This working paper is one of a series submitted for the Oct. 1, 2015, Baker Institute event "Currency Policy Then and Now: 30th Anniversary of the Plaza Accord."
This working paper is one in a series submitted for the Oct. 1, 2015, Baker Institute event "Currency Policy Then and Now: 30th Anniversary of the Plaza Accord."
This working paper is one of a series submitted for the Oct. 1, 2015, Baker Institute event "Currency Policy Then and Now: 30th Anniversary of the Plaza Accord."
This working paper is one of a series submitted for the Oct. 1, 2015, Baker Institute event "Currency Policy Then and Now: 30th Anniversary of the Plaza Accord."
Russell Green, David H. Papell, Ruxandra ProdanSeptember 16, 2015
This working paper is one of a series submitted for the Oct. 1, 2015, Baker Institute event "Currency Policy Then and Now: 30th Anniversary of the Plaza Accord."
Though drops in oil prices stand to impact Saudi Arabia’s economic stability, the government has turned to drawing down its foreign reserves and issuing bonds to alleviate budgetary pressures and avoid drastic domestic spending cuts. Fellow for the Middle East Kristian Coates Ulrichsen writes in the Baker Institute Blog: http://bit.ly/1fKLWG9.
While the recent fiscal troubles in Greece have received much attention, the U.S. fiscal position is hardly comparable to that of Greece. However, the United States is experiencing, and will continue to experience, one of the fundamental economic costs of relatively large and persistent deficits.
In a July 5 referendum, Greeks overwhelmingly rejected the terms of a bailout proposed by international creditors. Baker Institute Rice scholar Ted Temzelides blogs on the surprisingly strong vote against the rescue package, and what may lie ahead.
As Congress resumes work this spring on a bill granting Trade Promotion Authority to President Obama for completion of the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade pact, many members have sought inclusion of a chapter on currency manipulation. Currency manipulation is a legitimate concern. However, countermeasures require clear, objective identification of currency manipulation. Both the IMF and the U.S. Treasury Department have mandates to identify currency manipulation, yet neither has done so in the past 20 years. If it can be done, why has it not happened more often?
In this issue brief, Russell Green, Will Clayton Fellow in International Economics, reviews the difficulties of operationalizing a currency manipulation chapter and argues that the difficulty of identifying currency manipulation suggests serious political obstacles to implementation.