1. The Syrian press frequently accuses Israel of meddling and trying to provoke crises between the U.S. and Iraq. See, for example, Al-Thawra, February 25, 1998, and Tishrin, February 17, 1998.

2. See Asad’s address on his inauguration for a 5^th term of office, Damascus Radio, March 13, 1999.

3. See interview with Syria’s Vice President, Abdel Khalim Khaddam, to Al-Mustaqbal, February 3, 1995, in which he explains Syria’s surprise and anger at the separate treaties with Israel and interview with Asad’s son, Bashar, to Al-Kifah al- Arabi, February 4, 1999, in which he argues that the separate deals "gave Israel significant gains."

4. Syrian Defense Minister Talas refers extensively to this subject in an interview with the Kuwaiti daily Al-Anba, September 30, 1998, in which he scathingly attacks Jordan for joining the Israeli-Turkish alliance. In an interview with Al-Ba’th, July 30, 1998, the Syrian Chief of Staff, Aslan, declared that Israel had "made a dubious alliance with Turkish generals tied to the U.S., the aim of which was to frighten the Arab nation and Syria."

5. See interview with the Syrian Finance Minister, Al-Mu’ayna, to Al-Ba’th, September 1, 1997.

6. The Americans protested vehemently while the Syrians apologized and promised to pay about half a million dollars in damages. Al-Hayat, February 25, 1999, Radio Monte Carlo, February 13, 1999.

7. See, for example, Asad’s interview with Evans and Novak, CNN, September 25, 1996.

8. Syrian Foreign Minister Al-Shar’a often complained that Jordan’s ties with Israel were warmer than with any of the Arab states. See interviews, MBC and BBC, February 4-5, 1999.

9. In this context, it is worth noting Al-Shar’a’s comments on Algerian Television, March 19, 1998, that "no one wants war, aims for war, or thinks about war if a political solution can achieve results without casualties."

10. For a more detailed account, see Uri Savir, The Process: 1100 Days that Changed the Middle East, Random House (New York, 1998), Helena Cobban, Syria and the Peace: A Good Chance Missed, Carlisle Barracks, PA, U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, July 7, 1997, and Itamar Rabinovich, The Brink of Peace: The Israeli-Syrian Negotiations, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1998.

11. See, for example, Asad’s interviews with Al-Ahram, December 28, 1996, and CNN, September 25, 1996, and the comments of Syria’s Ambassador to Washington Walid Mu’allim, who, citing Israeli publications, declared that Rabin committed himself through the Americans to a full withdrawal from the Golan, Saudi Newsagency, August 30, 1997.

12. See, for example, Aluf Ben, "The Golan Heights File," Ha’aretz, January 14, 1997.

13. See Jerusalem Post, December 19, 1995, for a detailed account of the 10 new points raised by Peres to the Syrians as a basis for starting negotiations.

14. Turkish Daily News, Ankara, February 15, 1996.

15. French Newsagency, January 14, 1997, and interview by Mu’allim to Saudi Newsagency, August 30,1997.

16. See Radio Monte Carlo commentary from Damascus, February 9, 1996.

17. Interview with Vice President Khaddam, MBC Television February 9, 1997.

18. See Mu’allim interview with Al-Safir, January 17, 1997, and interview with Israeli Television, November 12, 1997, in which he expresses astonishment at Israel’s invoking agreements from the Mandatory period on the Syrian front, while refusing to implement them on the Palestinian front.

19. See Ze’ev Schiff, Ha’aretz, May 28, 1999, and Daniel Pipes, "What Netanyahu Almost Gave Away," New Republic, July 5, 1998, and Netanyahu’s interview with Israeli Television, Channel 2, July 14, 1999.

20. Interview with Al-Wasat, April 27, 1999.

21. It should be pointed out that the June 4, 1967 line is not demarcated or defined and merely expresses the effective areas of control by each side prior to the outbreak of the Six Day War. The international border of 1923 is the only line between Israel and Syria to have been accorded binding international and legal validity. The Syrian demand for withdrawal to the June 4 lines is motivated by considerations of prestige and national honor and by a desire to make gains across the 1923 border, especially El-Hama and parts of the Kinneret. But, from the point of view of international law, the Syrian position is weak.

22. See statement by then Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin at the opening of the Knesset’s winter session, October 3, 1994.

23. Radio Damascus, February 17, 1996.

24. See Aboulhay Saed, "National Threat Perceptions in the Middle East, " UNIDIR, Geneva, September, 1995.

25. See interview with Barak, Ma’ariv, February 2, 1999.

26. See Patrick Seale, Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East, University of California Press, California, 1989, and Moshe Maoz, Assad-The Sphynx of Damascus: A Political Biography, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, (London and N.Y., 1998).

27. See Mu’allim’s comment when discussing Peres’ policy, Al-Safir, January 17, 1997, and "Fresh light on Syrian-Israel peace negotiations," Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. XXXVI, No. 2, Winter 1997, pp. 81-94.

28. It is worth noting that in the past, the Syrians believed and said that there was no difference between the Likud and Labor. Ironically, there were even those who actually wanted a change in government in 1996. Asad himself said so once. There is no doubt now that Asad recognizes his error. Rabin’s assassination and the consequences of Netanyahu’s coming to power must have shaken him. One can assume that he now understands the political structure in Israel better, and that chances are both created and missed, and that now there is a fresh opportunity.

29. Asad, in a message to the Syrian Army, SANA, July 31, 1998.

30. See "The Prospects for the Israeli-Syrian peace negotiations," The James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy Study, Number 8, Rice University, Houston, Texas, August 1998.