Energy regulation under Mexico's energy-sector reforms are of great interest to investors, since autonomous regulators—protected from political pressures and able to make and sustain technical decisions—can guarantee greater legal consistency than government authorities exposed to political pressures. The difficulty was finding an alternative model that ensured the institutional strengthening of the agencies without relinquishing too much control of the executive branch.
This paper explores some of the issues that confront the full realization of the benefits of energy resource development in the United States, Canada, and Mexico, collectively.
José Woldenberg, who served as the first president of Mexico's Federal Electoral Institute, traced the country's transition to democracy at an April 2014 lecture hosted by the Baker Institute Mexico Center. The center's Lisa Guaqueta and Kristin Foringer explain why Mexico's experience is distinct from similar processes elsewhere in the world.
Mexico's organized crime groups have expanded into areas that include the theft of crude oil, gas and gasoline. The impact of organized crime on the energy sector is a real threat to the intended effects of Mexico's energy reforms.
Fossil fuel subsidies have allowed energy exporting countries to distribute resource revenue, bolstering legitimacy for governments, many of which are not democratically elected. But subsidy benefits are dwarfed by the harmful consequences of encouraging uneconomic use of energy. Now, with consumption posing a threat to long-term exports, governments face a heightened need to raise prices that have come to be viewed as entitlements. While reforms of state benefits are notoriously politically dangerous, previous experience shows that subsidies can be rolled back without undermining government legitimacy — even in autocratic settings — given proper preparation.
The violent struggle between rival Mexican drug cartels and other criminal groups has left tens of thousands dead and towns across Mexico paralyzed with fear. With overwhelmed police forces relatively powerless to control drug-related murders and kidnappings, a growing number of vigilante organizations, or self-defense
groups, aim to restore order — but now even they are fighting, and killing, among themselves.
Mexico’s 2013–2014 energy reform promises to bring the country’s economic drivers and regulatory institutions in line with the global practices of free market democracies. If successful, this development would be a 180-degree turn. The accomplishment of such realignment is hardly assured, however.
In 2012, the Drug Policy Program at Rice University’s Baker Institute and the South Texas College of Law (STCL) established a unique agreement to work together on model legislation for the decriminalization and regulation of marijuana in Texas. The collaboration was initiated by students and supported by the administrations and faculties of both educational institutions. South Texas College of Law students produced 19 separate statutes for their public law course in the spring 2013 semester. They were asked to write model legislation regarding some aspect of marijuana policy and provide well-reasoned commentary for their statutes. Experts from the Baker Institute’s Drug Policy Program gave guest lectures on drug policy issues and worked with STCL professor Drury Stevenson to provide a general direction for the course.
The goal of the collaboration between the STCL and the Baker Institute was to create a variety of statutes that legislators and government officials can consult and learn from as marijuana policy is increasingly debated over the next decade. Neither the Baker Institute nor the South Texas College of Law endorses any particular policy. The model legislation has not undergone editorial review by the Baker Institute.
Erika de la Garza, program director of the Latin America Initiative, discusses the political fragmentation and need for coalition building in Costa Rica, where the recent presidential election resulted in a runoff.
