What Comes Next for Gaza and Trump’s Board of Peace

The decisions made by Trump, as chairman of the board, and by the Board of Peace in the coming weeks will shape Gaza’s trajectory for years.

Trump Advances Gaza Peace Plan

In mid-January 2026, the Trump administration advanced its peace plan for Gaza from phrase one to phase two — “from ceasefire to demilitarization, technocratic governance, and reconstruction.” In a White House press statement issued on Jan. 16, President Donald Trump outlined the structure of these next steps:

• A National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG) will consist of 15 Palestinian technocrats tasked with leading the “restoration of core public services, the rebuilding of civil institutions, and the stabilization of daily life in Gaza, while laying the foundation for long-term, self-sustaining governance.”
   
• A “founding Executive Board,” operating under the Board of Peace to advance President Trump’s peace plan, will include Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Special Envoy Steve Witkoff, former Senior Advisor to the President Jared Kushner, former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, former U.N. diplomat Nickolay Mladenov, businessman Marc Rowan, World Bank President Ajay Banga, and Assistant to the President for Policy Robert Gabriel. Each board member is slated to oversee “a defined portfolio critical to Gaza’s stabilization and long-term success, including, but not limited to, governance capacity-building, regional relations, reconstruction, investment attraction, large-scale funding, and capital mobilization.”
   
• A “Gaza Executive Board” will support effective governance and the delivery of services to the people of Gaza. It includes many members of the founding executive board, as well as Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Hakan Fidan, Qatari Strategic Affairs Minister Ali Al-Thawadi, Egyptian Director of General Intelligence Hassan Rashad, United Arab Emirates Minister for International Cooperation Reem Al-Hashimy, Israeli-Cypriot businessman Yakir Gabay, and U.N. Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process Sigrid Kaag.
   
• Nickolay Mladenov, former U.N. special coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, U.N. envoy to the U.N. Assistance Mission to Iraq, and former Bulgarian minister of foreign affairs and defense, will serve as high representative for Gaza.
   
• Major General Jasper Jeffers will serve as commander of the International Stabilization Force (ISF), overseeing security operations, comprehensive demilitarization, and the delivery of relief and recovery assistance.
   

Finally, in a ceremony in Davos, Switzerland, on Jan. 22, Trump ratified the overarching Board of Peace as “an official international organization.” With the announcement, dozens of states agreed to join the board, including Argentina, Egypt, Hungary, Indonesia, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), among others. Major European and Asian actors, including France, the U.K., and Japan, have declined membership or remained uncommitted, in part due to concerns that the board is intended to replace the U.N. Notably, the charter for the Board of Peace does not directly mention Gaza, implying a broader mandate. 

The decisions made by Trump, as chairman of the board, and by the Board of Peace in the coming weeks will shape Gaza’s trajectory for years. But, as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu noted after the initial announcement, the moves to date are mostly “declarative” — an important step, but one not yet shaping realities on the ground.

As this process moves forward, many of the persistent dilemmas that mediators have anticipated since the war’s outset are coming to a head. Building on previous briefs, this analysis examines the Trump administration’s 20-point plan as it advances from phase one to phase two, as well as the broader debates and challenges around stabilization and security, governance, recovery and reconstruction, and long-term political horizons — all factors that will determine the effort’s ultimate success.

Trump’s 20-Point Plan for Gaza

The White House’s Jan. 16 statement on the Board of Peace and related committees noted: “This milestone perfectly aligns with United Nations Security Council Resolution 2803 (2025), which endorsed President Trump’s Comprehensive Plan and welcomed the establishment of the Board of Peace.” Since its initial announcement, Trump’s “Comprehensive Plan” has evolved rapidly — from press statements, implemented ceasefire and hostage exchange, a U.N.-endorsed vision, to this new emerging architecture for the Board of Peace.

On Sept. 29, 2025, in a press conference at the White House alongside Netanyahu, Trump announced a “20-point Gaza peace plan” to end the war in Gaza. The plan called for a ceasefire and release of all Israeli hostages held by Hamas within 72 hours of agreement by Hamas and Israel. This stage would be paired with a withdrawal of Israeli forces to pre-agreed lines and full humanitarian access for the people of Gaza. Trump’s 20-point plan also defined objectives for the stages to follow: 

• Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) process.
• ISF to maintain security.
• Temporary technocratic Palestinian governing body to operate under international oversight.
• U.S.-led Board of Peace to oversee the process.
• Conditional path toward Palestinian self-determination.

A week later, on Oct. 8, Israel and Hamas agreed to and implemented the first phase of the proposal to international relief and acclaim. The devastating two-year war seemed to be approaching an end point.

On Oct. 13, in the first days of the ceasefire, Trump and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi cochaired a historically noteworthy summit in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, bringing together more than 20 heads of state and world leaders, including Turkey, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Germany, France, U.K., Canada, the Palestinian Authority (PA), U.N., the EU, and many others.

Beyond celebrating the agreement, the event signaled the certain necessity of active, sustained regional and international participation in achieving a successful transition in Gaza. The weeks that followed highlighted not only the tenuousness of the agreement but also the persistence of the difficult “day after” questions, which have appeared since the war’s beginning.

On Nov. 17, the U.N. Security Council voted to adopt President Trump’s 20-point plan as the model for Gaza’s postwar transition — an important step in legitimizing the key pillars of the plan into international law, such as the creation of the ISF as well as temporary governing and oversight bodies. The weeks that followed the plan’s adoption, however, were replete with questions about to how such pillars will come into being: 

• Which countries will contribute forces to the ISF in Gaza and under what conditions?
• What are realistic steps and timelines for Gaza’s demilitarization?
• Who are the Palestinian technocrats who will administer the territory, and what relationship can or should they have to a future, reformed PA?
• How will Gaza’s reconstruction move forward on the ground, and who or what will fund the tens of billions of dollars needed for reconstruction?

President Trump’s 20-point plan— now given the weight of the U.N. Security Council and support of the world leaders who joined the Board of Peace in January — built on earlier, unfulfilled proposals and agreements, including the January 2025 ceasefire and the Biden administration’s May 2024 proposal. It offers some surprising new positions, including independent aid delivery; significant ambitions in developing new governing and security structures; and equally significant gaps and ambiguities, particularly regarding demilitarization, transitional governance and security, and paths to Palestinian statehood.

The January 2026 announcements are a step forward in clarifying some of these ambiguities, but most remain. The design and day-to-day operation around transitional and legitimate governance, the role and/or dismantling of Hamas, the establishment of stability by third parties, the procurement of resources or recovery and reconstruction, and the political dynamics that surround the conflict remain largely unresolved. Understanding what Trump’s 20-point plan and U.N. say — and do not say — will be critical for the nascent international coalition working to advance the plan.

Points 1–8: Immediate Steps

The first eight points of Trump’s 20-point plan define phase one’s steps and principles, which are meant to pause the war, offer relief, and set the stage for the phases to follow.

To begin, the first two points state that Gaza will become a de-radicalized, “terror-free” zone, and that Gaza’s redevelopment will serve the interests of its population, who have endured persistent hardship. The plan’s third point set the conditions for the Oct. 8 ceasefire: Once both sides accepted the plan, military operations would be frozen, Israeli forces would withdraw to what became called the “Yellow Line” — which separates the Israeli-held areas of Gaza from the remainder of the territory — and hostages would be released. Point 4 prescribed that within 72 hours of Israel’s public acceptance of the deal, Hamas would return all hostages, both alive and deceased. Point 5 linked the hostages’ release to a prisoner exchange, in which Israel would release 250 life-sentence prisoners and 1,700 Palestinians from Gaza detained by Israel since the war began. In the days that followed the agreement, despite a number of frictions, these steps were fulfilled.

The next three points relate to critical issues post-ceasefire. Point 6 offers amnesty to members of Hamas and other armed groups who commit to peaceful coexistence and disarmament, and it also offers safe passage for those wishing to exit Gaza. While offering off-ramps to militants is an ambitious proposition, implementing such a program in this context will be very difficult. Points 7 and 8 speak to the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, stating that once the plan is accepted, “full aid” will be delivered immediately into Gaza, including infrastructure repair — water, electricity, and sewage — hospitals, bakeries, debris clearance, and road openings. However, the term “full aid” is ambiguous. Point 7 notes that this aid will be “consistent” with the resources included in the January 2025 humanitarian agreement, yet beyond those remarks, no further details are offered. Given the sustained challenges in delivering aid in Gaza and the history of Israeli intransigence around the issue, this point will require far stronger clarity and operational commitment if it is to retain credibility and achieve its aims.

Relatedly, point 8 defined the independent bodies, as U.N. agencies, Red Crescent, and international institutions, which would be approved for aid entry and distribution. It also mandated that the Rafah crossing operate in both directions under the mechanism used in January 2025. For the Trump administration to delegate these roles to independent actors rather than the now-closed Gaza Humanitarian Foundation was considered a step forward, boosting the legitimacy of the plan’s humanitarian dimensions.

Points 9–14: Governance and Reconstruction

The next five points outline the Trump administration’s vision for the difficult governance and reconstruction questions surrounding Gaza in phase two and beyond.

The ninth clause stipulates that Gaza will be governed temporarily by a technocratic, apolitical Palestinian committee, with no defined timeline for its implementation. This committee will be composed of qualified Palestinians and international experts with oversight from a new Board of Peace chaired by President Trump, assisted by heads of state and other members. This committee will deliver public services, rebuild municipalities, administer funds, and lead until the PA has implemented a reform program and is in a position to take over governance of Gaza. As the committee’s formation and tasks further develop, the tension between technocratic governance and the deeply political nature of post-conflict reconstruction and state formation is clearly on the horizon.

The tenth point introduces a “Trump economic development plan” to rebuild Gaza, by assembling a panel of experts who have developed “modern miracle cities in the Middle East,” with the aim of attracting investment, creating jobs, and generating hope. While certainly crucial, the questions of incentives and assurances to investors and builders as well as the ability to meet urgent human needs during the transition to “miracle cities” are among the many undefined elements related to this point. Relatedly, point 11 proposes a special economic zone in Gaza with favorable tariffs and access rates negotiated with participating countries. Who will negotiate these regimes, how they will be determined, and what roles and protections that workers and citizens in Gaza will have are yet to be determined.

Clause 12 states clearly that no one will be forced to leave Gaza, and those who wish to depart will have the freedom to do so and to return. Efforts will be made to encourage people to stay and build a better Gaza. This point served to relieve many who were concerned that Trump or the Israeli leadership might follow through on previous remarks around removal or relocation of Palestinians in Gaza, temporarily or permanently. While Trump’s 20-point plan directly states that Palestinians in Gaza will not be removed, whether continuity of Palestinian lives and livelihoods — and stated support for freedom of movement — will prove viable depends on the practical success and progress around humanitarian aid flows, reconstruction, investment, and ultimately self-governance.

Points 13 to 15 are among the most politically complex. Clause 13 declares that Hamas and other factions will have no role — direct or indirect — in governance of Gaza; that all military infrastructure, including tunnels and weapons, shall be destroyed and not rebuilt; and that weapons will be permanently removed; and that the territory will commit to peaceful coexistence. This is the clause that moves the proposal beyond cessation of hostilities to Hamas’ disarmament and political exclusion — the crux of the challenge of Gaza’s political future. What options, if any, exist to incentivize Hamas to demilitarize and/or disband has been on the mind of analysts for years. Answers remain elusive.

Clause 14 requires regional partners to guarantee that Hamas and other factions comply and that the new Gaza will pose no threat to neighbors. Whether any regional actor has both the will and capacity to indefinitely enforce this, without undermining the goal of rebuilding trust and local legitimacy, is unclear and/or unlikely. How to thread the needle between locally led, legitimate Palestinian self-governance and permanent occupation-style oversight is the question.

Points 15–17: Security

The next three points speak to the critical stabilization and security components of the transition. Point 15 introduces the proposed ISF: a coalition of U.S., Arab, and international partners that would establish a body to maintain stability in Gaza and train vetted Palestinian police forces. The role of this force would include border security, goods flow, de-munition, and support for the exit of Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) from the Gaza Strip. While concrete, this clause also lacks several critical details: the size of the force, the contributing nations, the command structure, vetting mechanisms, exit criteria, and numerous other unaddressed questions.

Historically, temporary peacekeeping operations have proven hard to wind down — an issue on the mind of the diplomats and commanders negotiating next steps and considering contribution. A December U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) convening in Qatar brought together dozens of nations to discuss and define ways of contributing to the ISF — troops, law enforcement officers, logistical support, training of Palestinian police officers or funding — but, to date, clarity on roles and responsibilities has not emerged.

Clause 16 states that Israel will not annex Gaza or maintain occupation indefinitely. But while the ISF assumes control and the territory stabilizes, the IDF will withdraw in phases to agreed milestones and timeframes, eventually ending with only a security-perimeter presence until Gaza is deemed secure. The choreography of the handover process will be exceedingly difficult. If Palestinians and publics across the region and world perceive the ISF as a continuation of Israeli occupation under a different name, resentment may mount; violence may flare; and the roles of key contributing armed forces will be in doubt. Legitimate buy-in from Palestinians in Gaza — and a path to self-rule — will be critical.

Point 17 addresses a scenario in which Hamas delays or rejects the proposal. Should Hamas prove intransigent, the scaled-up aid and stabilization measures will proceed in “terror-free” areas transferred from IDF control to that of the ISF. This clause, in theory, is meant to offer Hamas a choice, whether to accept the plan or be bypassed, and it also encourages progress in areas under ISF control. In practice, the risk of parallel governing zones — some areas controlled by Hamas, some controlled by the ISF or IDF — is a real possibility and concern.

Points 18–20: Political Horizon

The final three points speak to the longer-term future of Palestinians and Israelis.

Point 18 proposes an “interfaith dialogue” aimed at shifting “mindsets and narratives” between Palestinians and Israelis, emphasizing tolerance and peaceful coexistence. This point is essential, but at the moment, difficult to operationalize. Religious, cultural, and civil-society engagement has value, but at present, the conflict primarily concerns intercommunal and political issues more than religious antipathy. The question remains: How will these two peoples address the seemingly inflexible security, land, governance, and political rights issues that divide them?

Clauses 19 and 20 gesture toward the “political horizon” question, though seeking to keep this sufficiently vague, likely to preserve the Israeli government’s amicability toward the effort. Point 19 states that once Gaza’s redevelopment advances and PA reforms are implemented, a path to self-determination may open. This point — if not included — would have made regional and international partnerships difficult or nearly intractable. However, the clause still lacks specificity and runs into the demanding realities of territorial fragmentation in the West Bank, Israeli resistance to a full Palestinian state, and the patchwork control arrangements that already exist. Finally, point 20 commits the U.S. to establish a formal dialogue between “Israel and the Palestinians” to settle a long-term political horizon for peaceful coexistence. Importantly though, in this clause, the PA is not named as the representative of the Palestinians.

Remaining Questions

In sum, the Trump administration’s 20-point plan achieved the goals of reaching a ceasefire, returning the hostages, and beginning the distribution of relief for civilians in Gaza, though full recovery remains far distant. It has also offered a broad policy architecture on which to build, the shape of which is now coming into view. 

However, to date, there are important questions around how to adequately address the following questions: 

• Transitional governance: Who will exactly govern, pay salaries, vet and manage police, address community issues, run courts, and other key day-to-day necessities? How they will be viewed by Palestinians?
• Security processes and end goals: How will roles, responsibilities, and milestones for the ISF be determined? Who will enforce the DDR parameters as well as oversee the training, vetting, and command of Palestinian security forces?
• Recovery and reconstruction: How will Gaza’s infrastructure and institutions be rebuilt, and who or what will fund this process?
• Political horizon: How will reforms, elections, negotiations toward two states with defined borders, and mutual recognition proceed and, if accomplished, be sustained?

This lack of clarity is understandable, as in negotiating a difficult ceasefire such as this, near-term progress necessarily took priority over difficult phase two and three issues, which could have disrupted phase one’s implementation. But as the Board of Peace and its subcommittees move forward, it will be necessary to rapidly and credibly build on the emerging architecture, before bad actors exploit openings or stasis sets in, creating an untenable frozen conflict liable to ignite again.

Gaza Faces Security, Governance, and Recovery Challenges

The remainder of the brief will address the four critical pillars that will pose challenges for the Board of Peace as it works toward solutions for Gaza: 

• Stabilization and security.
• Transitional governance.
• Recovery and reconstruction.
• Long-term political horizon.

Shortcomings on any of these four poles will certainly produce instability, and if they are left unaddressed, a collapse of the agreement could eventually transpire.

Stabilization and Security

One of the cruxes of Trump’s 20-point plan is the security and stabilization components. The plan calls for Hamas to demilitarize in exchange for Israeli withdrawal. Filling the vacuum left by Hamas and the IDF will be an ISF, which will take charge of Gaza’s day-to-day security, but also serve as a bridge toward Palestinian self-policing and self-government. Whether Hamas will agree to demilitarize, whether Israel will agree to cede Gaza to an international force meant to eventually hand control over to Palestinians, and whether global leaders will contribute forces all remain unclear, even after the Board of Peace announcements. Even so, without a detailed stabilization and security plan, the current temporary arrangements will likely harden into a permanent reality, in which Israel and Hamas each control parts of Gaza, friction deepens, and renewed fighting becomes inevitable.

Currently, the expectations for an ISF seem high, perhaps even too idealistic. An ISF is expected to provide area security, facilitate humanitarian operations, support disarmament and reintegration, coordinate border management, and help restore basic services in a densely populated, devastated urban environment. For an ISF to work effectively will require the consent of the governed, or it risks being perceived as a new form of occupation.

As quickly as possible, the ISF would need to maximize Palestinian participation while limiting the international footprint, building local credibility and capacity. This means assembling a force that is large enough to be credible, but structured in a way that reinforces Palestinian ownership. These collaborative efforts should include: affecting decisions on force composition, shaping the balance between civilian, police, and military elements, and determining the responsibilities that can or should be transitioned to Palestinian institutions as well as this transition’s pace. Without careful design, the mission could undermine the very legitimacy and ownership it seeks to cultivate. Even so, design may not be enough. Palestinians across the political spectrum and contributing nations will expect the ISF to be a path to a demilitarized Palestinian state, something Israelis are unlikely to accept easily. 

The ISF’s mandate will be important. Contributing nations will require a clear command structure; defined rules around the use of force; freedom of movement; authority and support around disarmament, border control, and humanitarian coordination; and an endgame. The force’s makeup will also be highly political and dependent on a workable mandate. Despite initial statements that countries, such as Indonesia, Azerbaijan, Pakistan, and Italy, signaled openness to participation in the ISF, most countries — both regional and further afield — are wary of entering Gaza if that means conflict with Hamas, Israeli oversight, and no timeline for withdrawal. Israel will continue to be a determinative voice in the establishment and day-to-day of the ISF, and to date, Netanyahu has not signaled intent to be highly accommodating.

Turkey, for example, would be a natural fit for a role: a NATO member holding relations with both Israel and Hamas. However, the Israeli government has rejected a role for Turkey in Gaza, and stated that Israel will decide which countries participate in the ISF. As such, the ISF member nations have yet to be defined and mobilized, and as a result, Gaza remains in limbo security-wise, with Hamas nominally in control of territory outside the “Yellow Line,” while Israel controls the surrounding territory.

Regional coordination will also play a decisive role. An ISF will necessarily work closely with Egypt, Jordan, and other partners, with active U.S. support and oversight, to manage ceasefire monitoring, crisis response, border arrangements, maritime management, and the interdiction of illicit finance and arms. All these tasks will hinge on standing mechanisms that provide confidence to all sides and reduce the risk of escalation. The Arab states involved have strong stakes in Gaza’s future, but also sensitivities about their roles, border arrangements, and political commitments. Building a durable regional architecture will require significant diplomacy and clarity of responsibilities.

Disarmament will be one of the most sensitive and potentially unstable parts of this process, perhaps the primary barrier between phases one and two. The Israeli government has set a high bar for Hamas’ disarmament; for example, in November they called for Hamas’ removal from the region altogether. To date Hamas has — at least in official rhetoric — generally refused to relinquish its weapons until Israel withdraws from all Palestinian territories. The Trump administration has expressed optimism that ongoing negotiations can create a solution in which Hamas disarms in exchange for amnesty, but these conversations are nascent and delicate. Currently, the form and function of incentives, guarantees, and vetting and monitoring systems to encourage and maintain compliance and reintegration remain unknown.

Across the board, the next forces running Gaza will be operating in a devastated environment. Civilian protection, trauma-informed policing, and restoration of essential services will be difficult to implement and sustain in areas destroyed by conflict. As described in greater detail below, much of the force’s success hinges on if its actions build legitimacy quickly, reconnect Gaza and the West Bank, and strengthen prospects for a durable political settlement.

Transitional Governance

Transitional governance is the counterpart to stabilization and security — the two tracks are parallel and mutually reinforcing. Neither can succeed without the other, and both should be supported by broader regional support, credible guarantees, and economic integration linking Gaza to the West Bank and the wider neighborhood. At the center of Trump’s 20-point plan, both literally and figuratively, is point 9’s articulation of the transitional government’s makeup: “Gaza will be governed under the temporary transitional governance of a technocratic, apolitical Palestinian committee, responsible for delivering the day-to-day running of public services and municipalities for the people in Gaza. This committee will be made up of qualified Palestinians and international experts, with oversight and supervision by a new international transitional body, the ‘Board of Peace,’ which will be headed and chaired by President Donald J. Trump, with other members and heads of state to be announced, including former Prime Minister Tony Blair.”

The Trump administration’s January announcements provided more detail on the structure of the Board of Peace and its affiliated bodies. The 15-member board of the NCAG includes Palestinian experts tasked with leading a number of portfolios: economy, agriculture, health, housing and lands, internal security, municipalities and water, finance, social affairs, education, telecommunications, and others. None of the officials are current PA officials, nor are they considered highly political, though many have previous experience with the PA and its governing political party, Fatah.

The NCAG’s highest-profile member and chair, Ali Shaath, formerly served as deputy minister of planning and international cooperation and as undersecretary at the PA’s Ministry of Transportation and Communications. Other committee members have held leadership roles in the private sector and civil society. Despite some protests from the Israeli government, the NCAG members have generally been approved by key stakeholders.

The outlines of a temporary governing authority (TGA), such as the NCAG, have been discussed and debated since near the war’s outset as a mechanism to bridge the gap between the current lack of recognized leadership and a longer-term independent, representative Palestinian government. The NCAG’s establishment is a notable step toward Palestinian-led governance and recovery for Gaza, but its mandate, capacity to rapidly deliver on the ground, timeline, and ultimate connection with the West Bank remain unclear.

A central challenge will be securing and maintaining public legitimacy. Gaza’s population has endured repeated cycles of governmental collapse and failed reconstruction, leaving confidence in Palestinian institutions low. How the NCAG will be empowered and embraced as visibly and credibly Palestinian-run, accountable, effective, and responsive to daily needs remains uncertain. Whether the Board of Peace and its accompanying committees — which lack Palestinian voices — will maintain credibility with the Palestinian public it governs is similarly undetermined.

In the NCAG’s first meeting, Shaath stated, “Our mission is to rebuild the Gaza Strip not just in infrastructure but also in spirit,” adding “We embrace peace, through which we strive to secure the path to true Palestinian rights and self-determination.” That mission — rebuilding Gaza physically, socially, economically, and politically — will require a delicate balance of meeting the needs of both the Palestinian people and the external actors poised to shape much of Gaza’s future. 

Thus far, the Board of Peace has not clarified its transitional government’s relationship with the PA. To date, the NCAG does not have a direct connection to the PA — a redline for Israel. However, should the NCAG and Board of Peace model prove effective, it seems likely that steps would eventually be taken to reunify Gaza and the West Bank under a single government, merging ministries, budgets, customs protocols, infrastructure, security frameworks, and more. Such reunification could also position Palestine within a broader regional political-security architecture, providing external guarantees for crossings and borders, reducing smuggling and illicit finance, and fostering practical cross-border cooperation on energy, transport, water, and digital connectivity. For now, the prospect of this process remains distant.

For reunification to be effective and sustainable, all parties would need to agree on it as the ultimate goal. Current official statements tend to emphasize terms, such as “self-determination” and “self-governance,” stopping short of “statehood,” which Israeli leadership rejects. While the process has moved forward without a clearly defined endgame, if it stalls or the people of Gaza perceive the NCAG and Board of Peace government as perpetuating occupation and division, the entire effort could unravel, and any gains achieved could be lost.

Forming a transitional government in Gaza as a step toward a permanent one will require strong coordination and unified positions among regional and international partners, sustained diplomatic alignment, and a clearly defined end goal. Negotiators face a markedly difficult task in addressing key questions: defining the NCAG’s mandate, structure, and timeline; establishing visible Palestinian ownership; synchronizing governance and security with the other stakeholders; rebuilding administrative unity; managing bad actors; and anchoring the transition within a broader regional framework. How these questions are resolved will determine whether transitional governance becomes a stabilizing bridge toward a political settlement or a fragile stop on the path to further devastation.

Recovery and Reconstruction

Gaza’s recovery and reconstruction will be central to its long-term stability and governance. Likewise, governance and security cannot take hold without visible improvements in daily life and a sense of hope for the future. The recovery and reconstruction process facing Gaza will require coherent strategies that integrate security, governance, financial stabilization, infrastructure planning, regional connectivity, and public confidence-building — a considerably complex task.

After two years of disaster, there was a broad sense after the ceasefire announcement that relief and early recovery should begin quickly, with steps such as free-flowing humanitarian aid, debris removal, electricity and water restoration, and the repair of basic services. These early gains would be able to help stabilize communities and demonstrate “peace dividends” to build confidence in the emerging transition. Since the ceasefire began, some of these steps have begun. However, the tasks ahead are enormous and major efforts at recovery and reconstruction cannot proceed without security and access. Humanitarian and engineering teams will be limited without reliable security and governance frameworks, which should define the operating environment.

Looking forward, as the first stages of transitional governance and security take root, the reconstruction pathway will move from urgent humanitarian access to medium-term institutional repair and then to long-term economic renewal. Short-term priorities include clearing rubble and unexploded ordnance, restoring utilities, and launching emergency livelihood programs that put money back into household economies.

The near-term challenges to reconstruction are considerable. Entire neighborhoods are uninhabitable; utilities are in collapse; and rubble removal will take years. Officials — whoever they may be, as the traditional municipal system is in disarray — will have to contend with missing or contested land records, unclear property rights, zoning complications, and a laundry list of other challenges in order to just get started.

Medium-term efforts will focus on rebuilding municipal institutions, repairing housing, schools, hospitals, and infrastructure, as well as ensuring transparent, standardized procurement. Palestinian leadership and ownership will be essential. The process is best served by a reconstruction process conducted, as much as possible, by Palestinian institutions, contractors, engineers, and civil society. Palestinian participation should be pursued with the goal of strengthening Palestinian economic and governance capacities, rather than entrenching parallel and outside structures. However, Gaza’s frozen financial system — lacking public revenues, salary payments, loan availability, procurement capacity, and so on — needs to be addressed rapidly for any kind of locally led, internationally supported economic renewal to begin.

Over the longer run, reconstruction will not be solely a technical task, but as part of a broader political and economic transformation that links Gaza and the West Bank under effective self-governance, as well as linking Palestine to regional political, economic, energy, water, transport, and digital networks. Achieving this will require cooperation among multiple states, alignment on regulatory frameworks, and sustained long-term investment, all of which will be difficult without clarity on Gaza’s political future.

Long-Term Political Horizon

As evidenced above, the political horizon question for Palestinians is the proverbial yet, at times, unaddressed issue, permeating every conversation about Gaza’s transition. Nearly all key actors agree that without a credible path toward Palestinian self-governance and eventual statehood, progress on stabilization, reconstruction, and transitional governance will not hold. A political horizon, an endgame, a finish line — whatever the terminology used — is necessary if the process is to gain traction and avoid becoming an indefinite interim arrangement. Without clear direction, transitional authorities will lack off-ramps; security arrangements will remain contested; reconstruction may stall; and ground-level frictions will continue to spark instability. Political horizon is, in a way, where the three issues above meet, and to date, a path toward Palestinian self-determination — “the two-state solution” — seems to remain the most common denominator, however distant that idea may seem.

This comes through in the final points of Trump’s 20-point plan, which situate Gaza within a broader trajectory tied to Palestinian institutional renewal and structured dialogue with Israel. How far will the U.S. and Israel be willing to proceed with coordinating and supporting Palestinian self-governance and statehood? Any explicit pathway to Palestinian statehood will face staunch resistance from Israel. Even if encouraged by the United States and key regional states, PA-Israel dialogue will need a formula acceptable to all sides, supported by incentives, guarantees, and verification measures that bridge divides without producing untenable political backlash — a tall order.

A second challenge is preventing the transitional period from becoming a substitute for political progress. While transitional governance cannot succeed in a political vacuum, it also cannot be a substitute for a forever-forthcoming political process. Well-designed interim arrangements can drift into permanence if political momentum fades. Thus, policymakers should define clear conditions for handover to the representative government and uphold commitments to a political track to avoid technocratic stagnation. Early steps such as establishing a transitional authority, restoring services, and reactivating institutions should unfold in parallel with political milestones that include renewed Palestinian leadership legitimacy through reforms and elections, structured dialogue between the PA and Israel, and regional guarantees that underpin demilitarization and responsible self-governance.

The political horizon also depends on reconnecting Gaza and the West Bank administratively, economically, and politically under a unified Palestinian apparatus capable of governing and negotiating cohesively. Regionally, a reconnected land would look toward operating within a wider umbrella of guarantees on borders, crossings, illicit finance, and long-term infrastructure connectivity in energy, water, transport, and digital networks. The objective is to generate an irreversible movement toward a negotiated settlement grounded in public legitimacy and measurable improvements.

A third challenge concerns administrative and territorial cohesion, as well as regional integration. As described above, a viable political horizon requires effective integration of Gaza and the West Bank across ministries, budgets, customs regimes, and governance structures. This will require careful sequencing, significant technical assistance, and political will among Palestinian actors and their regional partners. Especially given the current standalone nature of the NCAG, its future absorption by a Palestinian national government should be considered from the earliest days of the process.

Additionally, how a Palestinian state emerges in the regional order will be important. Some regional states will emphasize a clear path to statehood tied to normalization, while others will emphasize border security, stability, good governance, and/or other political or humanitarian issues. Aligning Palestinian institutional renewal with regional support and political posturing is another key challenge in sequencing and diplomacy, which can reinforce or fragment progress.

Altogether, success will require aligning Palestinian reforms, Israeli political dynamics, regional incentives, and international support around a single trajectory that strengthens and reconnects institutions across Gaza and the West Bank, stabilizes territory, and sets expectations around final status negotiations. It will also require forbearance. As the history of the region follows, bad actors will likely test any political process. Armed groups, political factions, or external actors may attempt to derail progress through violence, disinformation, or obstruction. This should be expected and can be mitigated or even avoided with planning and coordination put in place beforehand by the United States, Europe, and key regional states committed to the success of the process.

Trump’s Leadership and Regional Responses

At the time of publication, the processes around Gaza and the Board of Peace were moving rapidly. The vast array of political, institutional, security, and financial obstacles described in this brief were moving targets. The advance or collapse of all current efforts will depend on how these issues are specifically and fully addressed: 

• Willingness of primary actors such as Israel, Hamas, Egypt, and the PA to engage constructively.
• Credibility and functionality of the institutions created, including the NCAG, the Gaza Executive Board, the Board of Peace, and any stabilization force.
• Ability of the international system to deliver on humanitarian, economic, reconstruction, and political commitments.

Without these elements, the plan risks joining the many abandoned frameworks that have previously faltered in Gaza, between Israelis and Palestinians, and across other conflict zones.

What differentiates this moment, however, is the degree to which this process is tied to a single political figure. President Trump has placed himself at the center of the architecture: proposing the 20-point plan, chairing the Board of Peace indefinitely, pushing for a U.N. Security Council mandate, taking center stage in Davos to promote this vision, and implicitly linking the process to his personal legacy. His influence over key stakeholders, his ability to pressure or incentivize actors who might otherwise decline cooperating, and his appetite for a dramatic diplomatic achievement could create opportunities that previous administrations did not possess.

At the same time, the durability of the effort will hinge on whether Trump sustains focus, mobilizes the necessary coalitions, and remains committed to the difficult trade-offs the process will require. Trump’s self-image, desire for recognition, and capacity to co-opt or pressure actors may drive momentum in the early stages, but they could also introduce volatility if his attention shifts or if short-term political considerations outweigh long-term strategy.

In this sense, how far the process goes will rest not only on the complex dynamics inside Gaza and among regional actors, but also on the consistency and depth of engagement from the individual who has most closely tied his reputation to the outcome. At foreign ministries around the world, diplomats are debating the means of keeping the highly transactional president engaged and wielding his unique leverage toward the success of the plan. Phases two and three depend on Trump’s ability to move from the transactional to the transformational.

This publication was produced by Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy. Wherever feasible, the material was reviewed by outside experts prior to release. Any errors or omissions are solely the responsibility of the author(s). 

This material may be quoted or reproduced without prior permission, provided appropriate credit is given to the author(s) and Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy. The views expressed herein are those of the individual author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy.