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42 Results
A natural gas plant in Russia.
Russia's Use of the "Energy Weapon" in Europe
This brief quantifies the potential exposure of key European countries to Russian gas price and supply manipulation, shows how Moscow has used energy as an instrument of coercive diplomacy since the early 1990s, and briefly assesses the impacts and future policy implications of Russian entities’ past use of the “energy weapon” in and near Europe. Although it has not been widely successful to date in the former Soviet zone, Russia's use of the energy weapon against Western European countries in various forms still constitutes a strategic threat that warrants close attention from policymakers in Washington and throughout Europe, writes fellow Gabriel Collins.
Gabriel Collins July 18, 2017
Offshore oil platform at sunrise/sunset
Assessing Shale Producers’ Ability to Scale-up Activity
The oil production targets agreed to at the November 30, 2016, OPEC meeting have created the firmest prospect in the past two years of a meaningful oil price recovery. If WTI prices rise and stabilize in the $60/bbl range, how fast can U.S. shale producers respond? This brief addresses the question and highlights the challenges U.S. unconventional liquids producers will likely face during a scale-up. It also points out price and timing inflection points likely to broadly influence industry decision-making.
Gabriel Collins, Kenneth B. Medlock III January 17, 2017
One hundred dollar bills
The Unfavorable Economics of Currency Manipulation Chapters in Trade Agreements
As Congress resumes work this spring on a bill granting Trade Promotion Authority to President Obama for completion of the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade pact, many members have sought inclusion of a chapter on currency manipulation. Currency manipulation is a legitimate concern. However, countermeasures require clear, objective identification of currency manipulation. Both the IMF and the U.S. Treasury Department have mandates to identify currency manipulation, yet neither has done so in the past 20 years. If it can be done, why has it not happened more often? In this issue brief, Russell Green, Will Clayton Fellow in International Economics, reviews the difficulties of operationalizing a currency manipulation chapter and argues that the difficulty of identifying currency manipulation suggests serious political obstacles to implementation.
Russell Green April 27, 2015