Emiliano Polo Anaya, “Mexico’s New Approach to Organized Crime Reveals Growing Contradictions,” Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy, March 11, 2026, https://doi.org/10.25613/DQ6X-DH06.
The National Regeneration Movement (MORENA) Party’s repeated adoption of the “hugs, not bullets” approach to organized crime went beyond rhetoric. During President Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s six-year administration (2018–24), this policy had measurable effects, enabling criminal organizations to expand their influence. This approach led to weakened police, judicial, and prosecutorial capacity, leaving critical gaps in Mexico’s public security institutions.
The Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) expanded rapidly over the past decade, driven not only by its extreme violence and diversification into multiple illicit markets, but also by the federal government’s lack of sustained, direct efforts to dismantle or structurally weaken it.
Reduced security budgets and the limited investment in civilian law enforcement and justice institutions intensified the problem. As a result, the armed forces increasingly took on responsibilities typically handled by police, prosecutors, and courts — filling gaps left by weakened public security institutions.
The Mexican army’s killing of the CJNG leader on Feb. 22 revealed internal contradictions within MORENA — the country’s ruling party — and highlighted a broader confusion. The Mexican government now faces increasing pressure from the United States to adopt a more confrontational approach against cartels, but that pressure conflicts with MORENA’s core ideological commitments and previous policies. For years, the party’s decision not to directly confront criminal organizations also limited the development of strong public security institutions that would be required for effective alternative strategies.
Today, as the government moves to more forcefully address cartel actions to satisfy U.S. demands, it lacks the civilian police capacity, prosecutors, judges, and prison infrastructure needed to manage the expected wave of violence that often follows a direct challenge to entrenched cartels strengthened by years of near-total impunity.
The federal government is walking a delicate line. While it seeks to respond to external demands, it also aims to uphold MORENA’s ideological base. The recent security operation involving the death of cartel leader Nemesio Oseguera or “El Mencho” was tactically successful, but it remains unclear how deeply the cartel’s command structure and financial networks have been disrupted. Dismantling operational, logistical, and financial capabilities will be far more complex and would require commitments that can only be met through strong institutions and a genuine belief that impunity toward organized crime no longer benefits either the party or the country.
Effectively confronting cartels requires credible institutions and coordinated policies to contain retaliatory violence against security forces and public officials. After years of underinvestment and ideological approaches to organized crime, it remains unclear whether the Mexican government is both willing and able to sustain such an effort.
Since the Mexican government’s strategy shift appears to be driven by external pressure rather than a strong commitment to the rule of law and institutional reform, it may produce contradictory policies. The new approach is being implemented within a state apparatus that remains underfunded, unprepared, and structurally misaligned with a long-term strategy.
Criminal organizations are likely aware of these contradictions within the government and its ruling party and may seek to exploit the resulting confusion and hesitation. Whether these efforts yield lasting improvements in security will depend on sustained institutional investment, coherent policy implementation, and political commitment beyond immediate pressures.
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