Research Library

This report suggests the contours of a more comprehensive policy for the United States in the broader Middle East, one that pursues not only important tactical approaches to counter Islamic extremism and terrorism, but also shapes the larger strategic landscape to secure and promote U.S. interests. After defining the challenge for the United States and the international community, the report provides a brief narrative on the rise of ISIS before presenting key policy recommendations for a more strategic approach.

The deepening civil war in Yemen poses more challenges than solutions for Saudi Arabia, writes Middle East scholar Andrew Bowen.

Currently the Nigerian state is undergoing a civil war, with the protagonist being the Salafi-jihadi group popularly called Boko Haram. During the years since 2011, Boko Haram has morphed from being a local Salafi-jihadi group into a major player in West African radicalism. During the period since July 2014, Boko Haram has clearly set the establishment of a physical Islamic state in Nigeria as its goal and has fought the Nigerian military to a draw. While there is some support among the U.S. foreign policy community for proactively combating Boko Haram, the Nigerian civil war is not one that commands much interest among Americans as a whole. Nor is it clear the manner in which aid for fighting Boko Haram could be rendered or what exactly would be the acceptable scope of such a conflict for the United States. In this paper, author David Cook argues that there are only extreme circumstances under which the United States should involve itself in the Nigerian civil war and that thus far this conflict does not coincide with those circumstances. However, it is possible that with Boko Haram set upon the establishment of an Islamic state there could come a set of circumstances under which this reality could change.

A new analysis reveals substantial global health gains for AIDS, malaria and neglected tropical diseases that were first targeted by the administration of President George W. Bush in 2003 and then greatly expanded by the Obama administration. Beginning in 2016, an incoming administration will have opportunities to build on this legacy to control and eliminate poverty-related diseases — including those with pandemic potential — and to assert American leadership while being mindful of fiscal constraints.

As the United States once again ramps up involvement in Iraq, it makes sense to examine U.S. interests and strategy while considering what might constitute realistic parameters for participation and outcome. In this issue brief, energy fellow Jim Krane explores answers to the question "What are U.S. interests in Iraq and how are they best pursued?"

Thursday's Baker Institute Blog carries a commentary from fellow Joe Barnes on President Obama’s Sept. 10, 2014, speech on ISIS and Iraq.

Fellow Joe Barnes looks at the kerfuffle arising from former secretary of state Hillary Clinton’s critical — much-publicized — response to President Obama’s description of his foreign policy as “don’t do stupid stuff.”

One hundred years after the start of World War I, the legacies of decisions made by colonial powers during and after the period cast a long shadow over the Middle East.

On May 22, the House of Representatives passed the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, which specifies the budget and expenditures of the United States Department of Defense and sets the policies under which money (somewhat in excess of $600 billion) will be spent on our country’s defense. However, an amendment added to the bill will keep the Department of Defense from preparing for or performing any military activities that include any construction related to climate change.

President Obama’s commencement address at West Point on Wednesday was clearly aimed at deflecting rising criticism of his administration’s foreign policy. In particular, the speech was designed to address complaints that U.S. foreign policy under Obama has lacked strategic coherence and signaled a U.S. retreat from the international arena. The administration promoted the address as a platform for the president to describe his “vision” for U.S. foreign policy during the remainder of his term. To the extent that the speech did present a vision, it was not a particularly new one.