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Last week’s NATO summit in Madrid revealed an organization more energized than at any time since the end of the Cold War 30 years ago. The reason is simple: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This renewed commitment conforms to the fundamental purpose of NATO, reaching back to the organization’s origins in the late 1940s. The organization was created as a defensive alliance to deter possible Soviet aggression against Western Europe. The Soviet Union is, of course, long since gone. But Russia’s attack on Ukraine — the culmination of over a decade marked by growing Russian military interference in Georgia and then Ukraine — has refocused NATO’s attention on the threat posed by Moscow.
This is one of the great ironies of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Far from weakening NATO, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decision to attack Ukraine has revitalized the alliance. While not seamless, NATO’s response to Russia aggression has been characterized by high levels of cooperation among member states, including the United States. NATO may be walking a tightrope with its approach of providing substantial assistance to Ukraine without being drawn into direct military conflict with Russia. But it has done so successfully thus far — with dire consequences for Moscow. The steadfast performance of Ukrainian forces deserves pride of place in blunting Russia’s invasion. But the substantial and growing flow of NATO arms and munitions has substantially strengthened Ukraine’s hand as the war has subsided into an ugly slugging match. The conflict in Ukraine has become, in part, a proxy war between Russia and the alliance.
The transformation in the posture of some NATO member states toward the alliance has been dramatic. Germany, in particular, has embarked on a historic program of rearmament. This includes a commitment to meet NATO’s long-standing goal of defense expenditures totaling at least 2% of GDP. That Berlin — long a laggard in military spending and proponent of accommodation with Russia — would take such dramatic steps is emblematic of the alarm created by Russia’s strike against Ukraine.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine has also prompted two new countries to seek membership in NATO: Finland and Sweden. Both are traditionally neutral states. For a few weeks, it appeared that Turkey might block their application for membership. Turkey objected to the two countries’ policies toward Kurdish groups that Ankara considers terrorist organizations. But negotiations succeeded and, at last week’s summit, NATO formally approved Finland’s and Sweden’s membership bids.
NATO expansion is by no means the only important outcome of the summit. The alliance reaffirmed its support for Ukraine, pledged to increase the number of NATO troops on high readiness, and announced a number of initiatives aimed at bolstering the alliance’s military posture on its Eastern flank.
If the Ukraine war has reinvigorated NATO, it has also again revealed the centrality of the United States to the alliance. The United States has shipped the lion’s share of military materiel to Ukraine; Washington has also provided useful battlefield intelligence to Ukrainian armed forces. Outside of NATO, Washington has worked assiduously with allies in the EU and else on unprecedented economic sanctions against the Russian economy. President Joe Biden has shown a sure touch with the complexities of alliance management.
This stands in stark contrast to his predecessor, Donald Trump, whose views of NATO — and, indeed, all multilateral organizations — could be described, charitably, as ambiguous. As a candidate, Biden promised to reinvigorate Washington’s commitment to traditional alliances. He has been, by and large, as good as his word. There were early snags. Some allies privately groused about the lack of coordination associated with the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. There was an ugly but short-lived rift with Paris over AUKUS — a Pacific security arrangement formed by the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia. But Biden’s approach to the Ukraine has shown both the president’s long experience in foreign policy and the huge influence the United States possesses in NATO. It is difficult to say how Trump — erratic in foreign policy, as in all things — would have handled Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. He could have called for a summit with Putin to partition Ukraine. He could have threatened Moscow with annihilation. He could have done both. But it is hard to imagine the former president carefully managing a coalition, within and outside NATO, to confront Moscow’s aggression.
NATO unity will continue to face challenges. One short- to medium-term point of contention is Ukraine. While support for Kyiv remains strong, there are differences of opinion on the advisability of negotiations with Moscow. Any possible talks, of course, hinge on the situation on the ground. For the moment, the war appears a stalemate. But this could change. We simply do not know what the battlefield situation will be in six or three months. Moreover, the national and international calculus in NATO capitals could change if sanctions on Russia lead to more economic damage in member countries or if second-order effects of the war spill over into the global economy, prompting a worldwide downturn.
In the longer-term, the United States and Europe face vexing questions of regional and, indeed, international security architecture. The Ukraine war, as noted, has again revealed the centrality of Washington to European security. How to square this with calls, notably from France, for greater “strategic autonomy” is a dilemma. It is unclear, for instance, how a much-enhanced EU military capability would work alongside NATO without weakening one or both.
Not least, the question of U.S. military commitment looms large as Washington addresses China’s rise in the Far East. This dual threat suggests the need for a clearer division of strategic labor between the United States and its European allies. The United States cannot abandon either region. We have abiding and deep interests in both. But if we are to dramatically increase military expenditures in the Far East, we will either have to accept substantially higher overall defense spending or transfer increased responsibility for European security to Europeans. If we don’t, we may find ourselves increasingly overstretched in the strategic arena. Grand strategy is a complex and contentious subject. But, at an important level, it simply means setting priorities in the face of limited resources. NATO may be a resurgent organization. But NATO’s future role — and Washington’s place in it — remains very much unsettled in an increasingly multipolar world.
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