have been in the country for a decade. Many also reject the concept of local integration.

Considering Social Cohesion

Social cohesion is a broad concept used by researchers and incorporated into many development and humanitarian programs. The term is generally understood to encompass feelings of trust, belonging, and harmony among diverse groups within a society. Social cohesion focuses on the broader societal dynamics that shape inclusion — both interpersonal and institutional relationships — using tools like the Bogardus Social Distance scale to assess intergroup dynamics.

With Türkiye hosting 4 million Syrians, social cohesion has become a major concern for the Turkish government. Broadly defined, it refers to the relationships between refugees and host communities. As the Syrian civil war persisted and the prospects for an early refugee return diminished, the issue has become even more significant.

Since the arrival of Syrian refugees in 2011, the Turkish government has viewed their presence as temporary, expecting most to return home within a few months. Even as the war continued and the refugees largely remained, the expectation that their stay would not be permanent persisted. Initially, the host population expressed sympathy and welcomed the Syrians, as often happens with refugee movements. Over time, this welcome began to fray, as it has in other host countries such as Jordan and, particularly, Lebanon.

Since 2018, the government has adopted a policy of harmonization, encouraging Syrians to adapt to their new environment and foster positive relationships with their Turkish neighbors. However, challenges remain. Two examples illustrate the difficulties Syrian refugees continue to face:

• Although Syrians can apply for work permits, the process is cumbersome, leading most to work in the informal sector.
• While Syrians theoretically have a path to citizenship — and 86% of Syrians interviewed in 2024 indicated that that they would like to obtain Turkish citizenship — the issue remains highly politicized and bureaucratically complex. In 2016, President Erdogan’s announcement that Syrian refugees could be given citizenship provoked a popular backlash and the government scaled back its plans.  The issue of Syrian refugee citizens voting in the 2023 elections similarly aroused popuar opposition.

Despite tighter restrictions on Syrian asylum seekers at the Syrian-Turkish border since 2015 the refugee population has continued to grow, with an estimated 950,000 births to Syrian parents in Türkiye.

Turkish Attitudes Toward Syrian Refugees

The Syrians Barometer

Although most acknowledge that many Syrian refugees will remain in Türkiye, public sentiment toward them has become increasingly negative. The Syrians Barometer, conducted by Murat Erdogan with the support of UNHCR, has surveyed both Syrian refugees and Turkish civil society annually since 2017. The survey results reveal a paradox: While Syrians increasingly feel integrated into Turkish society, Turkish attitudes toward their presence have become more critical over time. Findings from the Syrians Barometer 2022, based on Turkish respondents, indicate:

• Syrians should be sent or return to their country — 88.5% of respondents.
• At least half of Syrian will remain in Türkiye — almost 90 of respondents.

While Turkish views seemed to soften in 2020, perhaps as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, negative perceptions returned by 2022. While in earlier years Turkish citizens characterized Syrians as people “fleeing war and persecution,” by 2022 the dominant narrative on Syrian refugees was unfavorable:

• They are a burden for us — 50%.
• They are not culturally similar to us — more than 90%.
• They are people who will cause lots of problems for us — 38%.

As in prior years, the Syrians Barometer study found that Turkish respondents’ biggest concern was citizenship, with 84% expressing fears that if the refugees became citizens and gained easier access to the formal labor market, the economic consequences would be harmful. In 2014, when there were fewer than 2 million Syrians in Türkiye, 41% believed they should all return — a percentage that rose to 88.5% by 2022. Additionally, only 24.7% of respondents felt that Syrians should have access to education at all levels.

Earthquake and Economic Impacts

In recent times, difficult economic conditions in Türkiye have contributed to growing tensions surrounding the presence of Syrians, characterized by:

• Inflation reaching 48.6% for the year ending October 2024.
• Declining purchasing power and GDP.
• Turkish lira losing 80% of its value over the past five years.

In February 2023, two major earthquakes affected approximately 11 million people in Türkiye and war-torn northeastern Syria, including 2 million Syrian refugees. The damage was extensive, with 53,000 deaths in Türkiye and 5,500 in Syria, and 800,000 structures destroyed. Reconstruction is expected to take years. The earthquakes strained social cohesion, as some Turks perceived that Syrians were prioritized in aid distribution, leading to tensions and extrajudicial violence.

Turkish political leaders have increasingly focused on immigration as a key issue. Opposition parties have advocated for the return of refugees, framing it as part of their vote-seeking strategies. In the lead-up to the May 2023 presidential elections, opposition parties campaigned heavily on the promise of deportations, while the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) government promoted voluntary returns as a means to ease tensions in Turkish society.

Return Intentions

Growing public discontent in Turkey toward the presence of Syrian refugees, coupled with worsening economic conditions and political rhetoric, appear to be influencing some Syrian refugees’ decisions to consider return. A 2024 UNHCR study of public opinion on refugees across 52 countries found that Türkiye had the highest level of anti-refugee sentiment. However, push factors are only one element shaping refugees’ attitudes toward return. A recent study analyzing return intentions among Syrian refugees in Jordan and Lebanon found that the primary drivers of return are conditions in the refugee’s home country, such as security, economic prospects, access to public services, and social networks. In contrast, the study indicated that factors in the host country have a limited impact on refugees’ intentions to return.

UNHCR’s February 2025 flash survey on Syrian refugee intentions across four countries found housing availability was the primary factor preventing return to Syria, followed by concerns about safety, economic challenges, and the availability of services. There were notable differences between countries. The highest return intentions were recorded in Lebanon (65%), while only 25% of Syrian refugees in Iraq expressed an intention to return. This difference may reflect the fact that many Syrian refugees in Iraq come from northeastern Syria, where insecurity remains high.

These findings suggest that while hostility from the Turkish community is increasing, it is not the primary push factor influencing Syrian refugees’ return intentions. Instead, conditions in Syria will largely determine if and when they choose to return. Significant improvements in both security and economic conditions within Syria would be required for the majority of Syrians to consider returning as safe and desirable.

While Türkiye and the Gulf states are playing important diplomatic roles in supporting the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in Syria, largely due to security concerns, it remains unclear whether the Gulf states will provide the substantial funding needed for reconstruction and recovery, or if U.S. sanctions on Syria will be lifted. The sanctions presently penalize entities doing business in Syrian government-controlled areas, which may hinder infrastructure reconstruction efforts. While fearing that a Syrian regime collapse could destabilize the region, the Gulf nations and Türkiye have yet to commit significant funds to support large-scale refugee returns.

Conclusion

Despite the fall of the Assad regime, most refugees are likely to remain in their host countries until living conditions in Syria improve through reconstruction. This situation may lead to increased tension with local communities and put additional pressure on host governments, especially in light of global funding cuts for refugee assistance. In this context, efforts to promote social cohesion are more important than ever.

In Türkiye, as elsewhere, the prevailing narrative that refugees are a burden and contribute to crime needs to be reconsidered. Five years ago, the Turkish government reported that there were 9,000 Syrian-owned businesses in Türkiye, along with 6,000 joint Syrian-Turkish enterprises, which provided employment opportunities for both Syrians and Turks.

Surveys show that Syrian refugees generally seek amicable relationships with their neighbors and that many already feel at home in Türkiye. Some programs aim to foster social cohesion by promoting greater interaction between Syrians and Turks, but research suggests that the quality of these interaction matters more than mere exposure. Negative or superficial contact can heighten tensions, particularly amid economic competition, while meaningful exchanges through education and women’s groups may enhance social cohesion.

Nearly 14 million Syrians remain displaced, needing not only humanitarian aid but also the opportunity to return home and contribute to rebuilding their country. They are vital to Syria’s future, yet their fate depends on whether the international community — after 14 years of support — will commit to lasting solutions. Until then, Syrian refugees will likely remain in their host countries, awaiting the opportunity to return or integrate.

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