Turkey’s Strategy in the Kurdish Peace Process

Overview

A recent brief outlined key demands of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party’s (PKK) declared ceasefire in March 2025, which marked a pivotal step toward resolving a decades-long conflict. This brief builds on that previous work by examining the Turkish government’s and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s strategic approach to the Kurdish peace initiative.

Background on Kurdish Political Minoritization

The 2025 Kurdish peace initiative represents a notable paradigm shift within the uneven trajectory of Turkish political evolution over the preceding decade. This development holds significant potential for addressing a fundamental sociopolitical challenge that has persistently destabilized Turkey’s national cohesion since its establishment as a nation-state in 1923: the status of its substantial Kurdish minority, which comprises 15% to 20% of the country’s population.

Historically, Turkey’s Kurdish minority population has faced longstanding challenges related to political, cultural, and social inclusion, along with periods of state-imposed restrictions. For example, the Turkish government has placed prohibitions on Kurds’ fundamental rights of cultural expression, including bans on Kurdish names and dress and restrictions on Kurdish language instruction. The current peace initiative offers an important opportunity to address institutional challenges and establish a framework for sustainable intercommunal reconciliation, with the potential to strengthen Turkey’s democratic institutions and regional position.

Turkish Government’s Approach to Peace Process

The Kurdish peace process also offers Erdoğan a multifaceted strategic advantage that merges governmental security priorities with political and regional ambitions. By addressing this historic challenge, he is likely aiming to strengthen his domestic political position while navigating Turkey’s complex governmental landscape and furthering the nation’s regional influence. Thus, the Kurdish peace initiative could serve both immediate domestic needs and Turkey’s international aims.

Erdoğan’s Strategic Approach

Domestically, the Turkish government and Erdoğan’s approach to the Kurdish peace process is motivated by two distinct factors: resolving a prolonged, domestic conflict and enacting political consolidation.

• Resolving a prolonged, domestic conflict: The PKK’s declared 2025 commitment to disarm and disband represents a pivotal moment in Turkey’s four-decade conflict that has claimed over 40,000 lives. This protracted struggle has exposed Kurdish grievances while diminishing Turkey’s political stability. For Erdoğan, resolving this conflict offers a crucial opportunity to secure domestic stability and cement his legacy. He has embraced this development, framing it as a “historic opportunity” to eliminate terrorism and rebuild national cohesion.
   
• Enacting political consolidation: Erdoğan is facing several challenges domestically, especially after experiencing his first major electoral defeat in the 2024 local elections. His involvement in the peace process appears to be a calculated effort to reshape and solidify his power across multiple dimensions. By initiating conversations with Kurdish representatives, including a pivotal meeting with the pro-Kurdish People’s Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party) in April 2025 — the first engagement of this nature in over 10 years — Erdoğan is likely working to secure the backing of Kurdish voters, who comprise a significant portion of the electorate.

In past elections, pro-Kurdish political parties have made significant strides, at times challenging the People’s Alliance’s control over Parliament. By launching peace initiatives and responding to Kurdish issues, Erdoğan is likely seeking to regain their support and thereby fortifying his electoral position in the next presidential elections.

Notably, Erdoğan is also facing a term limit. He is currently serving his second term, which is the limit set by the constitutional amendment enacted in 2018. However, two possible avenues could invigorate Erdoğan’s ambition for another term: amending the constitution or calling for early elections. Kurdish support would be pivotal to success in either scenario.

Erdoğan could opt for passing a constitutional amendment to extend the current presidential term limit. The amendment’s passage would require at least 360 votes in Parliament and a subsequent national referendum. However, the People’s Alliance — a coalition established between the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) in 2018 — currently holds about 320 parliamentary seats, falling short of the necessary majority. The pro-Kurdish DEM Party, with its 56 seats in Parliament, could, in principle, help surpass this threshold.

Alternatively, an early election could enable Erdoğan to pursue a third term without needing a constitutional amendment, as stipulated in Article 116 of the constitution. In this scenario, the pro-Kurdish DEM Party could support Erdoğan by rallying the Kurdish electorate and refraining from fielding their own candidate, thereby helping him achieve a majority of the votes.

Erdoğan’s participation in the Kurdish peace initiative can be seen, therefore, as a strategy to attract backing from Kurdish voters and pro-Kurdish political factions, which could help him secure another term.

However, this approach entails a significant risk. Erdoğan would likely need to manage the Turkish nationalist vote while reaching out to the Kurdish electorate. Yet, those two political camps have historically had a contentious relationship. As a result, Erdoğan’s strategy would need to strike a balance between engaging in the peace initiative and managing the domestic political landscape in order to obtain both camps’ support.

By framing disarmament as a victory over terrorism and delaying immediate concessions, he likely seeks to uphold the support of nationalist voters who may be skeptical of negotiations with Kurdish factions. His partnership with the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), led by Devlet Bahçeli, during the peace process highlights this balancing act.

Although Bahçeli has traditionally opposed Kurdish concessions, his recent openness to the peace initiative suggests a strategic alignment aimed at preserving nationalist support while addressing Kurdish issues.

Potential Impacts on Regional Dynamics 

Regional Standing

Erdoğan’s actions, likewise, hold considerable significance that transcend Turkey’s borders, especially at an opportune moment for himself and Turkey in the region. Successfully resolving the Kurdish conflict could elevate Turkey’s position in the Middle East, especially in Syria and Iraq, where Kurdish groups have significant influence. The Erdoğan government views the PKK’s prospective disarmament as a step toward stabilizing these neighboring regions, which, in turn, could strengthen Turkey’s position within NATO and its relations with Western allies.

Similarly, demonstrating a strong commitment to resolving domestic conflicts through dialogue can strengthen Turkey’s foreign relations and may lead to increased cooperation on broader regional challenges. Thus, Erdoğan’s participation in the peace process has the potential to improve Turkey’s international reputation.

Syria

In the wake of the Assad regime’s fall in December 2024, Turkey sought to forge diplomatic connections with Syria’s new government. These efforts included the reopening of its embassy in Damascus and discussions on potential defense cooperation. Such a move is in Turkey’s interest as it aims to counter Kurdish opposition and secure its southern frontier.

Concurrently, Turkey escalated its military actions in northern Syria to diminish the territorial and political presence of Kurdish factions. “Operation Dawn of Freedom,” launched in November 2024, sought to create a buffer zone extending 30 kilometers into Syrian territory along the Turkish border. This military campaign instigated intense conflicts — notably the seizure of the Syrian city of Manbij by forces supported by Turkey — which lead to considerable casualties and widespread displacement.

Turkey consistently claims that the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) and the PKK are fundamentally the same group, only known by different names. Therefore, any measures taken to reduce the PKK’s ideological and military power are seen by Turkey as a way to indirectly reduce the YPG’s ambitions in Syria.

The PKK’s declared disarmament has enabled Turkey to leverage its position in favor of integrating Syrian Kurdish forces into the Syrian national framework. In March 2025, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), led by the YPG, came to an agreement with Syria’s interim government to merge into the Syrian army and transfer control of key infrastructure, including border crossings and oil fields, to Damascus by the end of the year. Turkey indicated its expectation that the YPG will follow through on this agreement, seeing it as a significant step toward curtailing the group’s independence and regional power.

The announcement of the PKK’s impending disarmament and dissolution in early 2025 marked the conclusion of Kurdish militant activism associated with the group’s leader Abdullah Öcalan’s ideology. Additionally, the peace initiative was spurred by a call from Öcalan while imprisoned. This shift creates significant ideological and political challenges for the YPG-SDF alliance, which has traditionally relied on the PKK for both strategic guidance and symbolic leadership. Furthermore, the intended disarmament diminishes the rationale for the YPG to sustain an autonomous military presence in Syria, particularly in light of the Assad regime’s fall and the formation of a new interim government in Syria.

With the PKK’s proposed dissolution, Turkey is in a better position to assert internationally that the YPG should not continue to operate as an independent entity. This shift paves the way for demilitarization and the integration of groups, such as the SDF, into national frameworks, aligning with the region’s post-conflict stabilization initiatives.

The PKK’s prospective disarmament has played a crucial role for Turkey by diminishing Kurdish ideological and military power beyond its borders. Thus, this demilitarization could allow Turkey to more effectively influence the new Syrian authorities and other global actors to assimilate the SDF into national institutions. It could also permit Turkey to block the formation of a Kurdish autonomous zone in northern Syria, which it firmly opposes.

Kurdish Peace Process’ Politics and Implications

The prospect of resolving the longstanding Kurdish conflict in Turkey at this particular moment could be a political tool that Erdoğan may use to extend his presidency. This situation presents Erdoğan with a chance to maneuver around electoral and constitutional limitations that currently affect his hold on power. Moreover, the shifting regional and international landscapes provide Erdoğan and Turkey with a strategic advantage to bolster their influence across the region.

If the peace process is successful, it could mark a turning point in resolving one of the region’s most persistent conflicts. As such, the peace initiative could exert pressure on nearby countries, such as Syria, Iraq, and Iran, to reassess their approach to Kurdish minorities in their nation. Similarly, it could provide Turkey with its much-desired goal of holding a strategic position in the region.

Should the peace initiative be utilized solely for the sake of political survival, however, it risks collapse. In turn, the initiative’s dissolution could result in a resurgence of violence, further erosion of democratic governance in Turkey, and a regional credibility crisis for Turkey. Therefore, securing long-term success for the Kurdish peace process is crucial to prevent further conflict, even if Turkish political calculations figure prominently at its outset.

This publication was produced on behalf of Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy. Wherever feasible, the material was reviewed by external experts prior to its release. Any errors are the responsibility of the author(s) alone.

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