Aid Amid Conflict: Learning From Sudan’s Mutual Aid Networks

Foreign Aid and the Sudanese Civil War

The topic of foreign aid and humanitarian assistance has grown increasingly contentious. The U.S. is the top distributor of foreign aid worldwide, but the new Trump administration has taken action to dismantle the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). While a funding freeze for foreign aid was temporarily halted by a federal judge, the provision of aid to impoverished countries and those experiencing conflict will continue to face immense challenges in the coming months.

Sudan is one such country, engulfed in a nearly two-year civil war and currently undergoing the world’s worst humanitarian disaster. A mere six months ago, then-President Joe Biden released a public statement on the situation in Sudan, emphasizing the U.S.’ key aid contributions to Sudan that totaled $1.6 billion in emergency assistance over the last two years. Just days after this statement was released, the U.S. announced an additional $424 million to aid with food, health care, nutrition, and protection services to Sudan and neighboring countries. While the U.N. has also asked for $2.7 billion to aid Sudan, it acknowledged that the appeal was only 57% funded in November 2024.

Aid Delivery Difficulties and Famine Risks

Beyond the issue of insufficient aid, transporting and administering assistance into Sudan continues to be major challenge. Numerous commentaries and news reports have called attention to the issue of famine, underscoring how little international aid has been able to enter either Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) or Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) controlled territory. Unlike its response to the Syrian civil war, the U.N. Security Council has not yet adopted a cross-border resolution that would allow in aid without the approval of the warring factions. 

Entry into the country represents but one challenge. Aid workers have noted that one of the main difficulties is successfully and safely navigating the transportation of goods between areas controlled by RSF, SAF, and their affiliates. Thus, the near impossibility of delivering enough international aid into Sudan — as well as accusations that the RSF and SAF impede and loot what does cross into the country — has set the stage for “a full-scale hunger crisis,” as noted by the executive director of the U.N. World Food Program. Over 25 million people are currently facing acute hunger, with numbers expected to rise in the coming months.

While observers and practitioners stress the severity of Sudan’s conditions, their perspectives often center the actions of major powerbrokers in the conflict and the international community. To the extent that local communities are addressed, they are primarily portrayed as passive actors caught in the conflict’s crosshairs.

However, this approach overlooks how Sudanese communities — local and abroad — have banded together to form mutual aid networks to protect themselves in the face of famine and war. Recognizing these mutual aid efforts provides a critical opportunity to help improve material circumstances on the ground and to acknowledge the necessity for alternative humanitarian models, especially when aid delivery remains difficult.

Mutual Aid Networks in Sudan

Recent History of Mutual Aid Networks

Once the civil war began in April 2023, the international organizations that had been operating in Sudan — including U.N. agencies — removed their international staff, relocating them primarily to Egypt, Kenya, or elsewhere. Some organizations remained operational in SAF-controlled territory including Red Sea, Blue Nile, and White Nile states. However, the most populated areas that came under RSF control, including much of greater Khartoum and its sister cities, such as Bahri and Omdurman, were nearly inaccessible for international assistance. The complete collapse of state services — such as a functioning health care system — have exacerbated already stressed conditions, leaving Sudanese civilians in critical need of alternative sources of support.

Against this backdrop of civil war and crumbling public infrastructure, mutual aid networks built on the Sudanese notion of “nafeer” — meaning “a call to mobilize” in Arabic — have proliferated.

It is important to note that localized aid networks in Sudan precede the conflict, operating as far back as late 2013 in the aftermath of protests against then-President Omar al-Bashir and in the wake of mass flooding. In response, young volunteers coordinated to deliver relief items such as hygiene kits to areas heavily affected by flooding, where state services were particularly ineffective. During a period of governmental transition alongside the COVID-19 pandemic, local organizations rallied together to distribute vital supplies to hard-to-reach areas, such as the Nuba Mountains. However, in these earlier instances, aid networks still operated with state or international assistance.

Sudan’s Emergency Response Rooms

After the absence of international organizations left a vacuum of assistance following the civil war’s onset, Sudanese emergency response rooms (ERRs) increasingly filled this gap. While many ERRs’ efforts previously concentrated on development-related areas such as education and community building, these groups shifted their focus to the immediate needs of people living amid conflict. As of October 2024, over 700 ERRs are reportedly operating throughout the country and provide a range of services, including delivering food, creating mobile kitchens, establishing emergency shelters and women’s collectives, and repairing basic infrastructure.

Challenges Facing ERRs’ Efforts

Despite their success in providing localized aid in the absence of international assistance, ERRs face immense challenges, especially as they are not formally recognized by the warring factions or by international organizations, such as the U.N. Additionally, they lack in-country registration, which would enable a formal recognition and the ability to more freely transfer funds. However, to better connect available international funding with a localized response, some ERRs banded together with donors to create the Coalition for Mutual Aid in Sudan, which was announced in September 2024 at the Clinton Global Initiative Annual Meeting with the established goal of distributing at least $2 million to vetted Sudanese ERRs by the end of 2024.

ERRs’ challenges also include grappling with fatal risks, especially in the face of the increased deprivation of resources by the RSF and SAF. Evidence shows that the warring factions, particularly the RSF and their affiliates, have deliberately targeted ERRs. For example, RSF fighters have been accused of looting food and other supplies from Khartoum-based ERRs while also intimidating ERR members through physical violence and detainment. In addition, SAF soldiers have allegedly harassed, intimidated, and interrogated ERR members based on unfounded suspicions that such organizations are serving as RSF informants or collaborators. 

Ways To Support Mutual Aid Networks

Funding Mutual Aid Networks

The international community, including the U.N., the Security Council, and African Union’s Peace and Security Council, should continue working toward a political solution to end the war in Sudan. While various efforts have been made to achieve such a solution, more direct and practical engagement with the warring parties is necessary to reach a resolution, both locally and regionally, as well as within the context of international geopolitics. In parallel, international donors and development organizations should tailor aid and other programming to support emergency response and long-term development efforts in Sudan.

With ERRs, a dollar donated is a dollar spent on the ground benefitting people. At the same time, there will likely be pushback from the international community that is accustomed to operating through U.N. structures or other large international organizations that serve as implementing partners. Some large donors are reluctant to work with informal and small-scale organizations that may not be registered with the recipient country’s government. While international funding can continue to support host countries such as Chad, Egypt, and South Sudan where international humanitarian assistance directly benefits refugees, aid appeals intended to help recipients still living in Sudan should be increasingly redirected to mutual aid groups that have the most sufficient access to people and their needs on the ground.

Coordinating With ERRs To Distribute Aid

While international aid appeals continue — such as the U.K.’s recent promise to double its funding to Sudan — the issues of too little aid entering the country and the diversion of aid by the warring parties remain. The delivery of more aid directly to those best positioned to manage its distribution is necessary, and at present, mutual aid networks are best posed to fulfill this role. Coordinating with ERRS for aid delivery is also especially important to alleviate the immense financial burden on the Sudanese diaspora and will become increasingly important with the impact of cuts to USAID funding.

Recognizing Mutual Aid Networks as an Alternative Model

Mutual aid networks, and specifically ERRs, are conducting critical work in extremely challenging conditions, often facing significant risks, yet these efforts remain underrecognized. This may be partially due to how their actions challenge the common assumption not only that civilians lack agency during times of conflict but also that support of local communities completely hinges on international aid, even if this aid is insufficient. These groups’ work in Sudan offers an alternative model of aid distribution, one that directly involves local communities and their networks. These efforts are critical at a time when the global distribution of humanitarian aid remains difficult in Sudan as well as contentious and uncertain globally.

While internal displacement presents a challenge, these Sudanese mutual aid networks and ERRs are still the best equipped to respond flexibly and quickly. Most importantly, the current conditions — with international aid sitting at border crossings or being diverted by warring factions and gangs — is unsustainable, and the benefits of shifting to a more localized approach outweigh the potential costs.

This publication was produced on behalf of Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy. Wherever feasible, the material was reviewed by external experts prior to its release. Any errors are the responsibility of the author(s) alone. 

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