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Center for Energy Studies | Journal

A Pricing Mechanism to Jointly Mitigate Market Power and Environmental Externalities

May 23, 2023 | Juan Rosellón
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Juan Rosellón

Nonresident Fellow
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    Juan Rosellón, "A Pricing Mechanism to Jointly Mitigate Market Power and Environmental Externalities in Electricity Markets" (Houston: Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy, May 23, 2023), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2023.106646.

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By Lamia Varawala, Mohammad Reza Hesamzadeh, György Dán, Derek Bunn and Juan Rosellón

Abstract

The electricity industry has been one of the first to face technological changes motivated by sustainability concerns. Whilst efficiency aspects of market design have tended to focus upon market power concerns, the new policy challenges emphasise sustainability. We argue that market designs need to develop remedies for market conduct integrated with regard to environmental externalities. Accordingly, we develop an incentive-based market clearing mechanism using a power network representation with a distinctive feature of incomplete information regarding generation costs. The shortcomings of price caps to mitigate market power, in this context, are overcome with the proposed mechanism.

 

Access the full report in Energy Economics or download the PDF in the left-hand sidebar.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2023.106646
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