Research Library

On May 23, Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto signed a series of bills to implement constitutional changes to the country’s political and electoral processes. The reforms bring some of the most dynamic shifts to Mexican politics since the 1990s, including replacing the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) with the National Electoral Institute (INE). The new INE and the measures behind it now strive to replicate the IFE’s success in the country's states and municipalities.

This issue brief proposes a framework for awarding bids in a public tender for exploration blocks. The context for the proposal is Mexico’s energy reform of 2013-2014.

This issue brief examines the signals conveyed by Mexico's 2014 energy reforms, and analyzes the limitations in law, institutional design and policy that may delay, if not derail, the reforms' success.

Twenty years after NAFTA came into force, Mexico is more dependent than ever on food imports. Energy reforms could help change that.

Under proposed legislation to implement Mexico’s energy reforms, Pemex will remain a privileged state operator supporting exploration and production in most of the country's proven onshore and shallow water fields. It is not known if energy reform will effectively turn Pemex into a firm able to compete without policy bias against private investors.

Energy regulation under Mexico's energy-sector reforms are of great interest to investors, since autonomous regulators—protected from political pressures and able to make and sustain technical decisions—can guarantee greater legal consistency than government authorities exposed to political pressures. The difficulty was finding an alternative model that ensured the institutional strengthening of the agencies without relinquishing too much control of the executive branch.

This paper explores some of the issues that confront the full realization of the benefits of energy resource development in the United States, Canada, and Mexico, collectively.

José Woldenberg, who served as the first president of Mexico's Federal Electoral Institute, traced the country's transition to democracy at an April 2014 lecture hosted by the Baker Institute Mexico Center. The center's Lisa Guaqueta and Kristin Foringer explain why Mexico's experience is distinct from similar processes elsewhere in the world.

Mexico's organized crime groups have expanded into areas that include the theft of crude oil, gas and gasoline. The impact of organized crime on the energy sector is a real threat to the intended effects of Mexico's energy reforms.

Fossil fuel subsidies have allowed energy exporting countries to distribute resource revenue, bolstering legitimacy for governments, many of which are not democratically elected. But subsidy benefits are dwarfed by the harmful consequences of encouraging uneconomic use of energy. Now, with consumption posing a threat to long-term exports, governments face a heightened need to raise prices that have come to be viewed as entitlements. While reforms of state benefits are notoriously politically dangerous, previous experience shows that subsidies can be rolled back without undermining government legitimacy — even in autocratic settings — given proper preparation.