What Egypt’s New Asylum Law Means for Refugees

Transferring Responsibility

As part of global processes of border externalization — in which Global North countries attempt to reduce irregular migration by shifting migration controls to Global South nations that receive and host asylum seekers and refugees — there is a growing trend for these host countries to introduce their own domestic asylum laws. Examples from the past two decades include Mexico, Costa Rica, Turkey, and Morocco. This trend is not inherently negative: Increased host state responsibility can support better economic and social integration and improve relations between newcomers and host communities. However, when responsibility is transferred from the international community to a host state too quickly or before a host government is fully prepared, the process can produce deleterious outcomes.

Consistent with this trend, in December 2024 Egypt passed a new domestic asylum law that transfers responsibility for determining which asylum seekers qualify as refugees — a process known as refugee status determination (RSD) — from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to the Egyptian government. This brief examines the political context of the law, exploring why Egypt chose to assume this additional responsibility at this time. It draws on informal conversations with civil society organizations during a June 2025 visit to Cairo, six months after the law’s adoption. While much remains unknown, the brief finds that the law poses significant risks for current and future asylum seekers and refugees in Egypt. It offers a cautionary lesson for other countries considering similar domestic asylum laws when the motives for adoption are based on political calculations.

Europe’s Interest in Egypt

Following the proliferation of EU migration-related deals across the Mediterranean in the wake of Europe’s 2015 political crisis which stemmed from asylum seeker arrivals, Egypt began to think more strategically about its role as a migrant and refugee host state. It was not until a deadly boat tragedy on Sept. 21, 2016 — when a fishing vessel carrying as many as 450 migrants sank off the country’s north coast near the town of Rashid — that Egypt took real action. While government officials and government-controlled media outlets were quick to blame the smugglers and victims, independent media agencies accused the Egyptian coastguard of failing to respond to calls that the boat was sinking. The much publicized incident was deeply embarrassing for the government, particularly since so many of those killed were Egyptian nationals attempting to reach Europe.

Moved to Action

Within weeks of the Rashid shipwreck, the Egyptian parliament successfully approved domestic legislation on anti-smuggling (Law No. 82), thereby implementing the U.N. Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea, and Air. The protocol supplements the U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, which Egypt ratified in 2005. Within a few weeks Egyptian authorities also dismantled the entire smuggling network along Egypt’s north coast.

Around the same time, the government started to express interest in taking on further responsibility for hosting refugees. Specifically, the Egyptian government began to discuss taking over the process for RSD, which had been delegated to the UNHCR since the 1950s. The Egyptian government also started developing domestic asylum legislation — which the UNHCR had been quietly pushing for decades — eventually culminating in a draft law in July 2023.

Forging a Partnership

Egypt’s efforts to dismantle smuggling networks, combined with its growing willingness to assume greater responsibility for refugees, signaled to Europe that the country was eager to collaborate. In July 2017, Egypt and the EU adopted a series of “partnership priorities,” among which was a commitment to “managing migratory flows for mutual benefit,” including supporting “Egypt’s efforts to prevent and combat irregular migration, trafficking and smuggling of human beings, including identifying and assisting victims of trafficking,” and also supporting and strengthening the “Egyptian capacity to protect migrants’ rights and to provide protection to those who qualify for it, in line with international standards.”

On an October 2017 visit to Egypt, Johannes Hahn, EU Commissioner for European Neighborhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, offered €46 million in grants, €600 million in soft loans from European financial institutions, and a €60 million grant to “help Egypt deal with the pressures of hosting migrants and refugees, and help stabilize communities prone to migration.” After months of discussions and proposals from both sides, an EU-Egypt Migration Dialogue was launched in December 2017.

Following these developments, the EU and other international actors publicly praised Egypt. In 2018, Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz called Egypt “efficient” and commended Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi for providing “an example when it comes to illegal migration and people smuggling.” In January 2019 the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Filippo Grandi, met with the Egyptian president to recognize Egypt’s refugee hosting and discuss el-Sisi’s upcoming role as chair of the African Union. In February 2019, leaders from the EU and the Arab League convened in Sharm el-Sheikh for an inaugural summit to discuss migration, security, and business opportunities.

Beyond the financial assistance, partnership with Europe helped to inoculate the el-Sisi regime from international criticism. By praising Egypt’s capabilities as a partner in anti-trafficking and irregular migration prevention, along with its purported willingness to adopt a domestic asylum law and further integrate refugees, the EU deflected attention from longstanding concerns over the Egyptian government’s dismal human rights record.

Egypt’s heightened awareness of its role as a key migrant and refugee host state — as well as the enhanced leverage this afforded el-Sisi in his negotiations with Europe — only continued to increase in 2023, as Sudanese nationals began arriving in large numbers, fleeing their country’s descent into civil war. Their suspicion toward the growing Sudanese population — driven partly by a complex history of political tensions between the two countries, as well as economic scapegoating and rising xenophobia – gave Egyptian officials a security incentive to take greater control over the issue. By July of that year, the Egyptian government published a draft of the new asylum law.

Egypt’s bargaining power increased after the Israel-Hamas war began in October 2023, amid growing pressure from the U.S., EU, and Israel for Egypt to open its border to Palestinian civilians fleeing Israeli bombardment in Gaza. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen argued that “Egypt’s role is vital for the security and stability of the Middle East.” In 2024, the Egypt and the EU signed a new Strategic and Comprehensive Partnership and the EU pledged €7.4 billion in loans and investments to help keep the country’s struggling economy afloat, with Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni referring to the deal as, “the best way to address migratory flows.”

Praise for the New Law

Amidst this backdrop of increased partnership with — but also pressure from — Europe, the Egyptian Parliament’s Defense and National Security Committee approved the government’s draft asylum law in October 2024. President el-Sisi then ratified the law on Dec. 16, 2024, after which it was published in the country’s official gazette. Although the law’s preamble states that bylaws should be issued six months from its adoption, they had not yet been issued at the time this brief was written.

On paper, the new law appears to offer refugees in Egypt several key rights that they were previously denied.

1. Eliminates Work Restrictions — The law would remove restrictions on refugees’ ability to seek formal employment. When Egypt signed the 1951 Refugee Convention in 1981, it did so with careful restrictions related to the right of refugees to search for formal employment, forcing most into precarious jobs in the informal sector.
2. Establishes a Pathway to Citizenship — For the first time, the law would offer refugees an eventual pathway to citizenship. This is an exceptional development in a country where naturalization is highly restricted, usually limited to circumstances such as marriage to an Egyptian citizen.
3. Permits Travel Outside Egypt — The new law would allow refugees to travel outside the country with government-issued documents and return to Egypt, all while retaining their status. Previously refugees were forced to give up their status if they left the country.

International organizations were quick to praise Egypt’s efforts to adopt a new law, calling the country “generous” to refugees and a model to be emulated. Europe also applauded the move, as a domestic asylum law in Egypt makes it easier for Europe to declare that Egypt is a safe third country, allowing Europe to return third-country nationals who transit through Egypt on their northward journey across the Mediterranean. For decades, returning failed asylum seekers and other migrants from Europe to third countries has been a politically contentious issue. While several individual European member states have already designated Egypt as a safe third country, an EU-wide designation would make the process of forced return easier.

Finally, from Egypt’s perspective, the new domestic asylum law is tied to financial considerations — including registration fees and anticipated support from the EU and other international organizations — as well as security concerns. Under this legislation, the Egyptian government assumes primary responsibility for determining who qualifies for asylum, a role that was previously managed by the UNHCR. This issue has gained urgency since 2023, with the arrival of nearly a million Sudanese asylum seekers, prompting Egypt to implement measures — including mass deportations — to mitigate what it perceives as a security risk.

Civil Society Concerns

Civil society organizations in Egypt have expressed numerous reservations about the new law, both in terms of process and substance. They have noted that:

• Drafting and approval of the law were highly insulated and lacked transparency, only allowing for minimal input from the UNHCR and the EU.
• Parliamentary debate lasted only three days, resulting in minor textual changes (e.g. “or” to “and”).
• Civil society groups were not meaningfully consulted and could not propose substantive amendments.

Civil society organizations also voiced serious concerns about the government’s discretionary authority when it comes to determining who qualifies for refugee status. Asylum seekers can easily become disqualified if they commit an act deemed to be against Egypt’s “considerations of national security and public order” — though these terms are very vague and ill-defined — or if they express a political opinion.

The law also places a higher burden of proof on asylum seekers than the 1951 Convention and adds more exclusion grounds, including committing what it refers to as a “political” crime in one’s home country, which is the basis for many refugee claims. Asylum seekers of certain religious, national, social or sexual backgrounds may not be comfortable sharing supporting evidence of their refugee claims with Egyptian authorities. For example, LGBTQ+ asylum seekers seeking refugee status due to persecution based on their sexual orientation may be concerned about about Egypt’s laws condemning and prosecuting homosexuality.

Additionally, the legislation differentiates between those who enter Egypt regularly versus irregularly, making irregular entry punishable by imprisonment and a fine if an asylum application is not submitted within 45 days — a provision that contravenes the 1951 Convention. It also seeks to punish individuals who host or employ asylum seekers and fail to inform the authorities. This measure could be interpreted broadly enough to include Egyptians or foreigners simply renting an apartment to an asylum seeker.

While the law establishes a Standing Committee for Refugee Affairs, details about the body’s composition remains vague. It is set to be staffed by an unspecified number of individuals with undefined expertise drawn from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, the Interior, Justice, and Finance. There is also no discernible timeframe for the transition of RSD processes from the UNHCR to the Egyptian government, nor does it specify how existing cases will be transferred to the new committee’s purview. The future status of refugee resettlement from Egypt is also in question.

Overall, the law is highly securitized, in that it treats refugees and asylum as a matter of national security, rather than a humanitarian or administrative issue. Furthermore, close to unchecked power is given to Egyptian authorities. The only appeal to which asylum seekers will be entitled is against deportation, with no option to contest a negative decision on the determination of refugee status itself.

Balancing Interests and Risks

From the perspectives of both the Egyptian government and the EU, the new asylum law is beneficial. For Europe, Egypt is one of the few stable countries or territories in the region — in contrast to Libya, Sudan, or Gaza — and a willing partner on migration. As a result, Europe is highly content to continue financial support regardless of concerns about Egypt’s human rights record. From Egypt’s vantage point, the law provides greater control over an issue it sees primarily through a security lens, along with the potential for financial assistance to support its struggling economy. Refugees and asylum seekers in Egypt, however, are the primary ones affected by this hastily drafted law, which falls far short of international standards regardless of how future bylaws guide implementation.

For other Global South nations considering greater responsibility for refugees, Egypt’s experience serves as a cautionary tale. Adopting a new law to take control over refugee status determination (RSD) without meaningful stakeholder consultation — or when motivated by strategic political incentives — can be counterproductive. Such a move may increase uncertainty for asylum seekers and refugees, potentially driving greater onward migration. For Egypt, taking on additional responsibility may not deliver the financial benefits anticipated, while Europe could face more, rather than less, irregular migration.

This publication was produced on behalf of Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy. Wherever feasible, the material was reviewed by external experts prior to its release. Any errors are the responsibility of the author(s) alone.

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