Research Library

This issue brief describes the current state of brackish groundwater use and development in the United States.

The relationship between Mexico and Texas is in dire need of reassessment, given the chasm between the reality of the countries’ economic and cultural relationship and the political rhetoric that surrounds it.

With two corporate groups dominating Mexico's television sector, the country’s 2014 telecommunications reform established constitutional “must carry” and “must offer” (MC/MO) regulations. These regulations mandate that free-to-air broadcasters must allow pay TV companies to retransmit in the same coverage area without payment (must offer) and that pay TV companies must provide audiences with these free-to-air broadcasts without passing fees along to subscribers (must carry). While the reform legislation places rhetorical importance on promoting culturally diverse and pluralistic content for all broadcast audiences, there is little substantive commitment to these ideals. The Mexican variation of MC/MO is an ad hoc policy with many flaws. Ultimately, the Supreme Court will determine the future of MC/MO in Mexico. Given the reform’s legal framework, however, content diversity and pluralism will not be enhanced by MC/MO in Mexico.

Although there are enormous potential benefits for Mexico's energy sector in the future, there are also important challenges the country must overcome to fully realize its energy potential. One of them has to do with the land ownership and land use regime in Mexico. As the legislative debate on the new Ley de Petróleos and the Ley de la Comisión Federal de Electricidad (Petroleum Act and Federal Electric Utility Act) proceeded in the summer of 2014, the Mexican Congress anticipated potential land-related conflicts associated with exploration and production activities related to hydrocarbons and new energy-related infrastructure projects. These potential conflicts stem from the fact that all of these projects will necessarily require the right of way to access and work on the resources in the subsoil of privately owned as well as on so-called “socially owned” lands in regions targeted for energy development. Thus, the Mexican Congress sought to avoid land-related conflicts by including language related to land ownership and use in the new energy legislation. The legislation, however, may not be able to prevent such conflicts.

With the recent approval of Mexico's energy reform and the current enthusiasm of South American governments to attract foreign investment in oil, one might be tempted to conclude that the tide of resource nationalism is receding in the region. Nevertheless, the cycles of investment and expropriation that have characterized the oil sector in Latin America are unlikely to go away.

On May 23, Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto signed a series of bills to implement constitutional changes to the country’s political and electoral processes. The reforms bring some of the most dynamic shifts to Mexican politics since the 1990s, including replacing the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) with the National Electoral Institute (INE). The new INE and the measures behind it now strive to replicate the IFE’s success in the country's states and municipalities.

Under proposed legislation to implement Mexico’s energy reforms, Pemex will remain a privileged state operator supporting exploration and production in most of the country's proven onshore and shallow water fields. It is not known if energy reform will effectively turn Pemex into a firm able to compete without policy bias against private investors.

Energy regulation under Mexico's energy-sector reforms are of great interest to investors, since autonomous regulators—protected from political pressures and able to make and sustain technical decisions—can guarantee greater legal consistency than government authorities exposed to political pressures. The difficulty was finding an alternative model that ensured the institutional strengthening of the agencies without relinquishing too much control of the executive branch.

Mexico's organized crime groups have expanded into areas that include the theft of crude oil, gas and gasoline. The impact of organized crime on the energy sector is a real threat to the intended effects of Mexico's energy reforms.

Mexico’s 2013–2014 energy reform promises to bring the country’s economic drivers and regulatory institutions in line with the global practices of free market democracies. If successful, this development would be a 180-degree turn. The accomplishment of such realignment is hardly assured, however.