Appendix: Annotated Bibliography

This appendix provides a supplemental literature review for “Christian Americanism and Texas Politics Since 2008.” The full paper is available at: https://doi.org/10.25613/0ssp-2x65

Though historian Mark Edwards observed in 2017 that Christian Americanism remains largely understudied, the ideology is the subject of a growing body of scholarly literature.¹ To date, however, most work either treats the ideology as a national phenomenon or focuses on its role in the debate over the curriculum in Texas public schools. Few works emphasize the issue of Christian Americanism in Texas politics (outside the educational context). This appendix offers an annotated bibliography of selected works relevant to the study of that issue.


In this 2016 Baker Institute report, I examine how religion is covered throughout the Texas public school social studies curriculum selection process, from the development of curriculum standards to the review and adoption of instructional materials for use in Texas classrooms. While most scholarly and media attention has focused on controversies over the teaching of science and history in Texas, I argue that the coverage of religion in the Texas curriculum is equally if not more important, since religion underlies much of the debate surrounding instruction in other disciplines.

The relevance of Religious Imbalance to the broader question of Christian Americanism and Texas politics lies mainly in its examination of Christian Americanist influence on both the 2010 revision of public school social studies standards and the 2014 adoption of social studies textbooks (7-14), as well as its discussion of claims of “Judeo-Christian” origins for democracy in the standards (17-18).


This article is the definitive study of Christian Americanist domination of the Texas State Board of Education in 2009 and 2010 and its effects on the social studies standards for Texas public schools. Chancey, professor of religious studies at Southern Methodist University, draws on an extensive collection of materials—education board documents and meeting recordings, as well as public comments and writings by key figures involved in the controversy—to describe the political processes behind the standards. He pays “special attention to the ways in which the Texas system . . . lends itself to overt political
manipulation by giving more power to elected politicians than to professional educators, content specialists, or academics” (330). Chancey also critiques the 2010 standards, showing how they are influenced by Christian Americanist historiography and how far they depart from mainstream scholarship. The article concludes by considering “the implications of the controversy for understanding larger political and social trends and Christian Americanist agendas to impact public education” (330).

As far as the broader question of Christian Americanism and Texas politics is concerned, this article offers a concise and cogent definition of the ideology itself (the one used in the present report, in fact), information about the work of David Barton (an appointed “expert” consultant on the 2010 social studies standards), and a helpful discussion of what Chancey calls the Christian Americanist “reconstruction of history” (351).


Turning again to the 2010 Texas social studies standards, Chancey explores how they “reflect attempts to teach students to understand religion through a lens colored by red-state sensibilities” (164). Chancey pays particular attention to the Christian Americanist influence on the standards, reprising the content of his 2014 article. This essay, however, also offers an extensive survey of pre-2010 social studies guidelines in Texas (dating back to the 1920s), and demonstrates just how significantly the Christian Americanist-influenced 2010 standards departed from those earlier guidelines. Chancey finds that the claim reflected in the 2010 standards that “the Founding Fathers established the United States to be a distinctively Christian nation with laws and a form of government based on the Bible . . . is simply absent from all Texas guidelines from the previous one hundred years” (173-74). This demonstrates that, contrary to some Christian Americanist narratives, the absence of such a slant in the state’s social studies guidelines did not result from the Supreme Court-guided secularization of public schools in the 1960s (173-74). Along with Chancey’s 2014 article, this essay is an important resource for students of Christian Americanism in Texas politics, specifically in the realm of public education.


Historian John Fea, professor of American history at Messiah College in Pennsylvania, says this book is written “for the historically minded and thoughtful reader who is looking for help” in determining whether America was founded as a Christian nation (xix). The book is divided into three parts. The first offers a historical account of the idea that the U.S. is a Christian nation. The second and third parts focus on the role of Christianity in America’s founding period: part two examines the role of Christianity in the American Revolution and the framing of the Constitution, while part three examines the religious beliefs of
founders George Washington, John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin, John Witherspoon, John Jay, and Samuel Adams. Fea concludes that although “those who believe that the United States is a Christian nation have a good chunk of American history on their side,” the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution cannot be called Christian documents, and the founders, though generally religious, were a religiously “eclectic” group rather than uniformly orthodox Christians (245-46).

The first part is of greatest relevance to the study of Christian Americanism in Texas, along with Fea’s conclusion and epilogue to the 2016 revised edition. Fea touches on Glenn Beck’s attention to the religious beliefs of the founders, and he mentions the efforts of the Texas State Board of Education to add “Christian themes” to the public school social studies curriculum (xix, 244, xviii). He also mentions Ted Cruz as one of several 2016 GOP presidential candidates who “invoked the founding fathers on religion, claimed that the United States has Judeo-Christian roots, or argued that the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution are Christian documents” (247). He further mentions the efforts of David Lane’s American Renewal Project to recruit pastors to run for political office (247).

Perhaps most pertinent are Fea’s discussions and critiques of David Barton and WallBuilders. Fea places Barton in the context of other Christian Americanists (such as Peter Marshall and D. James Kennedy) and discusses the widespread influence in the evangelical community of Barton’s books, videos, radio and television work, and public appearances (58). Fea notes that Barton and similar writers claim that “the United States has lost its way” and that “a return to the founders’ beliefs—especially their religious vision for the nation—is the only way to get it back on the right track” (68). He discusses at length Barton’s contention that the founders intended only to make all Christian denominations equal, not all religions, as well as Barton’s attack on what he considers the “historical revisionism” of mainline scholars (71-73). Fea also devotes several paragraphs to the controversy over Barton’s The Jefferson Lies (247-49). Indeed, as a whole, Was America Founded as a Christian Nation? is an academic historian’s rejoinder to Barton’s work, for it shows that the history of America’s founding is far more complicated than Barton and his colleagues paint it out to be.

Nevertheless, this work does not treat Christian Americanism in the specific context of Texas politics, since Fea’s focus is on the ideology as a nationwide historical phenomenon.


Willamette University historian Steven K. Green examines how the “myth” of America’s religious founding as a Christian nation became “a leading narrative about the nation’s collective identity” (viii). By myth, Green does not mean “an imaginary, unfounded notion” but “a narrative of ostensibly historical events that seeks to infuse those events with greater meaning”; myths, he writes, “are essentially identity-creating narratives”
that “provide explanations for events,” “legitimize the past,” and offer “a unifying narrative for a distinct people” (15).

The bulk of the work is dedicated to showing that the myth of America’s religious founding was invented incrementally from roughly 1800 to 1840. Green argues that it was consciously created by the second generation of Americans in order to “construct a national identity that conformed to their own religious sentimentalities and political aspirations” (2). Those religious sentimentalities were shaped by the Second Great Awakening, a wave of evangelical fervor that affected most U.S. Protestant denominations in the early nineteenth century.

Green sharply contrasts the founding generation with their early nineteenth-century descendants. In the late 1700s, “the Constitution was universally seen as a secular document establishing a civil frame of government,” he writes. “In essence, few in the first generation would have viewed America as a ‘Christian nation,’ insofar as that term implied that the government was specially ordained by God or founded on Christian principles” (198); indeed, “people of the founding generation—from rationalist republicans to orthodox clergy—generally conceded the irreligious character of the Constitution and American republican government,” a character criticized by orthodox clergy up to around the end of the War of 1812 (211).

Green shows, however, that as the founding generation passed away and was replaced by a second generation of leaders, “the image of a secular government succumbed to a myth that America had been founded as a Christian nation” (211). Green identifies four main factors contributing to the construction of the religious founding myth: early histories glorifying the founding; the apotheosis of George Washington; claims that English common law is based on Christianity; and the rehabilitation of the Pilgrims and Puritans. In the process, “the character of the Constitution, which only recently had been viewed as being religiously neutral or even irreligious, was transformed into a document that became sanctified, in part through its association with the deified George Washington. The absence of a religious affirmation in the Constitution was explained as an oversight or inconsequence that had little impact on the nation’s religious foundations or its manifest destiny” (211). In the newly invented myth of a Christian nation, “the Founders emerged chiefly as scribes, divinely inspired to draft a frame of government as directed by God’s providential hand” (241).

The specific issue of Christian Americanism in Texas politics lies largely beyond the scope of Green’s study, though the introduction does include a short discussion of the work of David Barton and a brief mention of the Christian Americanist impact on the Texas social studies curriculum (6, 9). Nonetheless, this work may help in elucidating that issue in two respects. The first—discussed in Section 1 of this report—is Green’s observation that the “protean, chameleon-like” notion of America’s religious founding manifests in views of differing intensity, the most intense being the Christian Americanism associated with Barton, Beck, and others (4-5). This gradation may provide criteria for distinguishing
genuinely Christian Americanist Texans from those who merely espouse a form of American civil religion.

Second, Green's functionalist account of the myth of America's religious founding could inform the study of Christian Americanism in Texas politics. Though the major sections of the book persuasively demonstrate that the mythical narrative of America's religious founding does not match the historical record and was instead invented in the early 1800s, Green argues in effect that the function of that narrative is not to provide a historically accurate account of the founding, but to offer a founding myth that would "give us [Americans] our identity, help establish us as a common people ('E Pluribus Unum'), and distinguish us from other peoples (i.e., American exceptionalism)," in short, to "make us Americans" (16). "Since its creation in the early nineteenth century," Green writes, "the central function of this narrative has been to simplify the Founding into an uncomplicated form that meets with the hopes and aspirations of many Americans. . . . Today, people from many walks of life, not solely religious conservatives, desire a grand, and uncomplicated, story about the nation's beginnings" (241-42). The myth of a Christian America, Green argues, supplies such a story. While this functionalist account may overlook potentially pernicious effects of the Christian American myth—such as threats to church-state separation and to religious minorities—Green's approach accounts for the persistence of the myth in the American consciousness and its resistance to counter-arguments from academic historians, and thus helps to illuminate how it functions within the realm of Texas politics.


Though taking as its starting point the 2009-10 controversy over the Texas social studies standards, this essay by Hughes, distinguished professor of religion at Messiah College, quickly moves to broader questions regarding Christian Americanism: "How and why did the notion of Christian America develop in the first place? How and why have Christians sought to promote that notion? What purpose did that understanding serve? And how have Christians sought to link the nation with biblical vision of the kingdom of God?" (128). Hughes traces the roots of Christian Americanism to biblical notions of the kingdom of God, the Constantinian Settlement of 313, and Calvinist thought. He then explores how, contrary to Christian Americanist claims, the dream of a Christianized America “hit a roadblock” in the work of the founders, specifically, the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution—the latter constituting “the supreme rebuttal” to the contention that the founders sought to create a Christian nation (132, 138). However, the efforts of those seeking to create a Christian republic crystallized in the Second Great Awakening of the early nineteenth century and the Fundamentalist Movement in the early twentieth (138). Hughes argues that the Fundamentalist Movement in particular provided the background for the efforts of Christian Americanists to shape the Texas social studies curriculum in 2009-10. The work of the State Board of Education in that time period, Hughes concludes,
“was driven to a very large extent by its embrace of the contemporary myth of Christian America. Often disconnected from the Founders’ intentions, that myth has even less to do with the biblical text and the Bible’s vision of the kingdom of God. As a result, the work of the board promotes bad history, a skewed understanding of the Christian religion, and an impoverished sense of ethical norms” (145).

As concerns Christian Americanism and Texas politics since 2008, Hughes’ essay is useful primarily for its discussion of the historical roots and context of the ideology. However, this essay also touches on the work of David Barton and WallBuilders (127-28, 136).


As noted in Section 1, Christian Reconstructionism and dominionism overlap with Christian Americanism but are tangential to the study presented here. Accordingly, although Ingersoll’s extensive and important study of Christian Reconstructionism illuminates the broader context in which Christian Americanism operates nationally, much of the work will be of peripheral interest to students of Christian Americanism in Texas.

Of more direct interest, however, are Ingersoll’s chapter-length discussions of Gary North’s Biblical Blueprint Series (54-78) and of David Barton’s ties to Christian Reconstructionism, including the roots of his approach to history in Rushdoony’s thought (189-212). Those researching Christian Americanism as a factor in Texas politics will also benefit from Ingersoll’s examination of the influence of Reconstructionists like North on the Tea Party movement as it emerged in the late 2000s and early 2010s (178-88).


Whereas Green locates the origins of the Christian America myth in the early 1800s, Princeton University historian Keven Kruse argues that the myth arose much later, in the period from the 1930s through the 1950s. Kruse focuses on opponents of Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal who promoted a “Christian libertarianism,” a “blend of conservative religion, economics, and politics,” which held that the political and economic system that best fits the teaching of Christ is “the capitalist system of free enterprise” (xiv, 7). Gaining momentum as fears of “godless communism” rose in the post-WWII period, the movement received generous funding from major corporate executives and drew support from thousands of conservative clergypersons and leading Republican politicians (28, 30). “The story of business leaders enlisting clergymen in their war against the New Deal is one that has been largely obscured by the very ideology that resulted from it,” Kruse writes; the efforts of corporate executives and conservative clergy “convinced a wide range of Americans that America had been, and should always be, a Christian nation” (292, 293).
Kruse traces the rise of Christian Americanist sentiment during Eisenhower’s presidency, unsuccessful efforts to pass a “Christian amendment” that would have added language about Jesus Christ to the Constitution, and the successful effort to insert “under God” into the Pledge of Allegiance (95-96, 102-11). In the 1950s, Kruse writes, “the phrase ‘one nation under God’ . . . became an informal motto for the country, demonstrating the widespread belief that the United States had been founded on religious belief and was sustained by religious practice” (111). Kruse discusses key early-1960s Supreme Court decisions that moved the nation toward greater church-state separation, as well as the pushback from Christian conservatives, particularly with regard to the ultimately unsuccessful Becker Amendment that would have allowed public school prayer. In the epilogue, Kruse notes that the GOP became increasingly Christianized in the era of George H.W. Bush and added language about the country’s “Judeo-Christian heritage” to the party platform in 1992 (284-85). Kruse also touches on George W. Bush’s efforts to mobilize religious conservatives around “one nation under God” rhetoric (289-90).

Given that the book focuses on national developments from the 1930s to the 2008 presidential election, rather than issues in Texas proper, One Nation Under God contributes to the study of Christian Americanism in Texas politics mainly by providing historical background and context for some of the key concepts associated with the ideology. It also highlights the role of business interests in promoting the ideology (thus foreshadowing the contemporary involvement of Tim Dunn and the Wilks Brothers in Texas).


Like the Wuthnow text (discussed below), Martin’s With God on Our Side provides indispensable background to any study of the Christian right generally, and Christian Americanism particularly, in Texas.

After an introductory chapter tracing the historical background of the current religious right (from the Puritans, through the rise of fundamentalism, to the radio ministries of Charles E. Fuller, Father Charles Coughlin, and Gerald L. K. Smith), the rest of the work focuses on the gradual rise of conservative Christian political activism and influence from the 1950s through the early 2000s. Martin draws on more than 100 interviews with major participants in the movement during that time.

Although Christian Americanism per se is not a major topic in this work, indications of the ideology surface occasionally. For instance, Billy Graham’s early linkage of evangelical Christianity with politics (31) foreshadows today’s Christian Americanist activism, and his early preaching often sounded themes that echo in today’s Christian Americanist rhetoric, such as references to America’s “God-given democratic institutions” (32) and the “God-blessed superiority of the free enterprise system” (30). Chapter 5 includes a discussion of Mel and Norma Gabler and their influence on textbook content and adoption in Texas, as well as their connections to similar conservative religious activists in other states (120-43).
The Gablers accused textbooks of “undermining Judeo-Christian values” (121), criticized textbook material that drew “parallels between Christianity and other religions, since that seems to downplay the unique validity of Christianity” (122), and contended that only “Christian-Judeo [sic] morals, values, and standards” ensure the survival of civilization (122). Furthermore, the 2005 edition includes a helpful discussion of Christian Reconstructionism up to that date (353-60), and the epilogue offers a helpful historical discussion of separationism and accommodationism, the principal interpretations of the First Amendment’s religion clauses (371-85). Martin also has some words of wisdom pertinent to Christian Americanists and their opponents:

Christians should recognize, in justified humility, that there is no single Christian position on many, perhaps most, social issues. Intelligent, informed, sincere Christians may honestly differ not only with unbelievers, but also among themselves and adherents of other religions, as to what God or whatever powers govern the universe think about such issues as abortion, the distribution of wealth among nations, the legitimacy of a particular political regime, or the desirability of a given weapons system (384).


In this as-yet-unpublished work, Whitehead (assistant professor of sociology at Clemson University) and Perry (assistant professor of sociology at the University of Oklahoma) offer the first systematic and empirical evaluation of “Christian nationalism and its influence in American social, cultural, and political life” (5). The authors combine a quantitative approach, relying principally on 2007 and 2017 Baylor Religion Surveys (BRS), with a qualitative approach, including “50 in-depth interviews” and “participant observation at large events in Texas, Oklahoma, and South Carolina where Christian nationalists and their beliefs were prominently represented” (6).

Of the texts in this annotated bibliography, *Taking America Back for God* is most directly relevant to the study of Christian Americanism and Texas politics. Although their book is national in scope, Whitehead and Perry describe Christian Americanist-oriented worship services in Texas and discuss several key Texas Christian Americanists, including Barton, Jeffress, and Ted and Rafael Cruz.

Whitehead and Perry define Christian nationalism as “a cultural framework—a collection of myths, traditions, symbols, narratives, and value systems—that idealizes and advocates a fusion of Christianity with American civic life” (10). They distinguish it from American civil religion (11) and note that the Christian nationalist “conception of morality centers exclusively on fidelity to religion and fidelity to the nation” (15).
Whitehead and Perry’s three main arguments are “that understanding Christian nationalism . . . is essential for understanding much of the polarization in American popular discourse,” that it must be understood on its own terms, and “that Christian nationalism is not ‘Christianity’ or even ‘religion’ properly speaking” (16, 18, 20).

One of the most helpful elements of this work is the authors’ development of a Christian nationalism scale. They first construct a primary scale based on degree of agreement with six statements from the BRS (7-8). The distribution of scores on this primary scale yields a 24-point scale which then allows the authors to divide respondents into four heuristic categories of Christian nationalism: Rejecters, who reject the ideology; Resisters, who lean toward opposition to it, but remain undecided; Accommodators, who are also undecided but leaning toward acceptance of Christian nationalism; and Ambassadors, who fully support Christian nationalism.

Chapter 1 examines the variation in Americans’ beliefs about Christian nationalism, using data from the 2007 and 2017 BRS and applying the Christian nationalism scale. Whitehead and Perry examine the demographics, educational attainment, and religious and political affiliations of each of the four groups. They conclude that acceptance of Christian nationalism has declined slightly over the last decade, and that the proportion of Americans who resist or reject the ideology has increased significantly. However, they also show that Accommodators and Ambassadors still constitute over half of the U.S. population (46). Of particular relevance to my remarks in Section 4 of this report, Whitehead and Perry discuss Christian nationalism as a possible symbolic boundary, designating “who is ‘in’ and who is ‘out’” (51).

In chapter 2, which opens by describing Jeffress’ 2018 “America is a Christian Nation” sermon, the authors argue that “those Americans who adhere most strongly to Christian nationalist ideals have political interests primarily in mind. Religious interests rank second, if they rank at all” (58-59). They find a “great paradox” that “Christian nationalism and religiosity often influence Americans [sic] political views in the exact opposite direction”: as Americans become more religious (in terms of church attendance, prayer, and Bible reading), they tend to move away from the positions associated with Christian nationalism, and vice versa (84). Rather than reflecting the promotion of Christian values such as self-sacrifice, mercy, love, and justice, Christian nationalism is instead mainly about political power; it “uses Christian language and symbols to demarcate and defend group boundaries and privileges” (87).

Chapter 3 is particularly relevant to the discussion in Section 4 of this report concerning Christian Americanism as a symbolic boundary. Whitehead and Perry discuss how the ideology functions to draw and reinforce symbolic boundaries, and they find that Christian nationalism is associated with anti-immigrant views, support for white supremacy, and negative views of Jews, Muslims, and atheists. Once again, the authors find a “crisscrossing” effect between Christian nationalism and personal religiosity: the stronger one’s adherence to Christian nationalism, the more these negative attitudes tend to dominate; the stronger
one’s personal religiosity, the less likely one is to have such attitudes. This underscores the authors’ contention that Christian nationalism is less about Christianity than about power.

Chapter 4 examines how Christian nationalism seeks to establish order and hierarchy in the public sphere, but also—and “perhaps even more so”—in the private sphere, particularly in defending “hierarchies between men and women,” “the patriarchal family,” and traditional monogamous, heterosexual relationships (148).

In their concluding chapter, Whitehead and Perry suggest several possible lines of investigation for researchers. They also offer some tentative predictions about the future of Christian nationalism and its implications for civil society and American Christianity. They argue that while the number of strong adherents to Christian nationalism may decline in coming years, their importance in American politics will not. Whitehead and Perry contend that strong support for Christian nationalism, which entails viewing nonreligious and non-Christian Americans as “fundamentally deficient,” is “without doubt . . . a threat to a pluralistic democratic society,” since it “ultimately desires the silencing and exclusion of its opponents from the public sphere” (161-62). The authors also argue that Christian nationalism runs contrary to Christianity itself: its “desperate quest for power” is “antithetical to Jesus’ message” (163).

_Taking America Back for God_ constitutes a vital resource for future study of Christian Americanism. It is particularly helpful in illuminating the continuum of adherence to the ideology (the four heuristic categories), and for highlighting the distinction between Christian Americanism and personal religiosity, and thus the fundamental difference between Christian Americanists and Christians proper. As for the role, influence, and implications of Christian Americanism in Texas politics, Whitehead and Perry discuss several key Texas Christian Americanists, including Barton, Jeffress, and Ted and Rafael Cruz. The authors’ discussion of the boundary-drawing function of Christian Americanism may also help in understanding the ideology’s political function (as I discuss in Section 4 of this report). Nonetheless, _Taking America Back for God_ does not directly address the specific question of how Christian Americanism influences politics in Texas.


This work by Princeton University sociologist Robert Wuthnow is essential for understanding the role religion has played in Texas from the 1830s to 2014. Drawing on extensive research, Wuthnow tells a detailed story of religion in Texas, with special attention to divisions between conservatives and progressives, as well as the relationship between religion, race, and ethnicity. The book also explores the tangled relations between religion and politics in the state.
Though Christian Americanism is not a focus of the work, *Rough Country* touches on a few instances of the ideology in Texas. Wuthnow discusses the activities of Tyler-based Grassroots America, a Tea Party group organized in 2009 “to promote conservative activism and government watchdog efforts aimed at restoring the nation’s founding principles” (438). The group organized “God and Country” meetings, aimed at clergy and conservative laity, which “bridged the Tea Party’s antigovernment and antitax agendas with the concerns of Christians who felt the government was promoting policies destructive of traditional family values, such as abortion rights and homosexuality” (439). Wuthnow also discusses the case of a Church of Christ pastor in north Texas who became involved in the Tea Party and held “a series of meetings about Christians and the U.S. Constitution. The principal message, he said, was that ‘the concept of a limited government and the concept of freedom are based on concepts that go back to God’” (440). *Rough Country* also includes short discussions of then-Governor Rick Perry’s “The Response” rally in Houston in 2011, and the role of religion in Ted Cruz’s 2012 race for the U.S. Senate (442-443). However, Wuthnow does not treat Christian Americanism in detail, and he only focuses on events prior to 2014.

Yet like Whitehead and Perry’s volume, the Wuthnow text is valuable in its discussion of symbolic boundaries—which Wuthnow defines as “cognitive categories that delineate patterns of social behavior”—dividing “us” and “them” in religious-political discourse (459). This is particularly true of his afterword on “Religion and the Politics of Identity,” where he identifies lessons that the empirical investigation of religion in Texas may offer to broader thought about religion and its social context. Wuthnow’s discussions of symbolic boundaries and church-state dynamics may also be useful in understanding Christian Americanism in Texas politics generally, especially the intriguing lack of explicitly Christian Americanist legislation discussed in Sections 3 and 4 of this report.

Endnotes

2 However, in chapter 2, Kruse does make note of the key relationship between evangelist Billy Graham and Fort Worth oil millionaire Sid Richardson, who helped Graham early on in his ministry. Kruse, *One Nation*, 51, 54.