Currently the Nigerian state is undergoing a civil war, with the protagonist being the Salafi-jihadi group popularly called Boko Haram. During the years since 2011, Boko Haram has morphed from being a local Salafi-jihadi group into a major player in West African radicalism. During the period since July 2014, Boko Haram has clearly set the establishment of a physical Islamic state in Nigeria as its goal and has fought the Nigerian military to a draw. While there is some support among the U.S. foreign policy community for proactively combating Boko Haram, the Nigerian civil war is not one that commands much interest among Americans as a whole. Nor is it clear the manner in which aid for fighting Boko Haram could be rendered or what exactly would be the acceptable scope of such a conflict for the United States. In this paper, author David Cook argues that there are only extreme circumstances under which the United States should involve itself in the Nigerian civil war and that thus far this conflict does not coincide with those circumstances. However, it is possible that with Boko Haram set upon the establishment of an Islamic state there could come a set of circumstances under which this reality could change.
The decade 2003-2013 was an exceptional one for Latin America in social terms, but less clearly so in economic terms. Growth slowed down significantly after the exceptional factors that fed the 2003-2007 boom came to an end. The possible unwinding of the super-cycle in commodity prices and, to a lesser extent, of the expansionary monetary policy of the United States, has added new challenges. But the major issue is the need to overcome the
poor long-term economic performance that has characterized the region in the post-market reforms period, particularly by adopting active production sector development strategies.
As the United States once again ramps up involvement in Iraq, it makes sense to examine U.S. interests and strategy while considering what might constitute realistic parameters for participation and outcome.
In this issue brief, energy fellow Jim Krane explores answers to the question "What are U.S. interests in Iraq and how are they best pursued?"
The changing regional geopolitics of the Middle East have created new opportunities for the Gulf states to engage in Arab-Israeli conflict resolution after the Arab Spring. This policy report examines the potential role that the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states — Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) — might play in Israeli-Palestinian conflict resolution. It presents policy recommendations on how the Gulf states can engage with regional and international partners and build upon the greater space for action as the shifting parameters of Middle East politics create new regional pathways for action and cooperation.
Marijuana decriminalization and legalization have gone past being a trend and are settling in as federal policy, writes nonresident fellow Gary Hale, a 31-year veteran of the Drug Enforcement Administration. This policy brief includes recommendations for how the DEA can adjust its policies to adopt a new paradigm on marijuana policy.
Fellow Joe Barnes looks at the kerfuffle arising from former secretary of state Hillary Clinton’s critical — much-publicized — response to President Obama’s description of his foreign policy as “don’t do stupid stuff.”
Neal Lane, senior fellow in science and technology policy, testified before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation on July 17, 2014. Lane is co-chair of the American Academy of Arts and Science's project on New Models for U.S. Science and Technology Policy, and his testimony addressed the project's objective of sustaining a long-term, nonpartisan, national focus on science and technology policy issues of vital importance to the country.
One hundred years after the start of World War I, the legacies of decisions made by colonial powers during and after the period cast a long shadow over the Middle East.
Despite his sweeping electoral victory, it seems that Egypt's new president, General Abdul-Fattah el-Sisi, has learned little from the past mistakes of Mubarak and Morsi.
