Responsible Collaboration Through Appropriate Research Security

A Workshop to Discuss and Study the Emergent Discipline of Research on Research Security

Executive Summary

A topic largely forgotten after the Cold War, research security has reemerged as a top national security concern for academia and the government. The renewed attention on research security issues was brought into sharp, public focus in 2018, when the National Institutes of Health raised concerns about foreign governments using systematic programs to compromise the U.S. research ecosystem as part of the Department of Justice’s China Initiative. Foreign covert programs aim to illegally acquire U.S. federally funded research, which is built on a tradition of openness, transparency, impartiality, respect, and fairness (Collins 2018). That research is the bedrock of the current and future U.S. economy in which a rules-based order protects against the theft of innovations produced by sponsored research.

These concerns were addressed in new research security policies enacted under the United States Government- Supported Research and Development National Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM-33) as well as the research security provisions of the Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors (CHIPS) and Science Act of 2022. This policy is designed to strengthen protections of U.S. government-supported research and development against foreign interference and exploitation. Standing in the way of policy implementation is a poor understanding of what constitutes research security. Compounding the problem is a dearth of research on the pervasiveness of perceived risks; nature of the potential threats; and effective mitigation and prevention strategies. The shortage of research on research security and available data has led to a general lack of awareness among researchers and administrators on foreign influence and its associated risks to individuals and their home institutions.

To advance the field of research security, the U.S. National Science Foundation (NSF) announced its Research on Research Security (RoRS) program in July 2023. RoRS sponsors research in research security as required in the CHIPS and Science Act 2022. Initial thinking on the study of research security came in the form of a 2022 JASON report (JSR-22-08). The commencement of NSF funding has enabled actors in academia and industry to conduct scientific inquiry on this topic and in turn address unanswered questions in the field. NSF’s June 2023 issuance of a Dear Colleague Letter (DCL) opened the door for it to receive proposals to host a workshop that would bring together researchers who conduct or have an interest in conducting research in this domain. A workshop proposal was submitted to raise RoRS program awareness and develop a community of practice that includes institutions of higher education, industry, governmental entities, and nonprofit organizations conducting this highly interdisciplinary research. It was awarded to a team led by Rice University in Houston, Texas.

Workshop funding from NSF allowed Rice University and its Baker Institute for Public Policy, the University of Houston, IPTalons, Inc., and the Society of Research Administrators International, to host a two-part invitation-only workshop titled, “Responsible Collaboration Through Appropriate Research Security: A Workshop to Develop the Future Direction of the National Science Foundation’s Research on Research Security (RoRS) Program.” The workshop allowed the facilitators to assemble national and international academic experts and government and industry leaders across scientific disciplines and sectors of the research community who conduct or have an interest in conducting research on research security.

The results of the workshop generated four main research clusters along with the most pertinent research questions, potential research methods and approaches to address those questions, and associated challenges and hurdles facing the field of research security.

To access the full report, download the PDF.

Acknowledgments

This workshop and report were funded by NSF OIA #2348714, with supplemental funding from Rice University’s Office of Research. The organizing committee would like to thank John Marsh, Neethu Pottackal, Soumya Somani, Jordan Traylor, and Manna Treviño for serving as notetakers.

We would also like to offer special acknowledgements to Paul Zukas for his help organizing and facilitating the conference along with Phyllis McBride and Neal F. Lane for their comments and feedback to strengthen the clarity and consistency of the report.

Finally, we would like to extend our gratitude to Baker Institute staff Laura Hotze, Rachel Dehesa, Serena Storm, and the rest of the Baker Institute staff for their support of the event.

This material may be quoted or reproduced without prior permission, provided appropriate credit is given to the author and Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy. The views expressed herein are those of the individual author(s), and do not necessarily represent the views of Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy.