

PDGP

**PUBLIC DIPLOMACY &
GLOBAL POLICYMAKING
IN THE 21ST CENTURY**

الدبلوماسية العامة وصنع السياسة العالمية

The 2013 Houston Colloquium:

Findings from the
Student-led Public Diplomacy Program

Rice University's Baker Institute

in partnership with the
Qatar Foundation and Hamad bin Khalifa University

*The 2013 Houston Colloquium:
Findings from the Student-led Public Diplomacy
Program*

A Special Report by the Public Diplomacy and Global Policymaking in the
21st Century Program

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James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy
Rice University

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Executive Summary

The 2013 Public Diplomacy and Global Policymaking (PDGP) colloquium of Rice University's Baker Institute was the program's fourth undergraduate exchange since its establishment in 2010. The mission of PDGP is to bring together Rice University and Qatari students to actively participate in public diplomacy by listening to, learning from, and engaging with cohorts from around the world. Through cross-cultural exchange and open colloquium sessions on important areas of international concern, the PDGP program hopes to lay the foundation for global policymaking in the 21st century.

The 2013 PDGP colloquium was the product of the Baker Institute's continued collaboration between with the Qatar Foundation and Hamad bin Khalifa University (HBKU). The four-day event, hosted at the Baker Institute in Houston, Texas, included five two-hour colloquium sessions. Members of the Rice and HBKU delegations jointly led these colloquium sessions on preventive health care, sustainable environmental and energy policy, foreign policy in the Middle East, the role of interfaith dialogue in diplomacy, and immigration policies in competitive global economies. Outside of these formal discussions, the Qatari students were able to enjoy local landmarks and attractions through visits to the Houston Livestock Show and Rodeo, the Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center, the Houston Galleria, and Texas A&M University, which has a branch campus at Education City in Doha, Qatar.

This report provides the colloquium summaries written by the Rice University delegates through the Baker Institute course "Public Diplomacy in Qatar." These papers comprise the students' semester-long studies of each topic, as well as insights from the formal and informal discussions at the colloquium. From this research and dialogue, the students suggested policy options or goals. The overarching themes of these policy recommendations include the global need for increased education, the growing importance of media in the 21st century, and the need for a multidisciplinary approach to policymaking. Given the unique composition of each student delegation and open nature of the colloquium, the students were able to express their individual beliefs regarding global issues of policy concern.

The PDGP program hopes to continue promoting international engagement, public diplomacy, cultural awareness, and policymaking among undergraduate students to better prepare them for an ever-globalizing world. To this end, the Baker Institute and Qatar Foundation are currently planning for the March 2014 colloquium, to be held in Doha.

Introduction

by Walter Hurst Williamson

During his speech from Cairo's Al-Azhar University in 2009, U.S. President Barack Obama called for a "new beginning between the United States and Muslims around the world . . . based upon the truth that America and Islam are not exclusive" (Obama 2009). Despite this optimism for improvement in Arab-U.S. relations, Arab approval of U.S. policies throughout the Middle East has fallen significantly since the time of Obama's Cairo speech (Gallup 2010). In the aftermath of the Arab uprisings, which led to dramatic changes in regimes and spurred civil war, the Middle East remains in the media spotlight worldwide and at the forefront of U.S. foreign policy. As the various states in the region undergo transition and fundamental shifts in their ideologies and political doctrines, the people of the Middle East must grapple with how "Islamist values and goals may conflict with the [emerging] democratic politics of the revolutions" (Kennedy 2013). Given the present level of resentment and mistrust of the United States throughout the Middle East, a need for alternative channels to reach Arab populations has become increasingly apparent. One mechanism is through public diplomacy.

The Concept of Public Diplomacy

Public diplomacy aims to open a dialogue and forge a greater understanding between the publics of two or more states. It has been described as the effort to "first listen and understand, and only then to inform, engage, and influence" (Djerejian 2003). To this end, public diplomacy has emerged as an instrument by which individuals from the United States can reach out to and converse with their Arab counterparts. The present challenges of the Middle East reflect the importance of public diplomacy as a non-state-led effort to establish alternative civilian communications in an area that has seen large-scale American military involvement. U.S. involvement began largely after World War II through its support of regimes in the region to serve the U.S. oil interests, followed by the direct invasion in Iraq during Operation Desert Storm in 1991, and continuing through the 21st-century wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. As President Obama stressed in his speech, public diplomacy efforts by the United States are crucial for continued and expanded relations with Arab states.

Public diplomacy initiatives will not bring about an overnight change in U.S.-Middle East relations. Instead, the expansion of public diplomacy aims for a gradual improvement in relations through increased student and professional interactions. Through communication with international audiences, cultural programming, academic grants,

educational exchanges, and international visitor programs, the United States can work to improve its own public's opinion of the Middle East, as well as enhance America's image throughout Arab states (U.S. State Department 2012). Due to the continued strategic importance of the Middle East to U.S. interests, the United States should not only continue its current public diplomacy efforts, but also progressively adopt new methods to effectively influence the opinion of Arab populations.

Public Diplomacy and Global Policymaking at Rice University's Baker Institute

Through the student-led PDGP program, undergraduates with diverse majors and backgrounds participate in a form of public diplomacy. Since the program's inception in 2010, Rice undergraduates have participated in policy discussions with their Middle Eastern counterparts with the goal of "teaching scholars and developing tomorrow's policy leaders and statesmen" (PDGP 2013). The program is supplemented by the spring semester course "Public Diplomacy in Qatar," taught by Baker Institute science and technology policy fellow Kirstin R.W. Matthews, Ph.D., and culminates in a colloquium with university students from the Middle East. Prior to the colloquium, PDGP delegates from Rice and universities in the Middle East negotiate and collaborate on discussion topics. After the colloquium, the Rice students work in teams to publish their findings on each colloquium topic, culminating in a collective report.

During its first year, the PDGP program partnered with undergraduates at the American University in Cairo (AUC) (PDGP 2010). After the Egyptian revolution and ensuing instability, the program moved to Doha, Qatar, in 2012 and started a long-standing relationship with the Qatar Foundation. The 2012 program included a four-day colloquium at Qatar Foundation's Education City in Doha. Constructed under the leadership of Her Highness Sheikha Mozah through the Qatar Foundation, Education City is the location of the foundation's flagship program that develops the country into a more knowledge-based economy and promotes the creation of first-rate higher-learning institutions and research centers (Qatar Foundation 2013). Within Education City are six U.S. university branch campuses that are under the umbrella of Hamad bin Khalifa University (HBKU): Virginia Commonwealth University, Weill Cornell Medical College, Texas A&M University, Carnegie Mellon University, Georgetown University, and Northwestern University (HBKU 2013). Following that colloquium's conclusion, the Rice delegates published their findings in *The 2012 Qatar Colloquium: Findings from the Student-led Public Diplomacy Program* (PDGP 2012).

The 2013 Student Colloquium

This year marked the first year that the PDGP colloquium has been held in the United States. In March 2013, Rice University hosted a Qatari delegation at the Baker Institute. The Rice contingent comprised 12 students from a wide range of backgrounds, including students from the schools of engineering, social sciences, natural sciences, and humanities. Topics for the colloquium included globalization and the need for interfaith

dialogue; foreign policy in the Middle East (focusing on the roles of both the United States and Qatar); immigration policy; sustainable energy and environmental policy; and the creation of national preventive health care policy.

The Qatari delegation was made up of 11 international students attending the Georgetown, Northwestern, and Texas A&M branch campuses in Education City. Prior to the students' trip to Houston, they attended a companion course organized at Texas A&M University at Qatar by Todd Kent, Ph.D., the school's assistant dean for academic affairs. At the Baker Institute, Qatari delegates assigned to specific discussion teams met with their Rice counterparts to moderate their respective sessions. None of the sessions were electronically recorded in order to promote a healthy and more open dialogue.

Houston, as the nation's most diverse city (surpassing New York City in 2012), was a rich environment for hosting the PDGP colloquium (Klineberg 2012). Furthermore, Houston is one of the world's leading industrial energy cities and is home to the Texas Medical Center, the largest and most heavily trafficked medical facility in the world (Texas Medical Center 2013). Houston also hosts the largest waterborne tonnage port in the United States (Port of Houston Authority 2013). This setting offered both the U.S. and Qatari delegations the unique opportunity to discuss and debate energy, health care, and immigration policy in one of the world's largest epicenters of all three topics. Additionally, the Qatari delegates received extensive immersion in Texas culture: the Rice delegation hosted a night at Minute Maid Park to watch Rice's baseball team play Texas A&M's, as well as an afternoon at the Houston Livestock Show and Rodeo – one of the world's largest rodeos (Houston Livestock Show and Rodeo 2013).

After the conclusion of the colloquium, each team of Rice discussion leaders further researched and compiled papers suggesting policy goals stemming from the talks in their respective sessions. In the following report, each group provides an overview of a given colloquium topic, summarizes current literature on the topic, and offers a series of policy recommendations or options that draws on the discussions from the colloquium. The report also outlines final conclusions from the experience as well as thoughts for the future of the PDGP program.

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The Importance of Interfaith Dialogue in the 21st Century

by Shayak Sengupta and Walter Hurst Williamson

Throughout the world, eight in 10 people identify with a religious group. Furthermore, almost 55 percent of the world's population identifies as either Muslim or Christian (Pew Forum 2012). In both the Middle East and the United States, the majority of the population identifies with one of these two religions. In Qatar specifically, 78 percent of the population practices Islam, although this figure is close to 100 percent if only Qatari citizens are considered; and, like many other Middle Eastern countries, its government is intimately intertwined with religion through the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and the implementation of sharia law (U.S. Department of State 2011; Qatar Statistics Authority 2009). Similarly, the United States, though officially secular, contains a population that is 78 percent Christian and that reports one of the highest levels of religiosity among industrialized nations (Pew Forum 2010; Brown 2009). Religion undoubtedly plays a role in the public lives of these societies; therefore, interfaith dialogue could and should also play a role in developing policies between countries in order to form a basis of understanding, whether on a personal or political level.

In its simplest form, interfaith dialogues, or positive interactions between individuals or institutions of different faiths, serve as ideological forums and potential springboards for further secular interactions. This can include improving understanding between faiths, exchanging ways to better engage people of different faiths, or learning to work together toward a common goal. Interfaith exchanges are commonly used in the United States as outreach tools for helping the poor or others in need. Participants traditionally include, but are not limited to, religious leaders interacting to promote mutual understanding. Most importantly, interfaith dialogue can also be a tool for diplomacy, especially in resolving issues that involve various actors with devout religious backgrounds, such as the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks. Although Jewish Israelis and Christian and Muslim Palestinians used to live peacefully together, the issue has since become a political problem in which the unfortunate exploitation of religion has become a divisive factor. With Jerusalem being a center for the three major monotheistic religions, interfaith dialogue can be used to encourage communication based on mutual understanding and respect as a basis for settling overlying disputes. These exchanges can be accomplished by traditional players, such as diplomats, or nontraditional players who work outside of the government.

In this paper, we will highlight ways in which both traditional and non-traditional actors can be used to promote interfaith dialogue. We will also suggest specific issues for which

interfaith dialogue might be productive. Additionally, we will link interfaith dialogues to public diplomacy and the formation of public policy. Specifically, we maintain that policy should be tailored to improve the religious literacy of state-level personnel. Countries should also capitalize on the distinct position that nongovernmental actors play in facilitating interfaith dialogue. Finally, we will illustrate the past effectiveness of combining interfaith dialogue, public policy, and public diplomacy, as well as the potential application of this strategy in resolving continuous conflicts such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Diplomacy and Interfaith Dialogues

Government-level initiatives should be carried out through religiously literate state representatives. Career diplomats, attachés, aid workers, and even military chaplains must develop a basic understanding of the religious beliefs of the people with whom they work, both domestically and abroad (Johnston and Cox 2003, 24-26).

For example, the U.S. State Department Working Group on Religion and Foreign Policy illustrates the U.S. government's first institutional recognition of religious factors in developing foreign policy (Institute for Global Engagement 2011). Building off this historic first step, further efforts through the State Department's training arm, the U.S. Foreign Service Institute, should specifically target interfaith dialogue through required courses. While the institute offers a "Religion in Foreign Policy" course, region-specific courses should be expanded to include classes that address the role of religion in specific regions. In addition to courses such as "Iraq: Society, Religion and Politics," the State Department could develop courses tailored to Africa, South America, and Asia (U.S. Foreign Service Institute 2011).

Despite receiving comprehensive training, many U.S. diplomatic personnel still do not fully comprehend the importance of understanding the religious beliefs of the people with whom they engage (Patterson 2011, ix-x). An individual's religious beliefs are often extremely nuanced and hold great personal significance, often intertwined with everyday activities, cultural traditions, and even political affiliation. Because of the complexity and powerful influence of religion, U.S. personnel on the ground overseas should not only receive extensive training on religious attitudes in their deployed regions, but also refer to this knowledge and proficiency throughout the term of their service.

Such a top-down approach to expanding religious literacy should occur on a case-by-case basis. Echoing this sentiment during the student colloquium, both Qatari and American delegates agreed that a single policy could not be applied globally. A state-level approach tailored specifically to a region's culture and society allows for an efficient allocation of state resources. Through this strategy, career diplomats and other government officials with expanded religious literacy can more effectively engage in faith-based diplomacy that diminishes misunderstandings.

Inevitably, however, reform strictly along governmental lines cannot possibly incorporate all aspects of interfaith dialogue. If one state wishes to pursue policy reform that will lead to a broader cultural understanding with states holding differing views, then it should also consider how the policy will impact everyone. For example, in 2012, France passed legislation often referred to as the “burqa ban” to remove external signs of Islam, intending to help eliminate bias based on religion. Instead, the government was seen as anti-religious, and this restriction of an individual’s right to practice his or her religious faith created a negative public image (Leane 2011, 1032–1037). A state may have a role in the interaction between different faiths but should be cautious of addressing faith through legislation.

Religious Transnational Actors and Public Diplomacy

In addition to traditional players being involved in interfaith dialogues, globalization has led to more active religious transnational actors (RTAs). These individuals work outside the government and are often clergy, teacher, youths, or other practitioners of a particular faith. They possess “soft power,” or the ability to both directly and indirectly influence state policy (Haynes 2012, 1, 27).

RTAs and other nongovernmental entities project a soft power capable of promoting interfaith cooperation and cohesion. Clergy, academics, and, to a lesser extent, students, have the ability to partake in interfaith dialogue and education across international borders because of their ability to engage and interact freely without the entanglements of governmental channels. Such entanglements include public opinion, national security interests, and economic constraints imposed by national governments. This “ideological domination” by nonstate actors affords RTAs a freedom to “transcend the established international order,” effectively providing a magnitude of influence to operators outside of state control (Haynes 2012, 85).

The PDGP delegates from both sides recognized and extensively discussed the roles of nonstate actors in promoting interfaith dialogue. Suggestions included U.S. State Department–run exchange programs centered around interfaith envoys, similar to the Science Envoy Program launched in 2009. Envoys would promote national interests while simultaneously collaborating and cooperating with counterparts abroad. Religious scholars and leaders from the United States have gone abroad to establish a faith-based partnership to alleviate poverty. The United States also currently promotes programs such as the Fulbright program that funds academic study and cultural awareness between the United States and countries abroad, targeting both U.S. and foreign nationals. Using this framework as a template, similar programs or extensions of current programs could be implemented to include students and scholars wishing to pursue religious and interfaith studies. Conversely, such programs could also be implemented abroad to bring scholars and students to the United States. Such exchanges would capitalize on soft power and thus extend the RTA reach with an appropriate level of state involvement.

Use of Interfaith Dialogues

Several examples of current interfaith dialogues demonstrate how RTAs have helped improve diplomatic relations. The Alexandria Process, an established interfaith dialogue in the Middle East, brings together Muslim, Christian, and Jewish religious leaders—such as the Archbishop of Canterbury, a chief rabbi of Israel, and the dean of the Al-Azhar seminary in Cairo—for dialogue related to the matters concerning the Middle East and other world affairs. Funded by the U.S. Congress through the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), this program has averted religious violence in Hebron, Israel (United States Institute of Peace 2004, 3). In another example of a USIP-funded program, a grassroots-level initiative brought together Christian pastors and Muslim imams in Nigeria to engage in productive dialogue and solve problems based on shared values. This program aimed to curb the rise of youth school dropouts and drug use by promoting peaceful coexistence and mutual understanding, thereby helping to prevent possible religious violence (United States Institute of Peace 2004, 4-5). The Doha International Center for Interfaith Dialogue (DICID) was established by an Amiri decree in 2007 as part of Qatar’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It sponsors several programs, including lectures to train teachers in interfaith education, and has hosted international conferences to promote interreligious discussions and understanding. The 2011 conference focused specifically on the role of social media in interfaith dialogue. These projects are examples of how policy can effectively target community-level dialogue.

Use of interfaith discussions also could be used as a tool to address one of the most pressing world issues: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Although a political accord must be the ultimate solution to this issue, a government-level agreement will not guarantee popular and peaceful compliance unless the people themselves accept it. This acceptance can be gained through mutual understanding and trust, which can be built, at least partially, by interreligious dialogue. At the policymaking level, Palestinian and Israeli leaders should incorporate policies to promote interfaith dialogue as a way to provide the added legitimacy to future agreements (Abu-Nimer 2004, 493). The respective religions of both parties extend from the political elites to grassroots organizations, and the incorporation of religious literacy into the peace talks would create a symbolic framework to appease both sides.

PDGP delegates were skeptical in general of the role of increased religious literacy. Most participants believed religion would impede national policies more than promote international cooperation. Similar to the students’ hesitation to discuss religion, current Israeli and Palestinian peace talks have not included interfaith elements. However, the strong influence of religion in Israel, Palestine, and the United States—the three major players in negotiating peace in the region—is an important factor. In addition, interfaith dialogue is one of the few avenues that has yet to be fully explored as a negotiation option. Opening a religious aspect of the peace talks may help channel a path toward agreement, but PDGP delegates’ reactions highlight the wider reluctance to engage in interfaith

dialogue. Religion cannot, and should not, be excluded from the talks. On the contrary, through a combination of state-driven interfaith policy initiatives and RTAs, greater religious literacy in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process may provide a real possibility for finding a solution.

Conclusions

Interfaith dialogue can intersect public policy through a variety of avenues, such as increased religious literacy in state officials and the incorporation of RTAs and soft power entities into peacemaking processes. Career diplomats and other officials must actively gain knowledge about the religious beliefs and values of the people with whom they routinely engage—knowledge that primarily can only come through training, education, and openness. Furthermore, interfaith dialogue used by nonstate officials is often more effective. RTAs separate from the government, such as clergy, academics, religious scholars, and students can impact policy and interfaith discussions. Public policy can encourage such actors to participate by establishing cultural and academic exchanges, as well as peacebuilding for global conflicts.

Interfaith dialogue, because of its shown effectiveness, provides future opportunities for conflict resolution and mutual understanding across international borders. The application and promotion of interfaith dialogue could provide avenues for conflict resolutions between Hausa-Fulan, Yaruba, and Igbo ethnic groups in Nigeria; the continued religious violence between Christians and Muslims in South Sudan and Sudan, respectively; and the ongoing problems between Muslims and Buddhists in Burma and Buddhists and Hindus in Sri Lanka. These and future conflicts will undoubtedly need comprehensive solutions, and interfaith dialogue could provide a crucial perspective and a springboard to a peaceful resolution.

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Foreign Policy in the Middle East: The Roles of the United States and Qatar

by Jacinta Leyden, Monica Matsumoto, and Sevita Rama

The Arab Awakening has compelled both the United States and Qatar to reassess their foreign policy objectives regarding the Middle East. Despite its relative size, Qatar's international prominence has exponentially risen over the past 20 years with the promotion of a more active foreign policy than ever before. Particularly with respect to Syria, Qatar and the United States have been playing different roles in the ongoing revolution. Similarly, the decade-long conflict with Israel and Palestine has provided the opportunity for both countries to reassess their positions as mediators in the elusive search for lasting peace. The motivations and the types of assistance given to Syria, Israel, and Palestine differ between the United States and Qatar, but the solutions may provide a space for greater future collaboration. In this paper, we will explore the Syrian and Israeli-Palestinian situations as case studies of the role that the United States and Qatar play as diplomatic actors in the Middle East.

Current Approaches in Syria

The ongoing revolution in Syria presents a foreign policy quandary for both the United States and Qatar. With regard to Syria, the United States must take into account the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Iraq war, Iran's role in the Middle East, and the Arab Awakening in Syria and other Middle Eastern countries before taking a final course of action. Current motivations for U.S. intervention in Syria would diverge from past U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East, which has focused predominately on securing U.S. oil interests in the region. Despite the absence of oil, Syria remains a strategic battleground, not only as Russia's last true ally in the region, but also as a byway for weapons passed from Iran to Hezbollah. At this time, the United States is providing nonlethal aid to the Syrian revolution through organizations such as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the U.S. State Department giving approximately \$384 million to the Syria Humanitarian Response in the first three months of 2013 "to help feed, shelter, and provide medical care for children, women, and men affected by the ongoing conflict" (USAID 2013). The political, religious, and military atmosphere surrounding the Syrian crisis has the ability to change rapidly and unpredictably, which will continue to make the conflict a critical international issue until a resolution is found.

Qatar's financial power and political connections give it an opportunity to influence the course of the Arab Awakening. Qatar has assisted significantly in both the Libyan and Syrian revolutions. The Qatari government gave the Syrian National Council (SNC),

the main opposition group to Bashar Al-Assad, a seat at the March 2013 Arab League summit in Doha, as well as control of the Syrian embassy in Doha, pushing out the Assad regime's representatives ("Arab League" 2013, Bayoumy and Doherty 2013). In addition to sponsoring and supporting refugees, Qatar has given arms to Syrian rebels. In Libya, Qatar provided tens of millions of dollars in aid, as well as arms and military training to the rebel forces, with estimates surpassing 20,000 tons of weapons (Dagher, Levinson, and Coker 2011). By supporting these new regimes, Qatar has broken with its traditional role as an unbiased player in the Middle East, and is thus jeopardizing its emerging status as a regional and international mediator (Barakat 2012).

This bold approach presents new security risks. By taking such a definitive stance in these conflicts, Qatar must be prepared for potentially hostile relations with the regimes it did not support. For example, if Bashar Al-Assad and his supporters remain in power in Syria, Qatar could be the target of antagonistic actions, both from Syria and its ally, Iran. Qatar's reputation as an international mediator could also be compromised if it makes a severe political miscalculation (Ulrichsen 2013). In addition, Qatar may be placing itself in the midst of potential sectarian conflicts because it has generously supported what are considered the mainstream Islamist parties in the Middle East—largely consisting of the (Sunni) Muslim Brotherhood—such as in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Turkey, and the Palestinian group, Hamas (Haykel 2013). This support may be at the expense of alienating Shia Muslim groups in Iraq, Iran, and Syria (Hezbollah). Qatar is in a unique position by having ties with Syria, Hezbollah, and Tehran, as well as hosting a major U.S. military base. Therefore, bilateral relations between the United States and Qatar, if maintained, have the potential to assist in a stronger connection between the Middle East and the Western world.

Future Recommendations for the Syrian Conflict

The PDGP delegates arrived at a series of policy recommendations to address the roles that each of these nations can play in the Syrian crisis. Students from both delegations noted that Qatar and the United States recognize the extensive humanitarian toll that the Syrian conflict has had on civilians of the region and are cognizant of the responsibility that the international community has to address the rising body count, currently estimated at over 60,000 (U.N. News Centre 2013).

Currently, the United States has not indicated movement toward military aid for the Syrian opposition. U.S. action is affected by public opinion against intervention, lack of financial interest, and weakened foreign policy reputation in the Middle East. Humanitarian aid is an essential part to alleviate civilian suffering, but it will not produce a lasting political solution to the conflict. Rather, the United States must engage in traditional diplomacy with other political actors, including Qatar, Russia, and China, to shape a solution.

A significant point of contention surrounding the roles of other nations in this domestic conflict is the responsibility of nations in providing arms to the intended opposition groups. Hezbollah, a Lebanese Shiite political faction that has received financial, political, and material support from Iran and Syria, is currently providing weapons and supplies to the Assad regime (Barnard 2012). Conversely, the European Union has issued a highly controversial arms embargo to limit the flow of weapons to the SNC and other rebel groups (Gordon and Landler 2013). Proponents of the ban on arms trade to the rebels believe that it is more important to emphasize finding a political solution, and lifting the ban would be detracting from the focus of finding a diplomatic solution to the conflict (Erlanger 2012). There is additional skepticism that the weapons may not end up in the hands of the rebels. In order to move forward from the current standstill that nations are facing with regard to intervention in Syria, one delegate proposed having multilateral intelligence units in place to vet and ensure the appropriate distribution of sold arms into the intended hands. The difficulty with this proposition is that once arms are distributed—no matter how directly the hand-over may be—a comprehensive system to track the arms is unfeasible.

In the conflicts in both Libya (in 2011) and Syria (currently), international actors, including the United States and Qatar, have had to grapple with two major foreign policy and humanitarian quandaries: providing arms to the opposition groups and/or military intervention. In March 2011, President Barack Obama supported intervention in Libya's conflict in his "Address to the Nation on Libya" and cited a joint effort with Arab partners and traditional allies of the United States to protect civilians while still maintaining a limited role ("Remarks by the President" 2011). NATO is considered one of the most important allies in the Libyan movement; however, NATO has recently announced it has "no intention to intervene militarily in Syria" (Brussels 2013). NATO's unified platform in addressing the Libyan conflict is an important model from which other nations can base future actions for similar conflicts. If the United States were to partner with strong allies, such as Qatar and other nations from the Arab League or the European Union, the Obama administration could intervene and play a more active role in Syria. The United States, by engaging the international community in these discussions toward a united response, could avoid shouldering the responsibility of military intervention and nation-building.

Outside of traditional diplomacy, other methods can be employed to put political pressure on governments. Although the effects of social media campaigns may be difficult to predict, they have the potential to influence the political arena. For example, the international media attention during the Egypt elections in 2012 helped to mobilize and inform the population about current events, while also serving as a form of transparency. Therefore, the United States must continue to invest in using social media, domestically and internationally, to promote its diplomatic initiatives.

The United States and Qatar in the Israeli–Palestinian Peace Process

Unlike the recent crisis in Syria, the issue of Israel and Palestine has been a decades-long, highly polarizing debate and requires different action by both the United States and Qatar. The Israelis and the Palestinians have witnessed both violent and diplomatic attempts to change the status quo, resulting in no sustainable solution. An effective, enforceable peace deal will not only require strong political leadership, but also mutual acceptance by each population. Edward P. Djerejian, founding director of the Baker Institute and former ambassador to Israel and to Syria, acknowledges the gravity of this task, noting that the wider Arab–Israeli conflict cannot be solved without a peaceful, lasting solution to the Palestinian question of statehood (Djerejian 2013). The Arab Peace Initiative of 2002 epitomizes this view by calling for a diplomatic solution to the conflict (“Arab Peace Initiative” 2002). However, it is unlikely that the Israeli and Palestinian governments can negotiate a viable plan without international mediation and support. During the colloquium session, we addressed current and future roles of the United States and Qatar in the peace process, analyzing these countries’ strengths and limitations in moving reconciliation efforts forward.

Negotiations will likely require heavy U.S. involvement due to the strong U.S.–Israeli connection and potential leverage through U.S. military, economic, and political aid. The question is how the United States can and should get involved, and whether or not involvement is in its best interests. The United States should define mutually accepted guidelines for territorial exchange, as well as “terms of reference” about U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, the Clinton parameters, the Arab Peace Initiative, and the Road Map to Peace. The United States should ultimately create a “bridging proposal” for a two-state solution to reconcile the Israeli and Palestinian proposals (“Getting to the Territorial Endgame” 2010). If the United States brokers a comprehensive peace deal, it would improve Arab public opinion of the United States and U.S. relations with the Arab world. The Palestinians, with relatively little to offer politically or economically, have minimal ability to incentivize U.S. support; however, the current situation is untenable for both sides, as “Israel’s demographic future constitutes its central dilemma” (Miller 2013). The Palestinian population is increasing and will soon overtake the Israeli population, pressuring Israeli leaders to reach a two-state solution before demographics outweigh a fair political solution (Miller 2013).

Outside of the Israeli–Palestinian issue, and following the recent withdrawal of troops from Iraq and Afghanistan, the Obama administration has set the precedent of taking a backseat response to many current events. The cautious U.S. stance in the Arab uprisings may limit its influence in the region and thus decrease its ability to negotiate a solution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Moreover, there is a strong pro-Israel lobby in Washington, most notably the powerful American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), whose influential members exert significant pressure on U.S. political leaders to adopt a pro-Israel agenda. In addition, the United States voted in November 2012 against the U.N. General Assembly’s motion to grant Palestine nonmember observer status.

Palestine is pursuing this route as an alternative to gain formal recognition from the international community and put pressure on Israel to invest in a two-state solution. In order to gain legitimacy in promoting a peace resolution, the Obama administration must reconsider this position and demand Israeli recognition of the pre-1967 borders as a basis for land swap negotiations (Siegman 2012).

Qatar occupies a different position than the United States in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but could potentially be an influential actor. In line with Qatar's recent role as mediator in foreign policy initiatives, Qatari leadership sponsored talks between the rival Palestinian factions, Fatah and Hamas, in October 2006 (Ulrichsen 2013). Although these discussions were later upstaged by Saudi and Egyptian efforts in 2007 and 2011, respectively, recent progress included a series of agreements facilitated by both Doha and Cairo to organize a unified Palestinian side. Talks between the Arab League Ministerial Council were also hosted in Qatar to review the Arab Peace Initiative, originally proposed in 2002 (Segal 2012). In March 2013, the Arab League Summit took place in Doha, as another item on Qatar's long list of high-profile events (Black 2013). Despite Qatar's attempts to create a more level negotiating ground by uniting Fatah and Hamas, the talks have produced neither a decisive plan of action nor any noticeable progress.

Qatar has used extensive financial resources to bolster the Palestinians, which could create a more equal negotiating platform, but could also put the U.S.-Qatari relationship at risk. Qatar's relations with Israel have been poor since the closing of the Israeli trade office in Doha in 2008, after the Israeli offensive against Hamas in Gaza (Roberts 2012). The Amir visited Gaza in October 2012 and pledged US\$400 million in humanitarian aid to Hamas, the faction that ostensibly controls the Gaza Strip. Although financial resources may be influential, they cannot guarantee unity, and may even undermine it by discouraging potential collaborative efforts between Qatar and Israel.

Future Recommendations for the Road to Israeli-Palestinian Peace

Ultimately, the PDGP delegates suggested that the action and influence through public diplomacy of both the United States and Qatar are limited in dealing with the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The United States will likely have a more important role than Qatar because of the long-standing U.S.-Israeli relationship and strong U.S. financial and military interests. Yet, any initiative will be impossible without a broad change in public opinion in these states about the major issues in the conflict, including Jerusalem, the status of refugees, and settlements and land swaps. Taking into account our discussion on these topics, we developed a series of policy recommendations related to Israel settlements, public diplomacy, and financial aid.

International laws condemn Israeli settlements and support the right of Palestinians to self-determination, but they have yet to be enforced. The United States should stand in support of U.N. Security Council Resolutions 194, 242, and 338 as a platform for peace. Additionally, U.S. leadership should accept Palestine's bid for nonmember observer state

status to the U.N. and be firm in its stance on Israel's acceptance of the pre-1967 borders as a basis for territorial exchange.

A December 2012 joint Palestinian-Israeli poll determined that the majority of Israelis and Palestinians (65 and 62 percent, respectively) believed the chances for a final agreement were "low to nonexistent" (Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research 2012). The United States and Qatar, with their powerful media apparatuses, have the opportunity to launch major educational campaigns using both traditional and social media to influence public opinion toward a more positive and balanced outlook in support of a peace agreement. These campaigns may include initiatives to broadcast equal coverage of Israeli and Palestinian viewpoints and commentary, and stress verifiable facts.

Both the United States and Qatar have invested monetarily in this conflict. The United States sends aid to both sides, but the vast majority—about \$3 billion per year—is to Israel (Sharp 2012). The United States sends about \$500 million per year to the West Bank and Gaza (Zanotti 2013). Qatar has continued to pledge millions in aid to Palestine, and the amir's historic visit to Gaza in 2012 was a high-profile and symbolic political action (Rudoren 2012). The United States could pressure Israel by restricting military aid, while continuing humanitarian support of Palestinians. However, these fiscal actions must be accompanied by parallel political negotiations.

Conclusions

Throughout our discussion, it was evident that both the Syrian and the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts are complex and nuanced, and the influencing factors are constantly changing. An understanding of the multifaceted issues and consequences of involvement must be a precondition for the United States and Qatar if they are to actively participate in conflict resolution efforts. Public diplomacy through media and other education venues has the potential to influence public opinion in favor of peaceful resolutions for both conflicts. However, because of the highly political nature of these conflicts, traditional diplomacy, such as dialogue between political leaders, is paramount to public diplomacy. This route will require strong U.S. leadership to draw international support, coupled with continued Qatari initiative to mediate political dialogue. In addition to continuing humanitarian aid, the United States and Qatar must use their strengths to garner the type of international support needed to address conflicts of this magnitude.

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Immigration Policy in Competitive Global Economies

by George Romar and Sabrina Toppa

Countries with globally competitive economies such as the United States and Qatar are attractive destinations for immigrants seeking improved economic opportunities. For example, four of the top 10 countries with the largest percentage of foreign-born residents are oil-rich countries in the Middle East—Qatar included—which need large labor influxes to meet the international demand for oil, as well as provide services for the native, nouveau riche populations (Shapiro 2013). The 2013 PDGP colloquium addressed how Qatar and the United States contend with issues of citizenship, naturalization, labor rights, and migrant policy in a world where the flow of human capital is increasingly regulated.

Qatar

Qatar's population growth rate of 4.93 percent is the highest in the world, and largely stems from the influx of migrants settling into the small oil- and natural gas-rich country (CIA 2012). Historically, Qatar's economy was driven by fishing and pearl hunting. After discovering its energy resources in the early 20th century, Qatar began importing foreign workers to meet the labor demands of its oil- and natural gas-based economy (Gonzalez et al. 2008). With fewer than 250,000 citizens in a population of over 2 million (CIA 2012), Qatar's economy continues to depend on migrants to support its expansion.

This year, PDGP focused on reviewing policies on citizenship, wages, and sponsorship in Qatar to better understand the position of migrants navigating a complex socio-legal environment. The discussants proposed that in order to improve labor conditions, Qatar should amend its sponsorship system or introduce an employer-based contract. The country's current laws strictly tie employees to sponsoring employers and favor Qatari citizens over nonlocals, minimizing legal recourses in the event of abuse. Furthermore, Qatari labor laws grant extensive protections to migrants, but regulatory oversight and enforcement mechanisms in Qatar are insufficient for preventing labor law violations. Thus, conference participants recommend that Qatar's Ministry of Labor stringently pursue all violation reports and penalize companies committing abuses.

Reform to Qatar's migrant policy is timely, as Qatar currently holds the world's second highest net migration rate, with 33.31 migrants entering the country for every 1,000 persons (CIA 2013). Migrants outnumber Qatari citizens five to one [Human Rights Watch (HRW) 2012]. Many of Qatar's migrants arrive from emerging economies in Asia, such as

India, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Nepal. Migrant remittances drive economic growth in many of these developing countries, making earnings in the Gulf critical to growth in other regions.

Migrants enter Qatar through Law No. 4 of 2009 Regulating the Entry and Exit of Expatriates, their Residency and Sponsorship. Known as the sponsorship law, this law requires a sponsor's consent to change one's job and receive exit visas to return home (HRW 2012). It limits a migrant's ability to alter an employment situation by binding him or her to the employer, who assumes legal responsibility for the migrant. Neighboring Bahrain abolished the sponsorship system in 2009 due to international pressure, but since then, any real changes have been limited, especially with the advent of popular uprisings associated with the Arab Spring and the Bahraini government's aim to appeal to the business community (Mideast Youth 2013). Qatar and other Gulf countries are also considering moving to a contract-based system to similarly stem abuses flowing from the sponsorship system (Hyslop 2012).

Abuses of migrant construction workers often appear in the form of wage theft, passport confiscation, and occupational risks. The vast majority of Qatar's migrants are unskilled laborers working in the construction sector (HRW 2012). South Asian workers fall victim to schemes that bring them to Qatar under false pretenses. With limited education, the workers may not know how to extricate themselves from a bad situation. Housed in overcrowded labor camps, migrants report that job conditions or pay were misrepresented, and that transportation or accommodation is insufficient. When migrants seek redress, they are constrained by Qatar's sponsorship laws, which bar a transfer of sponsorship to a new employer. This effectively ties them back to an abusing sponsor. In order to minimize this, Qatar can amend its sponsorship law to permit a sponsor transfer whereby migrants have a right to switch employers without fear of employer retaliation or deportation from the country (HRW 2012).

Alternatively, Qatar could supplant a sponsorship law with individual employment contracts, some conference participants suggested. By clearly stipulating the rights afforded to the migrant in a contract in the worker's native language, the employer faces a lesser risk of labor violation while the employee knows his or her guaranteed rights. However, Human Rights Watch interviewed migrants in Qatar who stated that the power usually remains with the Qatari sponsor, who holds greater legal privileges in the country (HRW 2012).

There are limited pathways to citizenship available to migrant workers in Qatar, thus the sponsorship system is their only way to remain legally employed in Qatar. Law No. 38 of 2005, which lays out the process of acquiring Qatari nationality, defines citizenship according to *jus sanguinis* principles (i.e., "right of blood"), awarding Qatari citizenship to blood descendants of Qatari nationals. In 2006, the Qatari government opened up citizenship to individuals fluent in Arabic and residing in Qatar for 25 years (Gulf News

2006). However, in practice, naturalized citizenship is only granted through marriage to a male Qatari national or in exceptional cases, directly by the Qatari Amir himself (Gulf News 2006). In 2003, the Amir granted the Kenyan foreign athlete Saif Saeed Shaheen citizenship to compete for Qatar in sporting events, sparking an outcry that citizenship was a financial tool to increase Qatar's international prestige (The Guardian 2004).

As a result of Qatar's reliance on foreign labor and the underparticipation of nationals in the workforce, the state created a Qatarization program, which seeks to have 50 percent of the energy and industry sectors populated by nationals (Qatarization 2013). Due to the near-guarantee of public sector jobs for nationals, 99 percent of Qatar's private sector is composed of non-nationals (HRW 2012). Migrants are referenced in Law 14 of 2004 "The Labour Law" as private sector workers entitled to paid annual leave, timely wage payments, and a safe and healthy workplace setting (HRW 2012). However, no minimum wage is guaranteed to workers, nor are workers permitted to unionize. Qatari citizens are permitted to unionize, illustrating the differing rights of national and non-national workers in Qatar (HRW 2012).

Nonetheless, Qatar's labor law governs migrant rights by granting annual paid leave, limiting work hours to 48 hours a week, and banning recruitment schemes (HRW 2012). Furthermore, migrants may appeal to the Ministry of Labor's Department of Labor Relations with workplace complaints. However, Human Rights Watch (HRW) documented that 92 percent of the complainants continued to work with violating employers due to the ministry's long processing time for their grievances (HRW 2012). To redress this, Qatar's Ministry of Labor should multiply its efforts to prosecute violators in an efficient manner, and also introduce greater regulatory and enforcement mechanisms to ensure that laws are applied.

Finally, a minimum wage would ensure that employers pay their workers at a rate consistent with the cost of living in Qatar, conference delegates advocated. A 98 percent pay differential exists between the earnings of nationals and migrants in Qatar, indicating a gap in purchasing power between these two groups (Hay Group 2011). In 2012, a request by the Philippine embassy to introduce a minimum wage for its maids resulted in a drop in the number of Filipino maids hired, as Qataris employed Sri Lankan maids for less (Doha News 2013). The absence of a standard wage for maids thus resulted in discriminatory employment practices and inconsistent wages. To combat this phenomenon, conference participants proposed that embassies work with one another to exert pressure on incorporating a minimum wage into Qatar's labor laws. Minimum wages are proven employment incentives, increasing employee productivity and morale, and raising migrant consumption and spending levels in the local economy (Hay Group 2011). By specifying a minimum wage in the labor law, Qatar will illustrate its progressive stance on workers' wages, distinguishing it from other Gulf Cooperation Council countries and attracting more investment capital as a result of this modification.

The United States

In addition to Qatari immigration issues, delegates discussed related U.S. policy issues, including unauthorized migration to and residence in the country, the need to reform the naturalization process, and ideas for how the United States can attract and retain more skilled labor.

Citizenship in the United States, a nation built by immigrants, is conferred by either *jus soli* birthright (i.e., “right of soil”), *jus sanguinis* birthright, or through a formalized naturalization process. The United States has four major classifications for its residents: citizens, legal permanent residents, temporary residents, and undocumented or illegal migrants (Martin 2013). As in Qatar, there is a clear hierarchical structure among these residency statuses. American citizens are at the top and undocumented migrants are at the bottom. Citizens enjoy the most privileges (e.g., voting, eligibility for government assistance, etc.) while undocumented persons enjoy the fewest and constantly face the threat of being exploited or expelled.

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) estimates that in January 2011, 11.5 million people were living and working in the United States without proper documentation (DHS 2012). Since 2009, the Obama administration has deported 1.17 million such persons, a number that far surpasses figures for any three-year period since recordkeeping began in 1892 (DHS 2012). While deportation is recognized as the proper legal outcome for unlawful entry and residence, student delegation members instead viewed this as one option among several. Granting amnesty to illegal migrants who are productive members of society was proposed as the better solution.

As occurred in 1986 with the Immigration Reform and Control Act signed into law by President Ronald Reagan, amnesty would absolve current undocumented immigrants of unlawful entry and provide for legal permanent residency. Amnesty was previously recommended by the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform in its first report to the Congress (USCIR 1994). Opponents of the idea thought it unsatisfactory because they believed it would encourage even more illegal immigration across the U.S.-Mexico border. Researchers at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta examined the evidence and determined that this view was unfounded: illegal immigration has not increased at all because of the 1986 amnesty program, and, if anything, the program reduced such immigration in the short run (Orrenius 2001).

The student delegations also decided that the naturalization process itself should be reformed for all applicants. One of the primary complaints is that the system has produced severe backlogging. For example, because of the existing quota system, people from some countries (e.g. the Philippines) have been waiting several decades to have their applications considered (Martin 2013). We proposed a points system as an alternative policy approach: the more points an applicant gets, the faster the naturalization process. This is similar to the Canadian system in which points can be earned by maintaining gainful employment, demonstrating fluency in English, etc. The points system is seen

as a fair alternative for those who are not wealthy and therefore cannot benefit from the faster citizenship-through-investment program. The delegations also decided that the workforce for the Department of Homeland Security's Citizenship and Immigration Services office should be expanded so more manpower will be available to process applications and thus reduce backlogging. This recommendation is intended as a solution over the longer term because the prevailing environment of federal austerity makes funding the department a low priority in Congress at present.

Although it is illegal, undocumented immigrant labor adds to the U.S. economy and results in increased revenue from sales taxes. Many illegal immigrants are workers in low-skilled, low-wage jobs that American citizens typically do not want. In this way, the workers pump billions of dollars each year into Social Security through payroll taxes, few of which return to them (Martin, 2013). On the other hand, since undocumented immigrants are not spread evenly throughout the country, they place a disproportionate burden on the local and state governments that provide them with public assistance, medical care, and schools. Granting amnesty will do little to change the distribution of those who use public resources, so the states and local governments that have larger populations of undocumented migrants will still bear that cost. We can thus expect many members of Congress from these areas to oppose that strategy. Economists have projected that nationally, however, amnesty will allow the new permanent residents to be legally taxed, which will generate more revenue to help offset the cost for disproportionately affected areas (Orrenius 2012). The delegation also determined that the United States' citizenship-through-investment program should continue because it is a great way for an applicant to show that he or she will be a net contributor to the country's economy.

Foreigners who receive degrees in the United States face unnecessary difficulty in obtaining citizenship. The United States draws thousands of foreign students to its universities each year. Many of these educated workers want to remain in the country after graduating. However, current laws make it difficult for many of them to remain, so they end up returning to their home countries, where they contribute nothing to the U.S. economy and may even end up becoming entrepreneurs that directly compete with U.S. firms. Delegation members believe that it is therefore in the United States' best interests to halt this "brain drain." Some suggested that if the quota system is maintained, preferences should be modified such that employment-based immigration receives a higher priority than family-based immigration. The consensus was that more visas such as the H1-B should be provided so that the United States can retain the foreign talent that U.S. universities have trained.

Conclusion

Overall, both Qatar and the United States display a hierarchical legal structure in which citizens enjoy the greatest privileges. Guest workers and undocumented migrants in the United States face the risk of deportation in much the same way as do low-skilled migrants in Qatar who lose their sponsor. Both groups of workers occupy precarious

positions in the national labor market, which is already overflowing with cheap, unskilled labor. The United States differs from Qatar by offering a formal naturalization process, but this option is not readily accessible to the majority of undocumented persons. In this sense, the policy mirrors Qatar's restrictive nationality laws, which primarily limit citizenship to blood relatives of Qataris. This stringency creates a situation where few migrants work in Qatar with the aim of acquiring citizenship. Thus, while both states are attractive destinations for work, a lot of low-skilled migrants in the Qatar do not necessarily see their employment as long-term or sustainable. In contrast, low-skilled workers in the United States may enter with a reasonable expectation of fulfilling long-term ambitions to live, work, and educate their children in the United States.

The colloquium discussion on immigration policies in the United States and Qatar produced a number of policy recommendations that consider the best interests of each country and the opinions expressed by advocates on either side of their respective immigration reform debates. We believe that most of these recommendations are practical enough to be implemented in a timely manner. However, their implementation is dependent on the exercise of political willpower on the part of the national leadership in either country.

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Sustainable Energy and Environmental Policy

by Zach Bielak and Dante Zakhidov

Twenty of 23 members of the PDGP colloquium agreed that environmental sustainability issues—dealing with the energy needs of the present without compromising the environment and success of future generations—were of critical importance. However, when asked if these issues constituted governmental priorities, students almost unanimously agreed that they did not. This apparent disparity between mandate and action serves as a metaphor for the action taken by governments across the world: most nations eagerly pursue sustainability initiatives, but national policies often fall short. For example, even though Canadian citizens are “increasingly involved” in environmentalism, Canada is currently one of the lowest-ranked countries with regard to its adherence to Kyoto Protocol emission targets (Environment Canada 2013; Clark 2012). Canada has also created ineffective national policies, such as the failed \$3 billion Green Plan, that resemble voluntary guidelines rather than true regulations to address the underlying causes (Field and Olewiler 2005). Current scientific knowledge and popular opinion call for environmental sustainability in the public sector, but governments have yet to respond with truly effective solutions.

Over the past few decades, scientists have accumulated a tremendous amount of knowledge related to environmental sustainability. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), a team of more than 1,300 international scientists, predicts a temperature rise of 2.5°F to 10°F within the next century due to greenhouse gas emissions (IPCC 2007). Beyond emissions, there exist other issues that affect all world governments: potential groundwater contamination due to fracking and industrial pollution, killing of animals and plants from petroleum leaks and resource mismanagement, and booming populations that put pressure on natural resources.

This information and research has precipitated a global response, necessitating new and effective public policy measures. Many governmental departments, such as Qatar’s Ministry of the Environment and the United States’ Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), are working to structure national departments and policies to consider energy sustainability. International agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol have attempted to reduce carbon emissions by assigning different reduction goals to different countries. Countless other environmental policies and endeavors at grassroots and local levels also strive toward similar objectives.

However plentiful these policies and efforts may be, they simply are not enough. Most policies focus solely on carbon emissions. While this issue is urgent and the easiest to

quantify, it is merely one of numerous causes of environmental damage. However, these myopic policies and endeavors have been unable to solve even that singular issue: the world experienced record carbon dioxide emissions in 2012, with a 54 percent increase since 1990 (Global Carbon Project). Current environmental practices are failing because they only focus on “individual symptoms, rather than the causes and their interrelationships” (Resilient People, Resilient Planet 2012).

Unfortunately, the world’s current trajectory is not an auspicious one. However, humans have yet to pass the point of no return. There is still a chance for governments to take more extreme measures. If governments truly pursue more aggressive policies, they must reexamine and reconsider multiple factors. This paper focuses on the discussions of colloquium members on the role of government versus private organizations, resulting economic considerations, and the importance of improved international cooperation.

Governmental versus Private Roles

One of the most hotly debated issues from the colloquium session was the government’s role in ensuring environmental sustainability through investment in education, incentivizing sustainable innovation, and leading by example.

The delegates agreed that government policies should be paired with education programs in order to produce noticeable changes. World governments have the capacity to invest in education through a number of means, the most obvious of which is reforming curriculums for young students. Several countries, including Austria, Ireland, and the Czech Republic, are already pursuing sustainability topics in classrooms [Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 2008]. However, education must also continue later into life, through the use of campaign communication via popular media. Denmark’s “One Tonne Less” and New Zealand’s “The Big Clean-Up” campaigns both attempt to socialize the population to abide by and support environmental regulations. The better-informed citizens in these countries can promote environmental progress as “consumers, voters, and investors” (World Economic Forum 2012). By following these leads, the world’s nations could learn from each other and similarly invest in education to produce more lasting, sustainable changes.

In addition to education initiatives, governments should invest in promoting basic research and development (R&D) in scientific knowledge and environmental innovation. Specifically, governments should support research in areas of public interest that the private sector is unlikely to fund, such as protection of the environment and public health (*Use of Market Tools and Investments*). Moreover, governments should emphasize using public funds to back basic research in sustainability and renewable energies, even in times of economic hardship. Nations could pool their resources together to create an “International Green Impact Fund,” which could fund different applicants to pursue promising R&D, educational initiatives, and social projects. Beyond funding, states should also reform legal and institutional frameworks to make sustainability research

more viable. These reforms include decreasing obstacles to collaboration between national environmental departments and independent labs, as well as expediting the acceptance of sustainability-related patents.

Another huge, yet underutilized, responsibility of governments is leading by example. Governmental procurement worldwide constitutes between 6 percent and 8 percent of global GDP (Use of Market Tools and Investments). This amounts to an annual global public procurement of US\$4 trillion, which could incentivize “new enterprises, business models, and entire sectors” (Zadek 2012). Even a single government investing in more sustainable products, such as recycled paper or wind energy, could catalyze the production and usage of sustainable items and energy around the world. A recent example is state-owned Qatar Airways, which has worked with Qatar Petroleum and Royal Dutch Shell’s Gas-to-Liquids (GTL) Project to successfully develop a less environmentally damaging GTL jet fuel (Qatar Airways 2013).

However, the private sector is oftentimes more effective in bringing about change—but only if there is financial advantage to pursuing it. In order to make it a desirable option, governments should step in to provide financial incentives. For example, carbon credit trading, as established by the Kyoto Protocol, allows companies to sell carbon emission credits to other corporations that exceed their emission cap. Delegates agreed that this was an innovative system, but also flawed in that it did not consider economic fluctuations. Economic recessions have caused industrial activity and carbon emissions to decline, drastically decreasing the cost of carbon credits and nearly collapsing the European Emissions Trading System (Stonington). Furthermore, other nations may be put at an economic disadvantage in the global marketplace by instances such as the U.S. refusal to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and the lack of emission-cutting obligations for China and India. Governments should instead promote private environmental sustainability through incentivizing innovation. More than creating taxes and statutes, governments should focus on giving grants and rewarding environmental awareness. For example, governments could provide tax refunds for large environmentally friendly purchases or reward the most sustainable businesses in the nation with grants. Ultimately, collaboration between government and the private sector is crucial in providing environmental sustainability.

There also must be independent motivation from within the private sector—motivation the government cannot easily initiate. This includes voluntary pursuit of third-party certification such as the Global Reporting Initiative, a system that evaluates a company’s environmental sustainability. Reports of this nature would allow consumers to make informed decisions that align with their values, and would also competitively increase sustainability. Private businesses must also cease advertisements that claim environmental friendliness for products that are simply less environmentally harmful, such as large trucks with slightly better gas mileage or water bottles with less plastic. Consequently, the private sector would encourage genuine environmental awareness among constituents and voters, complementing governmental policies and actions.

However, some governments can exert more control over the environmental practices of industries in which state-owned enterprises (SOEs) dominate the private sector. In Qatar, for example, where the state is still a majority stakeholder in many industries, including telecommunications (Qatar Telecom), oil and gas (Qatar Petroleum), and air travel (Qatar Airways) (WTO 2005). In such countries, the government can play a larger role in mandating that its state-owned enterprises pursue innovation in environmental technology and practices.

Economic Considerations

Especially for economies that depend on fossil fuels, many economic considerations must be analyzed when discussing the effect of sustainability. In the colloquium, these considerations focused on the role of government subsidies in the United States and the importance of fossil fuels for Qatar.

Current U.S. governmental subsidies for food and energy production often run contrary to environmental initiatives and policies. Although removal of these programs would help promote sustainability, delegates were uncertain about the other implications of eliminating subsidies. Indeed, current literature maintains that many U.S. subsidies for corn (the source of ethanol in fuel) and fossil fuels have a net negative effect, often leading to “increased levels of consumption and waste” and failing to “include negative externalities” (UN Environment Programme 2008). Any economy that does not reflect the “full cost of assets, goods, and services” can never truly be sustainable (Resilient People, Resilient Planet 2012). Phasing out these counterproductive subsidies would have noticeably positive benefits, such as reduced oil use and lower carbon dioxide emissions by 2020 (Resilient People, Resilient Planet 2012). However, these benefits would not come without a price. In particular, discontinuing fossil fuel subsidies has the possibility of hurting lower classes by initially increasing the cost of electricity and gas. Any subsidy reduction should be conducted in sequence with other measures, such as aiding areas that might become financially strained (UN Environment Programme 2008). However, once the negative consequences are reduced, the resulting liberated funds could be redirected toward more sustainable sources—research, public procurement, grants—carrying with them an immense potential for change. Indeed, this trend is slowly happening across the world: coal subsidies have been gradually shrinking in OECD countries, and other nations have begun subsidizing green energy sectors (UN Environment Programme 2008).

Additionally, the notion that some economies are founded upon fossil fuels must also be considered. In countries like Qatar, gas costs around US\$1 a gallon and is often cheaper than subsidized water (Vafeiadis and Gupta). Members of the Qatari delegation argued it would be very difficult for Qatar to pursue sustainable energy because of the lucrative market of oil and gas, which are nonsustainable sources. Furthermore, much of the economic growth in Arab nations brings with it countless environmental issues from drilling and refining fossil fuels (Abaza 2011). However, Najib Saad, secretary-general of the Arab Forum for Environment and Development, believes that transitioning to

a green economy is not only possible, but would benefit many sectors of the economy (Abaza 2011). Saab concedes that the change would not be easy, but he does provide detailed plans on how to begin. These plans include rural agricultural development, water regulation, and the creation of more robust public transportation systems. Even in the Middle East, environmental sustainability is possible.

International Cooperation

Despite the variation in development and energy consumption throughout the world, colloquium participants stressed the importance of international collaboration as a means to protect the environment. There has been a push in international organizations and agreements to tackle the problem of sustainability, such as the New Partnership for Africa's Development, the UN Millennium Development Goals, and the Kyoto Protocol. However, without appropriate means of enforcement, these efforts have had little effect. In order to actually see worldwide environmental change, a stronger regulatory body must be created. This body could impose onerous economic sanctions on non-abiding members and focus on creating new solutions for environmental issues instead of simply counteracting problems. This body would also target each country's case-specific situation, implementing a more effective version of "common but differentiated responsibilities" (Resilient People, Resilient Planet 2012). For example, it would galvanize Qatar to pursue sustainability around the fact that its capital could be underwater within decades. Likewise, it would direct China on its worsening air-quality health concerns. It is also imperative that more-developed nations help less-developed nations. By allowing developing countries to tap larger investment flows and more advanced technology, sustainability could be integrated into their modernization process. This would negate the need for retroactive fixes to unsustainable institutions later (Reforming Energy Subsidies 2008).

Further Conclusions

In addition to the aforementioned suggestions, there are numerous other policy recommendations that governments should pursue. Colloquium members agreed that any effective environmental policy must be multidimensional in approach. That is, governments at every level—local, national, regional, and international—must simultaneously work toward sustainability. Beyond the national and international measures mentioned above, solid local foundations must also be created. Passionate individuals should have the opportunity to pursue public sustainability within their cities and states. Additionally, countries should work together regionally to protect mutual interests. Mexico and the United States should share responsibilities for protecting the Gulf of Mexico, and the Arab Gulf states should join forces to mitigate rising sea levels and prevent contamination of the water bound for their desalination plants. Furthermore, a novel and practical solution would involve developed nations integrating environmental security into the definitions of national and international security. By doing so, nations could target both internal and external sustainability issues with the same intensity and funding as traditional security problems. Droughts, contaminated water tables,

and agricultural degradation would be only a few of these new security threats. Since this is a multidimensional issue, governments should continue to increase collaboration with nonstate actors, such as businesses and scientists, in order to reduce bad practices and find new solutions. By reexamining and refocusing their efforts, perhaps our governments will finally begin pursuing the effective, exhaustive, and transformational environmental policies needed to save our planet.

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Preventive Health Care Policy in Developed Nations

by Nathan Lo, Rohini Sigireddi, and Carolina White

In the majority of developed nations, the cost of health care continues to increase over time (Stabile et al. 2013). This trend could be attributed to the use of novel but costly drug therapy and medical devices, the practice of defensive medicine, demographic factors such as aging populations, and the growing cost of managing chronic disease (Tuers 2013; Friedman 2013). The United States consistently spends the greatest portion of its gross domestic product (GDP) on health care—16 percent, or \$2 trillion (National Academies 2010). Additionally, costs are projected to rise to 25 percent of the nation's GDP by 2025 (Johnson 2013). Increasing health care expenses are not limited to the United States. In Qatar, a country facing health concerns similar to those of the United States, including a 70 percent obesity rate and related chronic diseases, the cost of health care has also risen by 27 percent in the last two years (SCH-Q 2012, Bell 2013). Unfortunately, this increase in spending—as seen in the United States, Qatar, and other nations—has not translated to improved health outcomes for patients undergoing treatment, or an overall increase in the health of the population. Compared to similarly developed countries such as Japan, Germany, and the United Kingdom, the United States has the poorest health care quality and faces the highest rate of adult obesity at 36 percent (CDC 2013a, National Academies 2013).

PDGP delegates discussed the rising costs of health care, as well as the implementation of preventative measures to improve spending efficacy and outcomes. The conversation largely focused on the creation of primary preventive health care programs as a means of improving daily health practices, bettering population health, and decreasing the national burden of rising health care expenditures. This report highlights key discussion points of the colloquium session and proposes programs for the United States and Qatar to facilitate healthy lifestyles.

Primary Preventive Health Care

Chronic illnesses are a growing concern globally. Noncommunicable diseases (NCDs) now represent the leading cause of death in the world, responsible for 63 percent of the 57 million deaths in 2008. The majority of these deaths were attributed to cancer, cardiovascular disease, diabetes, and chronic respiratory illnesses (WHO 2011). In the United States, nearly 75 percent of health care spending is directed toward the treatment of chronic diseases. This includes heart disease, cancer, stroke, and diabetes, which cause nearly seven out of 10 deaths in the United States (CDC 2013b). Diabetes in particular is a

growing problem in the United States and Qatar, affecting 8.3 percent and 15.4 percent of the populations, respectively. Additionally, the prevalence of diabetes in the Middle East is projected to increase by a startling 94 percent between 2010 and 2030 (Alhyas, McKay, and Majeed 2012, ADA 2013).

The costs of chronic diseases, for both treatment expenditures and loss in the workforce productivity, are nearly \$1 trillion annually for the United States and are expected to rise to \$6 trillion by 2050 (CDC 2013b, DeVol and Bedroussian 2007). Given the high incidence of chronic disease in Qatar, a similar trend will likely be witnessed. Preventive health care measures will be imperative to counter the onset of chronic disease and to reduce morbidity and mortality, thereby decreasing the treatment costs for chronic diseases (Salkeld 1998, IOM 2012).

Several common, but preventable, behavioral risk factors associated with NCDs have developed globally, including unhealthy eating habits, tobacco use, and sedentary lifestyles (Cecchini et al. 2010). While many of these risk factors are avoidable, the prevalence of tobacco use, overweight populations, and physical inactivity is higher in high- and upper-middle-income countries than in low- and lower-middle-income countries (WHO 2011). Rigorous scientific research links adequate consumption of fruits and vegetables to good health, and proves that sufficient consumption of “healthy” foods reduces the risk and prevalence of chronic diseases (Liu 2003). Despite this increase in knowledge, population behaviors have not adequately adapted. For example, the diets of American children have largely deteriorated in nutrition content, containing a high content of total fat, saturated fat, and sodium, while remaining low in more healthful complex carbohydrates and fiber (Kennedy and Goldberg 1995). In light of these trends and their contributions to health care spending, preventive health care policy centered on nutrition and the improvement of a population’s diet has a significant role in reducing cost (Blumberg 1997).

Cost-effectiveness of preventive health care programs should be a priority, whereby reduced health care expenditures from improved outcomes outweigh the cost of program implementation (Cohen, Neumann, and Weinstein 2008). However, cost efficacy and program impact are difficult to assess properly since the effects are often long-term and may be confounded by environmental factors that may take years to manifest. Furthermore, the fundamental goal of primary preventive programs—those that induce changes in behavior and lifestyle to improve health—often meet significant resistance from people who are unwilling or feel there are insufficient incentives to change ingrained habits (Fani Marvasti and Stafford 2012). Despite these challenges, primary preventive programs have the ability to make population-level improvements to health and are an important tool for counteracting the rising burden of health care expenditures for chronic conditions such as diabetes and heart disease (IOM 2012).

The PDGP delegates believed that the best preventative health plan would involve improving population diets, especially through increasing access to and encouraging

consumption of fruits and vegetables. Colloquium delegates agreed that an incentive system is critical for widespread adoption of these programs. One idea discussed was the adaptation of existing U.S. programs, such as Head Start or First Lady Michelle Obama's physical activity program Let's Move!, to include information related to nutrition and health education (Let's Move! 2013). In addition, delegates thought that novel forms of advertising and implementing nutrition-based programs through the use of social media (e.g., Twitter and Facebook) are key to the programs' success. However, effective communication should also take into account cultural differences between countries and regions when devising implementation methods for new programs or adapting existing models for delivery of health education (IOM 2002).

Delegates concentrated on the idea of improving nutrition as a means of preventive health care. Since Qatar and the United States have different health care and education systems, the policy recommendations suggested during the colloquium were specific to each country. In Qatar, the delegates believed that policymakers should design and encourage family nutrition in accordance with national nutrition guidelines. For the United States, national nutrition guidelines are well known but not always followed, due to consumer choice or confusion from packaging and display of foods (Olstad, Raine, and McCargar 2012). Thus, the students suggested that the United States implement an incentive system for improved nutrition in the general public as well as the low-income populations, which are at greatest risk for the onset of chronic disease due to financial constraints, urbanization, and more-limited access to resources and health care (Samb et al. 2010; Schmidt et al. 2011). If executed properly, these recommendations could help both countries become healthier, and thereby reduce overall health care expenditures and improve national health outcomes.

Policy Recommendations for the United States

Nearly 15 percent of Americans are unable to acquire food that satisfies their dietary needs (DHHS and USDA 2010). The majority of Americans consume excess sodium and calories from solid fat, added sugars, and refined grains. Poor diet can significantly contribute to rates of obesity, cardiovascular disease, and diabetes, among other diseases (Stanley and Laugharne 2012; Holmes and Thompson 2012). In order to increase adherence to dietary guidelines, the delegates proposed an incentive structure that rewards the purchasing of foods aligned with these standards. We recommend a program in which grocery stores, food manufacturers, and restaurants would be required to categorize their food under a standardized list of major food groups and an associated health metric. Food labeling has previously been used successfully by the U.S. government to support social objectives—in this case, the promotion of healthy diets (Golan et al. 2001). Foods would have a colored label associated with their food group, as well as a number for their nutritional impact and food classification as specified by U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) guidelines and Food and Nutrient Databases (Ahuja et al. 2013). Thus, labeling offers an opportunity for further dietary education, helping to identify healthier choices. For example, healthier foods, particularly fruits and vegetables, should have green labels, since individuals

often associate green-labeled items with better nutritional content and a low score, while high-calorie or fattening items (e.g., donuts) would be brown and receive a higher score, indicating poorer nutritional content (Schuldt 2013). The government or insurance companies can sponsor programs, utilizing financial incentives such as discounts or food vouchers to promote healthier purchases and lifestyles.

To promote participation, media campaigns and public service announcements should be used to spread public awareness. Mobile-device-based health campaigns, television advertisements, and Facebook health information pages have proven effective in health education for lower income and socioeconomic populations (Källander et al. 2013; Wakefield et al. 2013; Lohse 2013). Additionally, media outreach should be implemented through early education in schools. Schools have proven to be an optimal setting for informing individuals about dietary guidelines as well as encouraging both early and lifetime participation, especially through classroom learning and restrictions on school-provided lunches (Pérez-Rodrigo et al. 2001).

Low-income populations have a significantly higher prevalence of chronic disease than the general population. This association increases the importance of providing access to affordable, healthy food to these families and individuals (Lin 2005). Removing cost barriers for low-income populations to incentivize the consumption of fruits and vegetables can reduce disparity. Through federal nutrition programs such as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), the government can help provide federal financial assistance to low-income individuals and families to ensure that their caloric requirements are met (SNAP 2013).

However, we recommend setting nutritional guidelines that are more comprehensive than simply meeting a caloric threshold. This inclusive approach would ensure that individuals and families have their entire nutritional requirements met, including the consumption of a balanced diet of fruits, vegetables, meat, dairy, and carbohydrates, to help prevent the onset of chronic disease (Amine et al. 2002). The government should ensure that nutritional requirements are achieved by leveraging the current infrastructure and implementing three modifications: (1) providing subsidies to lower the cost of purchasing fruits and vegetables; (2) requiring that a percentage of financial assistance from SNAP be spent on categorically “health foods”; and (3) educating SNAP participants of the aforementioned food labeling system to help them make better choices.

In order to make this program a reality, we encourage collaboration between various social organizations within the government, local politicians, academic centers, and leading nutritional experts. SNAP provides the platform on which to facilitate the transition from focusing solely on meeting the caloric requirements of a population, to meeting full nutritional needs and improving the health of a population to prevent the onset of chronic disease.

Policy Recommendations for Qatar

Within Qatar, poor diet leading to obesity and chronic disease are equally pressing problems (Christos et al. 2013; Alhazbi et al. 2012). While efforts have been made to improve nutrition through the National Health Strategy in Qatar, significantly fewer health nutrition education programs currently exist than in the United States. Additionally, children in Qatar are at a high risk for obesity and lack national support and education policies to prevent and control this health issue (Bener 2006).

To address Qatar's nutritional challenges, we developed a three-tiered system consisting of: (1) creating and involving students in school nutrition programs; (2) implementing a healthy food point system for students with parental involvement; and (3) advertising and promoting the program nationwide. This health education program should start with primary-school-age children and include parental involvement and school support. The colloquium delegates believed this age range would be the most receptive—a belief supported by previous successful international programs (Sormunen, Tossavainen, and Turunen 2013). The point system would follow a structure similar to the one outlined for the U.S. program, including nationally recognized nutrition guidelines and government-sponsored rewards. One possibility is to incentivize students by linking points with scholarships for higher education. This incentive would simultaneously emphasize the importance of both nutrition and education. A program of this nature could also partner with Bil Afia, an initiative of Qatar's Sidra Medical and Research Center to improve the diets of its employees. Bil Afia includes “regular education sessions, weekly nutrition and diet counseling sessions, and work . . . to provide healthy food options,” and could be adopted by local schools to address the nutritional needs of children (Sidra 2013).

In order to reach the critical mass necessary for widespread adoption, the Qatari government should work with its students to disseminate advertisements through both traditional and social media outlets, similar to programs proposed in the United States. This education program should be created and further developed in collaboration with other successful national health education campaigns and curricula. In order for the program to optimize its efficacy in Qatar, it should include “teaching functional health information (essential knowledge), shaping personal values and beliefs that support healthy behaviors, shaping group norms that value a healthy lifestyle, and developing the essential health skills necessary to adopt, practice, and maintain health-enhancing behaviors” (CDC 2013c). Additionally, several health education programs can be used as a model, including COPD: Learn More Breathe Better and The Heart Truth, We Can!, run by the U.S. National Institutes of Health (NIH), and the STI and AIDS Program, run by the Supreme Council of Health of the State of Qatar (NHLBI. 2013; SCH-Q 2013).

Conclusion

The purpose of the 2013 PDGP preventive health care colloquium discussion was to propose feasible policy recommendations for programs that will address pressing

population health issues in a cost-effective manner. For this report, we chose to expand on two key issues: the increased occurrence of chronic diseases and rising health care costs. From these discussions, we developed in-depth and culturally specific policy proposals for implementation in both Qatar and the United States. If enacted, these programs have the capability to improve the public dissemination of nutritional information, with the hope that individuals can and will convert this knowledge into tangible and positive lifestyle changes. Ultimately, these transformations will result in a lower prevalence of chronic diseases related to obesity and diet, as well as decrease the cost of health care for the inhabitants of Qatar and the United States.

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Colloquium Conclusions

The 2013 Public Diplomacy and Global Policymaking (PDGP) colloquium had successful discussions on the five topics presented. Of these topics, only one was revisited from 2012—interfaith dialogue. The students explored four new topics: preventive health care, immigration policy in competitive global economies, U.S. and Qatari foreign policy in the Middle East, and sustainable energy and environmental policy. Throughout these colloquium sessions, three overarching themes surfaced: the need to adapt early education to address pressing global issues, the role of media in policy dissemination, and the necessity of utilizing a multidisciplinary approach in diplomatic policymaking.

The Importance of Primary Education

Similar to findings from the 2012 PDGP colloquium, the 2013 delegates found that education is an empowering way to engage the public in policymaking. The delegates of the 2013 colloquium, however, focused on primary—or elementary—education as a means of preparing future generations to be global citizens. Primary education has been of increasing importance to global policymaking and is highlighted by U.N. Millennium Development Goal 2—ensuring that “children everywhere . . . will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling” by 2015 (“UN Economic and Social Council” 2013). The importance placed on primary education in relation to social, economic, and political factors has increased over the last century, and delegates believe that the next generation must be equipped with a proper educational background early in life to tackle the future challenges of global policymaking (Benavot and Riddle 1988).

There are three main ways in which primary education can train the next generation for the challenges of a globalized world (Suárez-Orozco and Qin-Hilliard 2004). Primary education initially lays the foundation for complex cognitive thought, which is necessary for global policymaking (Sharp et al. 1979). In addition, primary education can be a means of promoting cultural understanding, also a critical component of public diplomacy and global policymaking. Education represents an opportunity to learn about global cultures and religions, promote tolerance and cultural awareness, and prevent the spread of stereotypes to future generations (Derman-Sparks and Edwards 2010). A more modern approach to promoting cultural understanding through early education includes online education, in which students and teachers from around the world can use an interactive setting to promote mutual trust and understanding (Edmundson 2007). Alternatively, a cultural connection can be made between students simply through email exchange,

similar to “pen pals” (Hertel 2003). These methods are becoming increasingly accessible and are low-cost opportunities to connect students globally from an early age.

Second, delegates felt that early education programs could provide future generations with an increased awareness of international matters, which would enhance the global efforts needed to tackle these challenges. In China, primary education, or *sushi jiaoyu*, has been seen as a means of modernizing the population and preparing it for the demands of an industrialized society, as well as fostering a sense of civic responsibility—traits that are essential for effective global participation in public diplomacy (Murphy 2004). As part of creating a more effective global environmental policy, delegates postulated that from a young age, children could be taught environmentally conscious habits, such as recycling and abstaining from producing excess pollution and waste. Despite a lack of complete scientific understanding of environmental issues, primary school children have shown cognitive and moral development regarding these concepts, such as New Zealand’s successful promotion of ecological sustainability through childhood education (Littledyke 2004; Duhn 2012). Similarly, preventative health care programs for both infectious and noncommunicable diseases (e.g., diabetes and cardiovascular disease) could be integrated into early education, particularly for students who are most at risk (Agrawal et al. 2012).

Third, primary education prepares individuals for global activities, and thereby provides a high return on investment (Psacharopoulos 1994). Research suggests that a shortage of educational resources in developing Islamic countries, such as Kazakhstan, has not only led to a lack of curriculum for the country, but also an increased susceptibility for youth to be recruited by radical groups (Achilov 2012). Delegates believed that proper early education that fosters awareness of cultural and media biases could prevent the spread of misinformation by powerful media sources or political factions that could lead to radicalism.

The Growing Power of Media as a Tool in the 21st Century

Both traditional and social media forms are expected to play an integral role in communication in the 21st century. Traditional media includes sources such as television news broadcasts and newspapers, while social media spans the wide range of blogs, social networking forums, and video-sharing sites (Meraz 2009). Both forms of media have the ability take a more active role in public diplomacy by disseminating information about policy issues and educating the populace. Programs in the United States to promote healthy lifestyles through social media and print campaigns often incorporate scientific research to improve effectiveness and legitimacy (Korda and Itani 2013).

The number of social media users and the amount of time spent on social media sites has skyrocketed over the past decade. The number of Facebook users is expected to reach one billion by the end of 2013 (“In 2013 Facebook Will Have 1 Billion Users” 2013). Newer forms of social media include Instagram and Twitter; the latter has 200 million active users and its population penetration rate in Gulf countries reaches as high as 12 percent

in Kuwait (Rao 2013; “Twitter Active Users in the Arab World”). In addition, Arabic is the fastest-growing language on Twitter and Facebook (Arab Social Media Report 2012). The spread of smart phone technologies has furthered the use of social media as a commonplace means of communication, transmitting ideas, images, and messages instantaneously and globally. Social media has already proven to be a critical tool in popular uprisings. Twitter and Facebook have publicized violent images attributed to the regime of President Bashar Hafez al-Assad in the Syrian civil war. Scholars also have found that Twitter played a unique role in giving Iranians an opportunity for their voice to be heard (Burns and Eltham 2009).

The heavy reliance of public diplomacy on media requires caution, as well. Students viewed social media as a form of cultural diplomacy, but were wary of its ability to serve as a legitimate tool of public diplomacy due to the degree of anonymity on the Internet and lack of assurance of the veracity of web content. Delegates noted the limitations of online videos, namely that the factors leading to their popularity can be difficult to pinpoint. Thus, efforts to create a “viral video” to spread policy information can be highly speculative, due to the difficulty in predicting public reception of videos. Additionally, while it can promote positive change, social media can also be used to spread fear and radicalism. Similar sentiments have been echoed by scholars examining the tactics of public diplomacy in comparison to those of nation branding (Szondi 2008). While the successful use of social media contributed to the democratic uprisings in Egypt, it was also used by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), the short-lived ruling effort after the fall of President Hosni Mubarak, to spread anti-revolutionary propaganda to Egyptian youth (El-Khalili 2013). PDGP delegates wished to use media as a means of spreading ideas and information, but not propaganda.

The Need for a Multidisciplinary Approach to Policymaking

Lastly, a common theme in all colloquium sessions was the need to engage players from multiple disciplines to address issues of global concern. Delegates found this to be a natural conclusion of a program promoting public diplomacy, a nontraditional means of diplomacy. The delegates noted an emerging trend in policymaking, in which political science is no longer the core academic discipline from which policymaking stems (McCann and Ward 2012). A multidisciplinary approach to governmental policymaking would involve the wider community and allow for public scrutiny of the many assumptions that policymakers and other parties often make while writing legislation. This approach fosters a sense of legitimacy and transparency in policymaking, as well as the formulation of relevant policies (Chen et al. 2009, Lasker and Weiss 2003).

The delegates considered public diplomacy, due to the varied nature of its participants, a viable means of achieving many of these multidisciplinary policy goals. Through listening to, learning about, engaging, and communicating with people of varied backgrounds from a young age, individuals are empowered with an academically well-rounded perspective that is necessary to tackle the complex policy conundrums

of the 21st century. Considering the example of energy policy, delegates noted that current policymakers focus solely on limiting carbon dioxide emission. However, research supports the need for a multidisciplinary policymaking approach, which can be implemented by crafting nuanced policy from unique individual experiences and perspectives (Vlek 2000). Seemingly unrelated disciplines, including those in the natural and social sciences and the humanities, can also provide a unique lens through which to view policymaking by raising philosophic, historical, and practical questions (Glad 1988). Delegates found that policy solutions to global challenges are varied and complex, and to achieve the best policy solutions, we should allow for a range of approaches and actors to participate in policymaking.

Future Plans for the PDGP Program

The 2013 PDGP program and colloquium embarked with a fundamental understanding of public diplomacy and a desire to engage in cross-cultural dialogue to strategize and formulate global policy solutions. Participants from both delegations felt that the colloquium was a highly rewarding experience of cultural growth and personal enlightenment, and a foundation upon which to build their globally oriented careers.

In the future, delegates advocated continuing the PDGP program tradition of alternating colloquium locations. To this end, in March 2014, the student colloquium will be held in Doha, Qatar, in partnership with Qatar Foundation, HBKU, and Texas A&M at Qatar. Furthermore, the delegates suggested revisiting some of the topics from the 2013 colloquium, including immigration, foreign affairs, and energy policy. These topics had especially rich and dynamic discussions. However, because of their broad nature, the delegates advised an emphasis on more specific aspects, which the PDGP delegation as a whole could address and provide substantive policy recommendations on. Other topics to potentially consider included global development, the impact of globalization, and the role of media.

In addition, delegates suggested including a pre-colloquium work day to the schedule. This would allow Rice and Qatari students to meet in advance, prepare colloquium topics, and convene with policy experts to get advice. This opportunity would provide for more informed colloquium discussions and hopefully produce more tangible policy recommendations. Several delegates were also interested in organizing a PDGP annual outreach activity to supplement the PDGP program goals. In addition, the delegates agreed that outside activities related to each year's colloquium topics would be informative, such as a visit to a liquefied natural gas facility in Doha if energy policy is a topic.

Overall, the PDGP 2013 colloquium was a phenomenal academic and cultural experience. From our well-informed, passionate, and frank discussions of areas of global policy concern, to cultural outings and the Houston Livestock Show and Rodeo, the delegates found the PDGP colloquium to be a valuable experience that provided lifelong lessons

in public diplomacy, cultural understanding, and friendship. We look forward to the continued success of the PDGP program, and the 2014 PDGP delegation's travel to Doha, Qatar, next spring.

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PDGP Delegation



Front row (from left): Kirstin Matthews, Sabrina Toppa, Monica Matsumoto, Sevita Rama, Jacinta Leyden, Rohini Sigireddi, Carolina White. Back row (from left): Dante Zakhidov, Walter Hurst Williamson, Nathan Lo, Zach Bielak, George Romar, Shayak Sengupta.

Rice Student Leaders

Rohini Sigireddi '14, student director, is studying chemistry, policy studies, and anthropology. In addition to participating in the PDGP program, Rohini conducts nanotechnology research with the Laboratory for Nanophotonics at Rice and the Health, Humanism, and Society Scholars Programs. She has developed an educational outreach program, NanoForAll, which will introduce the world of nanotechnology to children in primary and secondary school. Rohini is currently collaborating with the Baker Institute to host its inaugural undergraduate public policy competition on the topic of health policy. She has traveled extensively, including to international science conferences to China and Japan. After graduation, Rohini plans to pursue a graduate degree in public policy, with a focus on science and health policy, followed by a degree in medicine. She hopes to work internationally to promote science and health policy, particularly

regarding international health care. Rohini is a third-generation Indian-American and was born and raised in Houston, Texas. In 2012, she participated in the PDGP colloquium and co-led the discussion on science diplomacy.

Monica Matsumoto '14, deputy director, is majoring in Asian studies and minoring in biochemistry and cell biology. She spent June-December 2012 studying Arabic in Morocco and Jordan, and spent the 2009-10 academic year in Cairo, Egypt, through the National Security Language Initiative for Youth program. Monica plans to attend medical school after graduating from Rice and would also like to engage in international public health and shaping health policy, focusing on developing partnerships between the United States and the Arab world. She is an intern for Dr. Kirstin Matthews in the Science and Technology Policy Program at the Baker Institute, and is also conducting research at the Texas Medical Center. Monica loves to play sports, and is currently captaining the women's club Ultimate Frisbee and soccer teams at Rice. Monica was part of the 2012 PDGP delegation that traveled to Qatar, in which she co-led the conversation on democracy and secularization.

Sevita Rama '15, deputy director, is studying cognitive sciences, with a focus on linguistics, and policy studies, with a focus on international relations. Her postgraduate plans include pursuing higher education in international relations and continuing her study of Arabic to ultimately work for the U.S. Foreign Service, where she hopes to act as a link of understanding between the United States and the Arab world. Sevita currently works for the Baker Institute Kelly Day Endowment on the Status of Women and Human Rights in the Middle East, with program coordinator Isabel Kuri, to help bridge cultural barriers and conduct research on humanitarian issues in the region. She will spend the summer of 2013 working in Paris at the Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI) Center for Migration and Citizenship before continuing to study abroad during the fall 2013 semester at the Institut d'études politiques de Paris (Sciences Po). Through these programs, she hopes to gain further insight into interdisciplinary approaches to international relations. In 2012, Sevita traveled to Qatar and co-led the conversation on the role of cultural conceptions and media in social life and gender roles.

Rice Student Delegates

Zach Bielak '15 is majoring in mechanical engineering, with a focus on environmental sustainability. He hopes to one day combine these two passions into a career of engineering sustainable solutions, specifically through conducting research and developing practical applications for lower-income countries. Currently, Zach is active in the Ajayan Research Group at Rice, helping to create and analyze organic lithium ion batteries. He is also co-leading a committee within Engineers Without Borders to create a gravity-fed water distribution system for a community in El Salvador. Additionally, Zach is involved in numerous environmental groups around Rice, including the Rice University Biodiesel Initiative, of which he is a co-founder. Outside of these interests, he also enjoys singing in Rice's oldest a cappella group and designing websites for various organizations.

Jacinta Leyden '14 is studying bioengineering, with a minor in global health technologies. Following graduation, she plans on attending medical school to address global health inequalities through a career in global health policy and research. Jacinta comes from a diverse academic background. She has developed novel nanocrystals for breast cancer diagnostics in the Rice Bioengineering Department, led a health education trip to Ecuador, and most recently worked at the National Science Foundation Office of Legislative and Public Affairs through the Leadership Rice Fellows program. She is currently launching a campus organization, Rice MedicOwls, which aims to increase use of medical technology in developing countries through comprehensive user manuals. Jacinta is fluent in English, French, Mandarin, and Spanish.

Nathan Lo '13 studied bioengineering at Rice University, with a minor in global health technologies. After graduation, he plans to attend medical school with the ultimate goal of working in academia to use research and health policy to address issues in global health. At Rice, Nathan conducted research with the Rice University Department of Bioengineering on the disease mechanism surrounding E. coli-induced kidney failure, and spent the summer of 2012 studying HIV vaccine candidates at the NYU School of Medicine. He has experience in developing and commercializing global health technologies, and has conducted health-related work in Honduras, Ecuador, and Liberia. Nathan interned at the Baker Institute for Public Policy as a science and technology intern for two years, and was a member of the 2012 PDGP colloquium to Qatar, where he co-led the discussions on the role of cultural conceptions and media in social life and gender roles.

George Romar '13 is an Asian studies major. During his time at Rice, he has spent a semester abroad in China, where he studied Mandarin Chinese and Chinese film at Peking University in Beijing. He has a passion for languages and intends to learn more Spanish, American Sign Language, and Arabic. George is a research intern for the Baker Institute Science and Technology Policy Program, led by Dr. Kirstin Matthews and Dr. Neal Lane, in which he focuses on domestic and international biomedical research policies and funding. He was born in Galveston, Texas, and has lived most of his life there. Outside of classes, he enjoys reading, volunteering, exercising, attending live performances, trying new foods, and, more recently, birding. His postgraduate plans include working with the Science and Technology Policy Program before going to medical school.

Shayak Sengupta '15 is studying civil and environmental engineering, with a minor in energy and water sustainability. After graduation, he hopes to pursue graduate studies in preparation for a career in environmental engineering or environmental policy concerning energy use. Shayak currently conducts research with the Dr. Daniel Cohan, associate professor in the Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering at Rice University. His work involves analyzing greenhouse gas emission footprints of different energy sources (particularly natural gas) to contribute potential solutions to energy-related environmental challenges. He also works with the Boniuk Center for the Study and Advancement of Religious Tolerance at Rice, promoting interfaith engagement and dialogue, as well as the university's Honor Council. Shayak was born in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, but was raised for the majority of his life in Houston, Texas.

Sabrina Toppa '13 majored in Asian studies and policy studies. Her overseas experience has largely examined the condition of migrant Muslim populations. She spent a year in Copenhagen and Amsterdam studying the guest worker program and the integration of Muslim immigrants in Europe. In Amsterdam, she conducted oral history interviews with Muslim women to document employment discrimination in the Dutch labor market. She previously lived in Nabeul, Tunisia, as a cultural and language fellow with the Tunisian Ministry of Higher Education's Language Village Nabeul program. In addition to this, she studied Urdu in India on a U.S. State Department-funded Critical Language Scholarship. As the 2013 Zeff fellow, she will spend the next year traveling and interviewing migrant taxi drivers and rickshaw pullers in Qatar, Egypt, South Africa, Bangladesh, the United Arab Emirates, and Jordan.

Carolina White '13 majored in bioengineering. After graduation, Carolina plans to attend medical school, with the ultimate goal of combining her interests in public health, policy, and research to help shape health care on an international scale. Carolina has studied space diplomacy through the Baker Institute Moscow Summer Internship Program, and has worked summers in underserved countries such as Burma and Honduras to provide medical aid and work on sustainable community projects. Outside of the classroom, Carolina volunteers as an emergency medical technician and works with underprivileged populations at public hospitals to increase quality of postdischarge care. Carolina was born in Venezuela, but has spent most of her life in Texas.

Walter Hurst Williamson '15 is majoring in history and political science, with a focus in international relations. After graduating, he plans to pursue a career in diplomacy, and is particularly interested in evolving relationships between the United States and Africa. Hurst was born in Charlotte, North Carolina, and spent a number of years in Denver, Colorado, before moving to Atlanta, Georgia. Recently, Hurst spent the past summer working on Guest Ranch in Wyoming, specializing in introducing children ages 5 to 12 to western-style horseback riding. In addition to working with the PDGP program, Hurst is a member of the Rice Honor Council, the Rice lacrosse team, and Spontaneous Combustion, Rice's improvisational comedy troupe.

Dante Zakhidov '15 is studying chemistry, with an emphasis in physical and theoretical chemistry. He is currently conducting research under Dr. James Tour on the properties of graphene nanoribbons. He plans to continue his studies in graduate school and is interested in the field of nanomaterials. Dante was born in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, but now lives in Dallas, Texas. Dante eventually hopes to be a popularizer of science, exciting the public and prospective students about science, technology, engineering, and mathematics through policy and personal work. Outside of classes, Dante is the photo editor for *The Rice Thresher*, the university's student newspaper. He also enjoys running: he has finished his first marathon and is looking to expand to triathlons. Dante is a member of the Rice club water polo team and officer in Rice Empower, a student organization that aims to bridge the gap between science and the public.

Rice Faculty Advisor

Kirstin R.W. Matthews, Ph.D., Baker Institute Fellow in Science and Technology Policy, Lecturer in the Department of Natural Sciences, and Adjunct Lecturer in the Department of Sociology at Rice University

Qatar Foundation Student Delegates

Isha Galaz Abdullah (United States of America), Texas A&M University at Qatar

Moiz Abid Bohra (India), Texas A&M University at Qatar

Islam Khaled Saed El-Sayed (Egypt), Georgetown School of Foreign Service in Qatar

Mohammed Khalil Harb (Lebanon), Georgetown School of Foreign Service in Qatar

Salma Nabi Khan (Pakistan), Texas A&M University at Qatar

Fatima Labda (Qatar), Texas A&M University at Qatar

Talal Abdulaziz Al Naama (Qatar), Georgetown School of Foreign Service in Qatar

Ernesto De Guzman Nuguid Jr. (Philippines), Texas A&M University at Qatar

Munazzah Sayed (India), Northwestern University in Qatar

Essa Chandna Shaukat (Pakistan), Georgetown School of Foreign Service in Qatar

Anam Waheed (Pakistan), Texas A&M in Qatar

Qatar Foundation Faculty and Staff Advisors

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Acknowledgments

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We are honored to have the support of His Excellency Sheikh Abdulla bin Ali Al Thani, president of Hamad bin Khalifa University and vice president of education at Qatar Foundation. His generosity allowed us to host 11 students from HBKU. Many people helped bring the Qatari students to Houston, including Lana Asfour and Dr. Todd Kent, assistant dean for academic affairs at Texas A&M University at Qatar. The partnership with Texas A&M University at Qatar resulted in a course complementing the colloquium for Qatari students, similar to the one offered at Rice University.

In addition, the Rice University delegation would like to thank Dr. Kirstin R.W. Matthews for her continued commitment to the PDGP program, and her role as faculty adviser and course instructor to the program. We also extend our gratitude to Ambassador Edward P. Djerejian, founding director of the Baker Institute for Public Policy, who delivered the opening remarks to the 2013 PDGP colloquium and was a guest speaker in the PDGP spring semester class. In addition, we would like to acknowledge the Baker Institute fellows and scholars who lectured at the colloquium and PDGP course: Joe Barnes, Andrew Bowen, Russell Green, Allen Matusow, Ken Medlock, and Tony Payan. We would also like to thank the Baker Institute staff, especially Melissa Leuellen and Robert Gutierrez for providing logistical and audiovisual support, as well as Baker Institute fellows Joe Barnes, Marwa Shalaby, and Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, who reviewed the report.

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Finally, the Rice University delegation would like to thank the previous student directors of the PDGP program, Sean Graham '10, Tom Campbell '11, and Graham West '12, whose inspiration and commitment to student-led efforts in public diplomacy have led the PDGP program to become what it is today.



Down to Business

Held at Rice University in March 2013, the PDGP colloquium included five sessions on policy topics and a final session on the future of the program. The students also toured the Rice campus, met with Baker Institute guest speaker and former National Science Foundation director Rita Colwell, and enjoyed meals together throughout the week.







Having Fun

A major part of the PDGP program is cultural exchange. At this year's colloquium, students from Rice and universities in Qatar together attended the Houston Livestock Show and Rodeo, a Rice-Texas A&M baseball game, a concert at Reliant Stadium and dinners at local restaurants.

