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How will the midterm elections affect U.S. foreign policy? As is so maddeningly often the case in politics and policy, the answer is, well, complicated.
The midterms went surprisingly well for President Joe Biden. The Democrats held the Senate, 50-49, pending next month’s Georgia runoff between incumbent Raphael Warnock (D) and Hershel Walker (R). Should Warnock win, the Democrats would have a 51-49 majority. Sen. Chuck Schumer of New York will be the next majority leader. Sen. Mitch McConnell of Kentucky will stay on as minority leader.
Republicans did win the House of Representatives, but by a narrower margin than many expected. Indeed, the GOP majority in the House is going to be razor thin. Congressman Ken McCarthy is likely — though not certain — to be the next speaker of the House; a small group of House Republicans opposes him. With current House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s decision not to seek a Democratic leadership position, Congressman Hakeem Jeffries is highly favored to be next minority leader.
Foreign policy did not figure highly in the midterms. Other issues — notably the economy and abortion — dominated voters’ considerations. Biden’s initial decline in public approval coincided closely with the with the chaotic U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021. But there are few, if any, signs that the Afghanistan withdrawal or, indeed, Biden’s overall foreign policy had much of an impact in the midterm elections. As usual, there are strong partisan divides in voters’ assessment of Biden’s performance.
The most urgent and fraught of Biden’s foreign policies is his approach to the war in Ukraine. At some simplification, he has taken a position of a) strongly supporting Ukraine’s efforts to defend itself from Russia’s invasion while b) avoiding direct U.S. military confrontation with Russia.
To date, Biden has received bipartisan support in the Congress for $66 billion in emergency appropriations for Ukraine. His support among Democrats remains rock-solid. A very mild letter from House progressives that urged more direct U.S. diplomacy in finding a negotiated settlement in Ukraine received huge push back and was ultimately withdrawn.
GOP support has been more mixed, with perhaps a quarter of House Republicans (and a smaller percentage of Senate Republicans) voting against some of the aid packages. But there are some warning signs ahead. In October, House Minority Leader (and possible future Speaker) Kevin McCarthy said there would be “no blank check” for Ukraine should Republicans take control of the House. This could get ugly if House Republicans press for concessions elsewhere — on border control, for instance — in return for U.S. aid to Ukraine. The temptation to do so might increase should the war linger on in an ugly stalemate, a distinct possibility.
On another key issue — China — Biden should find surer Republican support. Even before President Trump, the U.S. foreign policy establishment was moving into a more confrontational attitude toward China. This was the result of the increasing challenge China represents to our global economic position and to our traditional military hegemony in the Pacific. Biden has, if anything, intensified this more aggressive approach, including new controls on high-end computer chips. True, his meeting with China’s President Xi and the G-20 Summit in Bali went well. But the overall tenor of U.S.-China relations is unlikely to change. Whether U.S.-China competition will end in armed conflict is unknown. But both countries’ militaries are planning for such a contingency.
Republicans, as a group, are likely to support Biden’s policies toward China, though they may still cause him heartburn. They could hold hearings on whether the COVID-19 epidemic was caused by a leak from a Chinese laboratory or pass bellicose resolutions on Taiwan. Both would irritate Beijing but not cause a rift in bilateral relations.
There is an area where a Republican House of Representatives could affect Biden’s foreign policy, though indirectly: raising the debt ceiling. By law, the debt ceiling — currently about $31.7 billion — must be raised periodically. Right now, projections are that the U.S. government will hit the limit early next year, constraining the government’s ability to meet its financial obligations. There is some talk of trying to get the limit raised during the Congress’s lame-duck session. If these efforts fail, House Republicans are positioned to prompt a fiscal crisis, much as they did in 2011 and 2013, by insisting on spending cuts in return for raising the debt limit. These cuts could fall on foreign affairs agencies or potentially even the Department of Defense. But, perhaps more importantly, a crisis triggered by a failure to raise a debt limit would signal, to enemies and partners alike, that the United States — for all our fleets and fighter wings — is a dysfunctional state.
In short, a Republican House is not a disaster for Biden’s foreign policy. But it will surely complicate his job as he pursues policies toward China and Ukraine.
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