How the Iran War Is Reshaping Türkiye’s Western Orientation

The war’s initial phase illustrates that Türkiye’s two primary risks in this conflict —namely territorial integrity and Kurdish security threat — are interconnected. 

Türkiye’s Position in the Iran War

On Feb. 28, 2026, the United States and Israel launched Operation Epic Fury — a joint campaign of airstrikes aimed at a range of Iranian targets. An Iranian response including retaliatory missiles and drone strikes followed and focused on Israeli and American targets as well as the Gulf region, likely to weaken the U.S. commitment to the war.

As of March 13, three reportedly Iranian missiles aimed at Türkiye were intercepted by NATO missiles. While Iran officially denied intentional targeting and attributed these incidents to technical issues, the developments render Türkiye’s geographic exposure as immediate and multidimensional: energy vulnerability, migration risk, the entanglement of Kurdish actors in an expanding conflict, and territorial integrity.

The war’s initial phase illustrates that Türkiye’s two primary risks in this conflict —namely territorial integrity and Kurdish security threat — are interconnected. More specifically, the nature of Türkiye’s relationship with NATO and its position within the organization shapes how these risks will likely evolve. That NATO served as the primary line of defense for Türkiye in a war that could spread across the Middle East raises the question of whether Türkiye should reconsider its ambiguous relationship with the Western security structure, anchored by its NATO membership.

NATO’s Interception of Iranian Missiles

NATO air and missile defense systems deployed in the Eastern Mediterranean — systems that Türkiye hosts and integrates with as a member of the alliance — have intercepted three reportedly Iranian ballistic missiles thus far. This is not only a symbolic gesture but also a significant concrete demonstration of the benefits of Türkiye’s NATO membership. Amid the ongoing war, NATO’s missile defense system has proven effective in upholding Turkish security.

Notably, it was not Türkiye’s newly acquired S-400 system that responded to the missiles. According to the Turkish Ministry of National Defense, the most practical and quickest system is deployed automatically in these scenarios. This suggests that either the S-400 system is less capable than NATO’s defense systems or is not fully operational. Thus, both possibilities challenge the rationale behind Türkiye’s decision to purchase the Russian system in 2019.

The response from the Iranian Embassy in Ankara claiming that no ammunition from Iran was targeting Türkiye illustrates Iran’s deterrence calculus. Iran’s actions, such as reportedly attacking a NATO member’s airspace with missiles and subsequently denying intentionality, indicate that it has sought to avoid inciting the alliance. Iran’s statements and actions reflect a multilayered deterrence calculation that takes the following factors into account: NATO membership, the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons at Incirlik, and Türkiye’s own military capabilities.

Ultimately, NATO membership offers Türkiye tangible security. NATO’s interception of the three Iranian missiles demonstrates that collective defense infrastructure is operationally effective, and that Türkiye benefits from it materially. The episode also strongly aligns with what political scientists have long argued: Formal alliances with defense commitments provide measurable deterrent value, particularly against states that calculate escalation thresholds carefully.

US and Kurdish Roles in the Conflict

The unfolding conflict among the United States, Israel, and Iran has exposed the underlying tensions in the Türkiye-NATO-U.S. relationship, particularly regarding Kurdish policy. Ankara’s concern about Iran-based Kurdish groups’ involvement in the conflict is compounded by reports suggesting that as of March 4, the U.S. was moving to arm Iranian Kurdish opposition groups to develop an internal opposition to the Iranian regime. If these reports materialize, it would likely strain U.S.-Türkiye relations and complicate the transatlantic trust.

Ankara’s clear boundary on Kurdish autonomy near its borders is largely well-established, especially given their recent agreement with the Kurdish opposition in Türkiye to disarm. The Trump administration’s stated willingness to collaborate with Kurdish forces in Iran without consulting Ankara, while relying on NATO infrastructure on Turkish soil, places Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan at a structural impasse: The ally providing the country’s security infrastructure could be simultaneously empowering forces that Ankara considers existential threats.

Türkiye’s Purchase of Russian S-400 System

Erdoğan’s decision to purchase the Russian S-400 system and accept delivery in 2019, despite American and NATO opposition, was the product of several internal and external factors: a fundamental aim to assert strategic autonomy within a formal alliance; insistence by Turkish aerospace industries on technology transfer; pricing of the U.S.’ Patriot system; a notable air defense gap; and post-coup domestic politics. These factors were compounded by Russian pressure following the accidental Turkish shoot-down of a Russian military aircraft and the subsequent Russian economic sanctions.

Türkiye’s S-400 acquisition has come at a considerable economic and security cost. It resulted in the weakening of interoperability, capability, and confidence within NATO and led to Türkiye’s exit from the F-35 program — a prospective source of significant income and technology benefits for the country. The Iran war has now crystallized an underlying paradox: The system Türkiye acquired at high economic and political costs seems to have remained dormant while NATO intercepted Iranian missiles over Turkish territory.

Türkiye’s refusal to grant the U.S. basing access for Iran operations aligns with its post-2003 doctrine of maintaining operational independence within the alliance, a stance characterized as “strategic ambiguity” in the current multipolar world. While the strategic autonomy to which Türkiye aspires has tangible costs, its position in NATO has offered effective defense and security architecture and, thus, should remain the country’s baseline.

At the same time, such autonomy has limitations. When missiles crossed into Turkish airspace, NATO systems intercepted them, not Türkiye’s autonomous partnerships with Russia or China. This asymmetry and real-world incident will likely garner attention from Turkish strategic planners, leading to a serious reconsideration in Türkiye’s international orientation.

US and Israeli Views on Türkiye’s Defense

President Donald Trump’s approach to Türkiye largely aligns with his broader pattern of treating NATO relationships more as bilateral deals than institutional commitments. He appears to perceive the S-400 impasse as a solvable issue, not an alliance principle. Thus, reports indicate his willingness to use the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) waiver authority — which allows the U.S. president to exempt countries from sanctions for purchasing Russian or other sanctioned country’s defense equipment — creatively.

On Sept. 25, 2025, Trump hosted Erdoğan at the White House. The primary defense agenda item was resolving the ongoing impasse. Reports suggest that Trump expressed openness to selling F-35s to Türkiye, provided Ankara formally declares its S-400 system “inoperable.” This would then allow Trump to invoke the “vital national security interests” waiver mechanism in CAATSA and notify U.S. Congress. In late 2025, U.S. Ambassador to Türkiye Tom Barrack stated that Ankara was moving closer to a resolution on the S-400 system and toward a path to purchase F-35s, possibly within months.

While Trump’s approach could present a genuine opportunity for resolution, Congress and Israel continue to pose significant challenges to this agreement. Regarding Congress, the path forward remains uncertain. In addition to CAATSA — which Trump can waive — Section 1245 of the 2020 National Defense Authorization Act explicitly prohibits the transfer of F-35s to Türkiye so long as it possesses the S-400 system; “inoperable” does not satisfy the statutory text requirement of divestment, according to critics.

Another central political challenge lies in Israel. A Türkiye equipped with F-35s could potentially weaken Israel’s “qualitative military edge” in the Middle East. Recent statements from Israel have positioned Türkiye as a potential regional adversary. Any deal between Trump and Ankara will likely require navigating Israel’s expected objections.

Türkiye’s Future in NATO

Türkiye is set to host the 2026 NATO Summit in July. The ongoing Iran war is likely to shape its agenda and amplify Ankara’s influence within the alliance, particularly on issues ranging from mutual security responsibilities and Middle East security architecture to the terms of collective defense in contested gray zones.

Ankara is expected to use diplomatic channels to press the U.S. to limit its engagement with Kurdish forces in exchange for continued NATO cooperation. The success of Erdoğan’s strategy to translate the current conflict into a lasting defense realignment with the West hinges both on his ability to act swiftly and on Trump’s ability to fulfill the reported agreement on Türkiye’s military equipment.

This publication was produced by Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy. Wherever feasible, the material was reviewed by outside experts prior to release. Any errors or omissions are solely the responsibility of the author(s).

This material may be quoted or reproduced without prior permission, provided appropriate credit is given to the author(s) and Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy. The views expressed herein are those of the individual author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy.