Israeli Elections Cast Doubt on Gaza Peace Plan

While the 20-point plan — with support from the U.S. and several other nations — recognizes Palestinian statehood as essential for regional stability, current policies and actions of Israeli leadership demonstrate that they are increasingly an obstacle to that goal.

Israel’s Role in the Peace Process

On Jan. 22, 2026, in Davos, Switzerland, President Donald Trump formally ratified the “Charter of the Board of Peace.” This new diplomatic architecture — chaired by Trump himself — is designed to oversee Gaza’s reconstruction and post-Hamas transitional governance.

However, the calculations of the current Israeli coalition may affect implementation of the plan. Its lean toward the far-right of the Israeli political spectrum, combined with elections planned for the second half of 2026, could limit the coalition’s willingness to support — or could slow progress on — the basic building blocks of the Gaza peace plan’s architecture.

Furthermore, the Israeli government’s close coordination with the Trump administration — as demonstrated by their cooperation in the current war with Iran — may complicate efforts by the U.S. and its Arab partners to advance the Gaza peace plan in a swift and organized manner.

Iran and Middle East Security

Against the backdrop of the Board of Peace’s ambitious goals, Iran is facing significant opposition to its theocracy from nationwide protest and mounting international pressure. The Iranian regime’s violent crackdown on mass protests that began in late December 2025 has resulted in death toll estimates, ranging from the government’s figure of 3,117, as high as 30,000 according to officials at Iran’s Ministry of Health, to even 43,000 per reports by the International Center for Human Rights in Iran.

As the U.S.-Israeli operation in Iran demonstrates, a Middle East regional security coalition is no longer only a strategic preference but should be seen as an existential necessity. When Tehran strikes aim not only at Israel but also at numerous Arab states — Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, Jordan, and the United Arab Emirates, particularly Dubai andAbu Dhabi — a Middle Eastern-Western alliance seems imperative.

Moreover, if “a credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood” is achieved, as outlined in Trump’s 20-point Gaza peace plan, Tehran and its proxies’ primary mobilizing narrative of support for the Palestinian cause would no longer be applicable.

Assessing Netanyahu’s Commitment to the Peace Plan

One should not overlook the extent of security, intelligence, and military cooperation between the United States and Israel, as reflected in their coordinated military attacks on Iran. At the same time, the perceived closeness of the relationship between President Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warrants careful interpretation.

While Netanyahu has delivered on certain tactical commitments outlined in Trump’s 20-point plan — including reopening the Rafah crossing on Feb. 2 for limited pedestrian traffic — a significant gap remains in the plan’s strategic execution. Netanyahu’s statements and policies suggest he does not intend to follow through on the plan’s political horizon.

As recent as November 2025 — months following the peace plan’s announcement — Netanyahu insisted, “There will not be a Palestinian state. It’s very simple: it will not be established.” Additionally, over the course of the last two months, Israel has continued to pursue its annexation of the West Bank to deepen its control of the region. These trends are likely to become more extensive during the upcoming Israeli election campaign, especially if they are rescheduled to an earlier date than October.

Despite the cordiality and reciprocal praise seen at Mar-a-Lago between Trump and Netanyahu on Dec. 29, Netanyahu views a two-state solution as a political impasse that would likely lead to his political career’s end. His office has already signaled opposition to the plan’s contents and implementation strategy, declaring that the Board of Peace’s composition “was not coordinated with Israel and is contrary to its policy” and specifically objecting to Turkey’s and Qatar’s inclusion.

Even the limited reopening of the Rafah crossing — allowing only 50 people and 50 medical patients, including two companions each, to leave Gaza — met resistance from coalition partners Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich, who pressured Netanyahu to withdraw his initial proposal to open the crossing in both directions fully. This pressure reflects each coalition leader’s broader outlook: Smotrich’s vision is an Israel that occupies and settles in the Gaza Strip, while Ben-Gvir has stated, “[I]t is time for Jewish settlement in Gaza.”

The U.S. administration should refer to the Dec. 3 Israeli Knesset vote as evidence of Netanyahu and his coalition’s deeper obstruction. While the vote was framed as an approval of the 20-point plan, the prime minister and coalition leadership left the room as the vote neared, in what appeared to be a boycott of the motion.

These statements and events highlight a central contradiction: While the 20-point plan — with support from the U.S. and several other nations — recognizes Palestinian statehood as essential for regional stability, current policies and actions of Israeli leadership demonstrate that they are increasingly an obstacle to that goal.

Gaps Emerge Between Peace Plan and Israeli Policy

At the heart of Trump’s 20-point plan lies point 19, which anchors the peace process in a political horizon leading to the establishment of a Palestinian state. Most of the plan’s other measures hinge on point 19’s stated goal — “a credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood.” Without the achievement of Palestinian statehood, the demand for Hamas to disarm will not likely be fulfilled in the near term.

Senior Hamas official Osama Hamdan stated on Dec. 24, 2025, that the terrorist group would only consider disarming within such a sovereign framework and after Israel’s withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. Yet, Netanyahu’s government is actively moving in the opposite direction, as he stated that Israel will not withdraw from its occupied area of the Gaza Strip — which now accounts for 53% of the strip — or allow reconstruction in Gaza until Hamas fully disarms. 

Moreover, the Israeli government is deepening its control over the West Bank. The government has promoted a political narrative emphasizing security, territorial control, and the permanence of Israeli governance over disputed lands — themes that resonate with right-wing and settler constituencies ahead of the 2026 elections. The current coalition is pursuing “de facto sovereignty” over Israeli-controlled areas in the West Bank per a top official’s words on Feb. 10, 2026.

Additionally, on Dec. 21, 2025, the Israeli Cabinet approved a proposal for 19 new West Bank settlements, a push that Smotrich characterized as aiming to block Palestinian statehood. More recently, on Feb. 8, 2026, Israel’s Security Cabinet approved measures expanding Israeli control in the West Bank that would allow the removal of land-sale restrictions and, thus, lead to increased enforcement in Areas A and B of the West Bank. The measures would also permit the renewal of state-led land acquisition in the Palestinian territories.

This trajectory largely reflects the agenda of a ring-wing faction in the Israeli government that views Trump’s 20-point plan as an obstacle rather than an opportunity. Netanyahu’s political career is extensively tied to this government faction, and his actions that aim to hinder the Palestinian state process indicate that he is prioritizing his political viability above the strategic interests of both Israel and the United States.

However, the Israeli public is ready for change. A recent Israeli Democracy Institute poll shows that 64% of Israelis believe Netanyahu should resign and take responsibility for the Oct. 7 attack. Furthermore, research from aChord suggests most Israelis would accept a two-state solution if it were tied to Saudi normalization and credible security guarantees.

Why Palestinian Statehood Remains Key to Peace Efforts

Ultimately, the success of Trump’s 20-point plan depends on if point 19’s guarantee for Palestinian statehood is elevated as the primary political horizon. For that to happen, Israel should install a new, pragmatic government capable of moving from phase one — ceasefire and hostage release — to a strategic regional transition, starting with the implementation of the plan’s phase two.

Netanyahu’s government has not fully implemented measures to safeguard the country’s national security or U.S. interests. For example, over the last 15 years, the coalition has allowed the continuance of the Hamas terrorist group by the following: the reported permission of billions of Qatari dollars to enter through Gaza for years; Smotrich’s 2015 statement that “Hamas is an asset”; delegitimization of the Palestinian Authority to potentially bypass the prospect for an eventual two-state solution; lack of discussions on “the day after” in Gaza; and impairment of initiatives that provide frameworks for a potential Israeli-Palestinian permanent status agreement, as noted above.

Without Israeli leadership willing to commit to the plan’s ultimate goal, even the most determined American diplomacy may face significant challenges. Achieving the goals of the peace plan requires leadership capable of advancing democratic fundamentals and supporting regional integration.

This publication was produced by Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy. Wherever feasible, the material was reviewed by outside experts prior to release. Any errors or omissions are solely the responsibility of the author(s).

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