The Weakening Foundation of International Protection

Global Protection for Refugees and Displaced Persons

Policy changes introduced by the second Trump administration have affected the daily lives of millions, both in the United States and abroad. Earlier Baker Institute briefs have examined the consequences of closing of USAID, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the dismantling the refugee resettlement system. This issue brief explores how U.S. policy changes have impacted the global system for responding to refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) — a system that was already fragile when President Donald Trump took office in January 2025.

Reflecting the Trump administration’s central tenet of “America First,” U.S. policy has retreated from support for the multilateral system — a system the United States helped create in the early 1950s. Damian Lily notes that “within the broader humanitarian system, the U.N. receives the lion’s share of funding. Between 2012 and 2021, 60% of humanitarian funding went to U.N. agencies, with 47% going to just three organizations” — the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Food Programme (WFP), and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). Unlike development aid and USAID funding, which primarily flowed through nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), most humanitarian funding was channeled multilaterally; U.S. assistance to refugees both supported and relied on a strong UNHCR and other multilateral agencies.

The International Protection System Under Strain

By 2024, trends in the international systems for refugees and IDPs were unsustainable. The refugee system, established in the aftermath of World War II and largely designed to meet the postwar needs of Western governments, was being stretched to cover situations far beyond what the drafters of the 1951 Refugee Convention intended. Rather than fleeing persecution under one of the five Convention categories — race, religion, nationality, social group, or political opinion — most asylum seekers were fleeing civil, communal, or gang violence.

As wars dragged on and the number of refugees continued to steadily increase, long-term solutions became elusive. By the end of 2024, the UNHCR was reporting 31 million refugees under its mandate, another 5.9 million Palestinians under the mandate of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, 8.4 million asylum-seekers, and 5.9 million others in need of protection. In addition, there were some 73.5 million IDPs.

International recognition of the needs of IDPs came much later, with the 1998 publication of the “Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.” While not legally binding, these principles were drawn from existing legal frameworks and emphasized that national authorities were responsible for protecting and assisting refugees. Despite outnumbering refugees by two to one, IDPs received far less attention from the international community and lacked the considerable mandated support that UNHCR mobilized for refugees. Internal displacement finally began to gain visibility following the establishment of a High-Level Panel on Internal Displacement (2019–21) and the appointment of a Special Advisor on Solutions to Internal Displacement (2022–24).

Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, Western governments developed increasingly creative ways to prevent asylum-seekers from reaching their territories. These measures included visa restrictions, maritime interdictions in the Caribbean and Mediterranean, and the physical hardening of borders. Countries in the Global South hosting large numbers of refugees grew increasingly concerned about the burden, having agreed to admit refugees under the implicit understanding that international support would cover associated costs.

Meanwhile, the number of people needing humanitarian assistance continued to rise, with no end in sight. In 1998, donors provided $7.2 billion in humanitarian assistance — a figure that grew more than five times over 25 years, reaching $37.5 billion in 2023. Funding declined in 2024 to $33 billion as the United States, the European Union, and Germany reduced their humanitarian spending. In 2025, the U.N. reported that 305 million people were in need of assistance and appealed for $47.4 billion.

US Immigration and Foreign Policy Changes After 2024

After the Jan. 20, 2025, inauguration of President Trump, a rapid series of executive orders and proclamations reshaped U.S. immigration policy. These changes created uncertainty for immigrant communities nationwide and for those seeking entry from abroad, including 270,000 migrants awaiting asylum appointments in Mexico.

In the months that followed, the U.S. government eliminated its premier foreign assistance agency, USAID, and sharply curtailed foreign aid, with global consequences, as noted in an earlier Baker Institute policy brief. Other key actions included: 

• Restructuring the State Department: The Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration was gutted; hundreds of staff were fired, and remaining employees were reassigned from refugee protection to supporting deportations of undocumented migrants.
• Border closures and militarization: The U.S.-Mexico border was closed and militarized, including the deployment of U.S. troops.
• Suspension of asylum processing: Asylum requests were temporarily halted and there is no indication of when they will be processed.
• Dismantling refugee resettlement: Ceilings for refugee admissions fell from 125,000 in FY 2025 to 7,500 in FY 2026, most allocated to South African Afrikaners; previously approved refugee visas were also canceled (in some cases for refugees who already had airline tickets).
• Termination of temporary statuses: Temporary Protected Status and Humanitarian Parole were ended for several nationalities, leaving nearly a million formerly legal immigrants undocumented and vulnerable to deportation.
• Enhanced deportation programs: Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officials were given daily arrest quotas of 3,000 to reach the administration’s goal of deporting 1 million undocumented immigrants in 2025.
• Reported departures: By October 2025, DHS reported that 2 million “illegal aliens” had left the country, including 1.6 million who self-deported and 527,000 formally deported.
• Increased border enforcement funding: Funding expanded for new detention facilities and border wall construction.
• Additional restrictions after security incidents: Following the November 2025 shooting of two National Guard members by an Afghan immigrant, the administration issued further restrictions, including a hold on all asylum approvals, a blanket restriction on immigration from the 19 countries covered in the spring travel ban, and a review of the 200,000 refugees approved under the Biden administration.

All of these actions — along with many others, such as challenging birthright citizenship and increasing fees for asylum-seekers — created widespread uncertainty within the United States and in countries hosting migrants in transit to the U.S. They also had significant implications for the international protection system for refugees and IDPs.

Effects of US Foreign Aid Cuts on Global Protection

Until these recent changes, the United States provided over 30% of the budgets of most humanitarian agencies, including UNHCR and the International Organization for Migration (IOM). Most of this funding was cut, though some provisions allowed for the continuation of lifesaving assistance — amid debate over what qualifies as “lifesaving.” Refugees and IDPs bore the brunt of the these cuts, which had primarily been directed through three main channels: multilateral U.N. agencies such as UNHCR, IOM, UNRWA, and UNICEF, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and NGOs.

Food programs, education initiatives, health services, and many other programs were cut with little notice. Governments and civil society organizations have been unable to make up the shortfall. This left refugee-hosting countries responsible for costs they had expected the international community to cover, particularly low- and middle-income nations. What happens when that support is no longer available?

International Examples

In December 2025, Uganda — often cited as one of the world’s most refugee-welcoming countries — announced that it would stop granting refugee status to Ethiopians, Eritreans, and Somalis as a direct result of funding shortfalls. Hillary Onek, Uganda’s Minister for Refugees said, “Uganda used to get $240 million per year from UNHCR, but with an increased refugee population of almost 2 million people, we now get less than $100 million.” In 2025, Uganda received $155 million in humanitarian aid — less than half the $357 million received in 2024. 

In 2023, Pakistan began deporting Afghan refugees to Afghanistan, many of whom had lived their entire lives in Pakistan and had never been to their ancestral homeland. But in 2025, the pace of deportations accelerated, with roughly 1 million Afghans forced to return. Another 1.5 million Afghans have been deported by Iran.

For countries such as Bangladesh, which is reluctantly hosting around 1 million Rohingya refugees, U.S. funding cuts have had severe consequences. Fifty-five USAID-funded development projects in the country were halted by the U.S. government, resulting in a loss of $700 million in assistance and approximately 50,000 jobs.

The funding cuts weakened multilateral agencies, particularly UNHCR and IOM, as well as the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), UNICEF, the U.N. Population Fund (UNFPA), and the WFP, all of which provided assistance to refugees and IDPs. As a result, these U.N. agencies laid off staff, closed offices, and suspended programs.

Infrastructure, Data Collection, and Research

Beyond suspending aid to vulnerable populations around the world, including refugees and IDPs, the U.S. had also been a leading supporter of the humanitarian system’s infrastructure — funding data collection and research, coordination systems, and early warning platforms. It led the drive toward more evidence-based policy by supporting the data systems used to measure programs’ impact. Those initiatives were severely affected by U.S. funding cuts, including reductions to the departments and agencies responsible for data collection and analysis.

Participation in Global Forums

Although its financial contributions were essential, U.S. leadership in the international refugee system extended far beyond funding. The U.S. was an active participant in key intergovernmental forums, including the UNHCR’s Executive Committee and the Annual Tripartite Consultations and their successor, the Consultations on Resettlement and Complementary Pathways (CRCP). These forums helped guide UNHCR and other stakeholders on priorities and modalities for protecting refugees and supporting long-term solutions.

Since the Trump administration assumed office, however, U.S. engagement in these global forums has been markedly weaker and, at times, absent altogether. For the first time, the United States did not participate in UNHCR’s 2025 pledging conference, where donor countries are invited to commit a first tranche of funding for the coming year.

Refugee Resettlement

With more than 3 million refugee admissions since 1980, the U.S. has historically resettled more refugees than the rest of the world combined, though this leadership stalled during both Trump administrations. Today, 24 countries accept refugees for resettlement, many of them encouraged to do so by U.S. diplomatic engagement. In the past, the United States used its influence to press governments to keep borders open to people fleeing violence and civil war — from Vietnamese refugees in the 1970s to Syrians in the 2010s. Whether other countries will continue to resettle refugees in the absence of U.S. leadership remains an open question.

Funding Crisis

U.S. funding cuts came at a moment when other traditional donors were already reducing humanitarian spending, with significant global implications. In December 2025, the U.N. Emergency Relief Coordinator announced that the organization would reduce its 2026 humanitarian appeal from $47.4 billion to $33 billion and would prioritize assistance for 87 million people — less than half of the original request. Other Western donors have also scaled back funding for both development and humanitarian agencies, in part due to U.S. pressure to increase defense spending. Germany, for example, cut its humanitarian aid budget by more than 50% between 2024 and 2025, and has announced that this reduction will continue into 2026.

UN80 Reform Process

Taken together, these funding cuts have produced an existential crisis for the U.N., which faces shortfalls across nearly all of its programs. In response, the U.N. Secretary-General launched a reform process, known as UN80, aimed at improving efficiency and rebuilding trust in the institution. The initiative includes efforts to streamline humanitarian operations, including a proposed Humanitarian Compact that would reportedly increase efficiency by pooling certain back-office functions.

However, because the reform process remains largely in the hands of existing U.N. agencies, few expect major structural changes, such as agency mergers. Critics have also argued that UN80 is driven more by funding pressures than by a strategic reassessment of the U.N.’s added value. Others have criticized the process as excluding affected communities, including refugees and IDPs, and of ignoring the role of local governments and civil society organizations.

Challenges to International Law Protecting Refugees and IDPs

Until now, the 1951 Refugee Convention has been the bedrock of the refugee system. Over the years, efforts have been made to expand the application of its relatively narrow provisions, including recognition of prima facie refugees, regional agreements, and interpretations of “particular social group” to include victims of domestic violence, individuals fleeing criminal gang activity, and those persecuted for their sexual orientation or gender identity.

In November 2025, the U.N. Secretary-General called for the reaffirmation of the 1951 Refugee Convention which has “spelled the difference between life or death for millions. He continued, “We must safeguard the integrity of the refugee protection regime, working with States and other actors to ensure it is applied in a way that meets the challenges of our time. We must reaffirm that the Refugee Convention and its Protocol are the cornerstone of international refugee law — and are as necessary today as several decades ago.”

Two weeks after his January 2025 inauguration, Trump issued an executive order withdrawing the United States from the U.N. Human Rights Council and reaffirming that the U.S. would not fund UNRWA. The order also mandated a review “within 180 days of U.S. participation in and funding for all international organizations (whether or not they are part of the U.N. system) as well as multilateral treaties and conventions to which the U.S. is a party.” This includes the 1951 Refugee Convention and the U.N. Convention Against Torture, which has been used to prevent the return of individuals to countries where they may face torture.

Although the review of U.S. participation in international treaties has not been released, there is growing concern that U.S. actions may violate at least the spirit, if not the letter, of international refugee law. For example, the U.S. deportation of Iranians, Guatemalans, and Afghans appears to contravene provisions prohibiting refoulement — the expulsion or return of refugees to countries where they may face persecution or torture. While U.S. law guarantees that immigrants facing deportations have the right to due process, including the opportunity to present their case in immigration courts, the administration has repeatedly violated this process by detaining and deporting immigrants without a judicial hearing.

While international refugee law does not prohibit returning asylum-seekers to a third country, U.S. deportations of Venezuelans and others to El Salvador’s Centro de Confinamiento del Terrorismo (CECOT), a prison with a history of human rights abuses, raise serious concerns about the safety of deported individuals. By December 2025, the U.S. had deported third country nationals to 11 countries, and agreements had been signed with an additional five governments to accept further deportations.

The Landau Proposal for Refugee and IDP Protection

Despite a consensus that the 1951 Convention is not well-equipped to address modern crises such as climate-related displacement and internal flight, the international community remains cautious about reform. The prevailing concern is that reopening the Convention for amendments could reduce global protection standards. Instead, UNHCR and refugee advocates have called for a more flexible interpretation of existing international law and emphasized the millions of lives that the Convention has already helped save.

In September 2025, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, Christopher Landau hosted an event on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly, titled “The Global Refugee and Asylum System: What Went Wrong and How to Fix It.” At the event, he presented a set of principles for refugee policy aimed at addressing the challenges governments face in responding to mixed migration. Some of these principles reaffirm existing international law.

• “Every nation ultimately has the right to control its own borders.” This reflects a central tenet of existing international law, including migration law.
• “There is no right to immigrate or to receive asylum or refugee status in the country of an individual’s choice.” This implies that asylum-seekers must request protection as refugees in the first country they enter — a rule that would affect nearly all asylum-seekers in the U.S., as most arrive after transiting other countries.
• “Refugee status is temporary, not permanent.” Most countries, particularly those hosting large refugee populations, treat refugee status as temporary, pending return. In contrast, refugees resettled in the U.S. are considered permanent, as they are required to apply for permanent residency within one year and may apply for citizenship after five years.
• “Ultimately sovereign states and not transnational bodies must be making the determination whether the conditions in a country of origin permit return.” The 1951 Refugee Convention allows for cessation of refugee status when conditions causing displacement end; UNHCR has invoked this clause on 23 occasions since 1973. Some hosting countries have ended refugee status unilaterally. In practice, refugees often return when they perceive it is safe to do so — for example, over 3 million Syrian refugees and IDPs returned in the past year, even though the cessation clause has not been invoked. UNHCR is not promoting return; it is facilitating travel only for those choosing to return.
• Every country “must agree to accept expeditiously the return of its nationals.” While this is generally assumed, there are concerning instances where governments have refused to accept deportees.

While these principles seem reasonable and several reflect existing international law, there is concern from human rights groups that the U.S. could use them to develop a framework outside the United Nations to replace the 1951 Refugee Convention. The dissemination of alternative principles or frameworks could weaken both the Convention and the U.N.

IDPs as a Continuing Global Challenge

Current discussions about changing refugee norms and broader United Nations reform have largely ignored internally displaced persons (IDPs). Since IDPs are a domestic issue, countries are often reluctant to invite U.N. involvement. The scale of internal displacement remains substantial and IDPs are often more vulnerable than refugees due to their proximity to the violence and restricted humanitarian access.

There is also a clear connection between internal and cross-border displacement, with the number of IDPs rising in part because of the current trend of closing borders. Fears that UNHCR might reduce its support for IDPs due to funding shortfalls have not yet materialized, but as resources for the agency’s core mandate of protecting refugees diminish, support for other vulnerable groups is likely to come under scrutiny.

Emerging Paths to Reform

Against the challenging backdrop of funding cuts and U.S. retrenchment from multilateral approaches, some constructive trends are emerging in terms of localization.

• Importance of local integration: Responsibility is increasingly shifting to local governments and civil society actors, who are well-positioned to respond to needs in their communities. Although resource gaps remain a concern, local and refugee-led organizations are stepping into leadership roles.
• Streamlined coordination structure: Groups such as Refugees Seeking Equal Access at the Table (R-SEAT) and the United States Refugee Advisory Board (USRAB) are demanding a seat at policymaking tables and beginning to see some success.
• National and local engagement: Refugees and IDPs are increasingly recognized for the contributions they can make. In Ukraine, for example, local IDP Councils now have authority to make decisions and implement policies within their communities.

While host governments often frame refugee presence as temporary, the likelihood of return declines as displacement becomes protracted. With international funding no longer guaranteed indefinitely, local integration should be prioritized. The engagement of the World Bank in protracted refugee situations is a positive step, as is the growing emphasis on supporting refugees to become self-reliant.

Decreased humanitarian funding is also driving a necessary streamlining of the system’s complex humanitarian architecture. Over the past two decades, interagency mechanisms evolved to enhance coordination, but the system is now saturated with global, national, and sub-national meetings and working groups, some of which are organized by UN agencies and others by governments or NGOs. While clusters have improved collaboration since their introduction in 2005, they have also imposed high costs in time and resources. Current fiscal constraints may finally allow a reduction in these layers, shifting focus from meeting-heavy coordination back to direct service delivery.

The immediate effects of the Trump administration’s funding cuts and reduced support for multilateral institutions have been significant. So far, international agencies have largely sought to maintain existing operations, albeit with fewer resources. Yet the instability in global protection offers opportunities: to shift power to local organizations and to encourage governments to allow refugees and IDPs to settle permanently in their communities of displacement.

Although the 1951 Refugee Convention — the foundation of refugee protection — is under strain, this moment may inspire other governments to uphold its importance and explore alternative approaches to its limitations. It is too early to assess the long-term impact of these changes, but the lives of millions of people displaced by violence and persecution hang in the balance.

This publication was produced by Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy. Wherever feasible, the material was reviewed by outside experts prior to release. Any errors or omissions are solely the responsibility of the author(s). 

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