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Things are getting dicey in Eastern Ukraine. Pro-Russian protesters — strongly suspected of following Moscow’s lead — have taken to the streets, seizing some government buildings and calling for a referendum on separation from Ukraine. Eastern Ukraine is home to a large number of Russian speakers; it represented the political power base of ousted president Viktor Yanukovych.
This occurs while 40,000 Russian troops remain poised across the border. There is a concern in Kyiv, Washington and European capitals — not too far-fetched, given Russia’s seizure of Crimea last month — that Moscow might invade Eastern Ukraine on the pretext of protecting Russian speakers.
The response to the unrest is predictable: the central government in Kyiv has accused Russia of fomenting separatism in Eastern Ukraine; Moscow has denied any such meddling; Washington and its allies in Europe have warned Russia that any move into Ukraine would prompt a sharp reaction from the West, one above and beyond the modest sanctions currently in place.
Whatever Russia’s role in the disturbances — and it’s difficult to imagine that Moscow has not played a part in them — they do represent leverage for Moscow as it presses Kyiv to grant greater autonomy to Ukraine’s eastern regions. (The government in Kyiv is fearful, rightly, that by “autonomy” Moscow means effective Russian control and the de facto further partition of Ukraine.) The disturbances also represent leverage in Russia’s ongoing talks with the United States and the European Union on ways to defuse the current crisis. They are one more bargaining chip that Moscow can trade in return for assurances on Ukraine’s future status vis-à-vis the West.
Will Russian tanks roll across the Ukrainian border in a full-fledged invasion? It seems unlikely, as long as Moscow still entertains hopes of an outcome in Ukraine that avoids an overtly hostile state on its borders. Note that I write “unlikely,” not “impossible.” Russian President Putin is not a madman. But he is not a Machiavellian master of strategy, either. He can miscalculate. Putin did so when he seized Crimea, dashing the possibility of striking an early modus vivendi with the new government in Kyiv. And he may do so again.
Russia would no doubt bear a significant cost were it to move into Eastern Ukraine. There would be additional sanctions, with commensurate damage to the Russian economy. Moscow would find itself further isolated in the international community. NATO would likely move additional troops to Poland and the Baltic states. What was left of Ukraine would be pushed firmly and irretrievably into the Western camp. And the Russian military might face a nasty low-level conflict in the eastern regions. Whether these costs are high enough to deter Russia represents the fundamental question of the moment. And we do not have an answer. What we do know is that the West would not be prepared to go to war in order to stop Russia. This has been obvious from the beginning of the crisis. It remains obvious today.
Joe Barnes is the Baker Institute’s Bonner Means Baker Fellow. From 1979 to 1993, he was a career diplomat with the U.S. Department of State, serving in Europe, Africa, the Middle East and South Asia.
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