Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 and a Nation in Transition

Introduction

Ten years have passed since Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud became King of Saudi Arabia on Jan. 23, 2015, and transferred policymaking authority to a younger generation of princes led by his then 29-year-old son, Mohammed bin Salman. Fifteen months later, in April 2016, Prince Mohammed — by then Deputy Crown Prince as well as Minister of Defense — unveiled a comprehensive document called “Vision 2030” as a strategic framework for transforming the Saudi economy and society.^[1]

More properly viewed as a collection of initiatives rather than a single plan, Vision 2030 is about much more than giga-projects such as Neom — a high density, planned city with a low environmental impact being built by Saudi Arabia in its Tabuk Province.^[2] Although Neom has attracted much of the media analysis devoted to Vision 2030, the overall strategic initiative entails a restructuring of many other aspects of governance and domestic socio-economic priorities.

In its totality, the release of Vision 2030, which was drawn up with the assistance of global consultants, constituted an ambitious statement of intent from a figure seen at the time by many, especially outside the kingdom, as a relatively unknown political novice. Its goals became more urgent when a sharp fall in oil prices in 2015 hit Saudi economic prospects hard. Following a series of budget cuts, Mohammed bin Salman declared that, “2015 was the year of the quick fix, 2016 is the year of the more organized quick fix, and 2017 is the year the vision will begin.”^[3]

Subsequent Vision Realization Programs announced a year after the Vision 2030 launch provided more details about how the government planned to achieve specific aspects of its ambitious plans, including the National Transformation Program, the Quality of Life Program, and the Fiscal Sustainability Program.^[4] A series of giga-projects followed, beginning with Neom in 2017, and soon came to dominate external perceptions of Vision 2030’s reforms, even as key domestic initiatives were also unveiled.

Various assessments since have evaluated Saudi Arabia’s progress toward the goals outlined by Vision 2030, and several of the giga-projects have recently been scaled back.^[5] This research paper offers context often missing from existing analyses, exploring why some goals have been accomplished more easily than others and how elements of Vision 2030 have evolved since their introduction in 2016. Most analyses have evaluated the kingdom’s efforts to reduce its economic dependence on fossil fuel.

However, given Saudi Arabia’s influence within the Middle East as well as the global Muslim community, this paper devotes equal attention to Vision 2030’s societal transformation initiatives and builds on the authors’ 2019 Baker Institute report, “Mohammed bin Salman and Religious Authority and Reform in Saudi Arabia.” Written two years after Mohammed bin Salman became Crown Prince, and at a time when he was shunned by Western policymakers after the killing of Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul in 2018, our earlier report assessed the balance between symbolism and substance in Mohammed bin Salman’s early reforms, especially in the social sphere.^[6] 

This new paper — published nearly six years later and more than halfway through the Vision 2030 timeline — takes the narrative forward and focuses on analyzing Saudi progress as 2030 draws near.

View the full paper (PDF).

Notes

^[1] Vision 2030 is a comprehensive document and strategic framework for achieving Saudi Arabia's long-term goals as a kingdom. It details plans to diversify its economy, primarily to reduce its dependence on oil; develop a more knowledge-based society that includes an enhanced quality of life and improved public services; and create a more transparent and accountable government (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, “Vision 2030 Overview,” accessed June 25, 2025, https://www.vision2030.gov.sa/en/overview). 

^[2] “Giga-project” is a term for large-scale, multibillion-dollar development initiatives that has been popularized through the media attention paid to Vision 2030. Giga-projects typically have the potential to transform a region's economy, infrastructure, and society. They require substantial capital investments as well as support from various technological, real estate, tourism, technology, energy, and infrastructure sectors in order to achieve the significant economic, social, and environmental outcomes they seek. They are inherently long-term projects since their completion depends on complex delivery systems that involve multiple contractors and suppliers. Finally, while both giga-projects and mega-projects involve large-scale development, giga-projects are typically defined as those exceeding ten billion dollars in cost with the potential to serve as catalysts for innovation, economic diversification, and societal transformation. 

^[3] Margherita Stancati and Ahmed Al Omran, “Saudi Arabia Approves Economic Reform Program,” The Wall Street Journal, April 25, 2016.

^[4] Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Vision 2030 Overview, “Vision Realization Programs,” updated July 7, 2025, https://www.vision2030.gov.sa/en/explore/programs.

^[5] Sloane Ortel and Ashby Monk, “Saudi Arabia’s Progress on Reducing Fossil Fuel Dependence,” Free Money, August 20, 2024, https://freemoneypodcast.com/p/saudi-arabias-progress-on-reducing; Ilker Domac, “Saudi Arabia’s 2030 Agenda: Half Time Report,” Citigroup Insights, February 21, 2024, https://www.citigroup.com/global/insights/saudi-arabia-s-2030-agenda-half-time-report; Centuro Global, “Saudi Vision 2030: Saudi Arabia’s Transformation Program Explained (2025 Update),” updated June 11, 2025, https://www.centuroglobal.com/article/saudi-arabia-vision-2030/.

^[6] Kristian Coates Ulrichsen and Annelle Sheline, “Mohammed bin Salman and Religious Authority and Reform in Saudi Arabia,” Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy, September 29, 2019, https://www.bakerinstitute.org/research/mbs-political-religious-authority-saudi-arabia.

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