A Final Nuclear Agreement With Iran: Close but Not Quite There

Well, we finally have it: the framework of a nuclear agreement — ultimately, a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) — with Iran. The final details of the JCPOA, a document that will likely run to hundreds of pages, will have to be hammered out before the June 30 expiry for the current interim agreement. So the JCPOA isn’t a “done deal” yet.

The framework agreement was struck after feverish last-minute negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 (the U.S., U.K., France, China, Russia and Germany). A U.S. State Department factsheet on the parameters of the framework can be found here. Vox provides a useful, non-technical description of the main elements. Unsurprisingly, the framework agreement reflects compromises from all the parties involved. The bottom line: In exchange for scaling back its nuclear enrichment program and submitting to tough inspections, Iran will receive relief from economic sanctions currently imposed by the U.N., the EU and the United States.

We can expect the framework agreement to receive harsh criticism here in the United States, by Israel and perhaps by Saudi Arabia. All (or almost all) Republican candidates for their party’s presidential nomination — both announced and unannounced — are likely to go on record opposing it. So will most congressional Republicans, who will be joined by a significant number of Democrats. Whether opponents on the Hill will be able to scuttle any agreement by passing new sanctions against Iran is an open question; the Obama administration clearly believes it can successfully sustain a presidential veto of any such legislation.

The framework agreement is a beginning, not an end. First comes the hurdle of actually nailing down the particulars of a final JCPOA. Then comes its implementation. Here, Iranian compliance will be key: The framework agreement includes a very robust inspection regime precisely for this reason. It is also possible that the next U.S. president — particularly if she or he is a Republican — might simply withdraw from a JCPOA, though this could prove difficult to do if our allies in the EU refuse to go along.

If a final deal can be struck and if the agreement holds — both are very big ifs — the JCPOA will mark a historic foreign policy achievement by an administration that has very few of them. A successful agreement would not only reduce a major source of instability in the Persian Gulf, but it could also mark a tentative start to the process of normalizing U.S. relations with Iran. The operative word here is “tentative.” The United States and Iran remain divided on a range of important issues, most notably Iran’s support for Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Assad government in Syria; any significant improvement in U.S.-Iranian relations will require significant changes in Tehran’s foreign policy. Under the best of circumstances, normalization lies years in the future.

In any case, a JCPOA has merit on its own. It is imperfect. It may fail. But it is better than the most plausible alternatives: a further escalation in U.S.-Iranian tensions, a redoubled drive by Iran to acquire nuclear weapons, and, ultimately, U.S. military strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities. The technical term for the last is “war.”

Joe Barnes is the Baker Institute’s Bonner Means Baker Fellow. From 1979 to 1993, he was a career diplomat with the U.S. Department of State, serving in Europe, Africa, the Middle East and South Asia.

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