Oil Production Disruptions and Surges in Major Producers

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&

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Outline

- Motivation and Methodology
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 - Methodology

- 2 Results
 - Incorporating Hotelling
 - Disruptions and Jumps

- Previous work (Oil, Dollars, Debt, and Crises): endogenous self perpetuating cycle of oil prices and credit crises
 - 1980s: banks and sovereign debt crisis (countries don't go out of business)
 - 2000s: housing (home prices never go down) and then sovereign debt crises
- Geopolitical catalysts at turning points of the cycle
 - "Arab oil embargo" coincided ⇒ correction for depreciating Dollar
 - Some effects are permanent (real 70s shock in 1979 after Iranian revolution)
 - Sometimes, geopolitical and financial "shocks" themselves are endogenous (e.g. our anticipation of "the Arab Spring" and the sovereign debt crisis)



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


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


Amy's Conjecture: Does Regime Change Lead to Disruption?


Iran: Production plummets in 1979 and never recovers despite investment



Disruptions in Either Direction




Example of Positive Disruption (Technical Advance): UK





Example of Status Quo Hubbert Curve: US





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- Twenty countries with at least 1 million barrels per day production within sample (1/1/1965-2/1/2012)
 - Algeria, Angola, Brazil, Canada, China, Former Soviet Union, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Mexico, Nigeria, Norway, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE, UK, USA, and Venezuela
- Did not impose parametric form on Hubbert curves
 - Only imposed minimal smoothness conditions
- Abstract from short-term fluctuations (weather, etc.)
- Statistical approach:
 - Define "disruptions" or "jumps"

 ≡ significant (5% level) deviations
 at wave(let)lengths lower than 32 months
 - Regress (orthogonal) wavelet decompositions of output on similar decompositions of WTI price, S&P500, Gold price, US 10 year Treasury yield, US Manufacturing PMI

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
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
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Example 1: DWT Decomposition of US Production



Example 2: Decomposition of Venezuelan Production





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Saudi Production Responses 1

	Prod Detail 1 (2-4 months)	Prod Detail 2 (4-8 months)
DWTID1	1.60	
	(8.42)	
DSP500D1	0.84	
	(0.67)	
DGoldD1	3.36***	
	(0.58)	
DUS10yrD1	-1.23	
	(81.72)	
DPMID1	-5.31	
	(8.84)	***
DWTID2		16.86***
		(5.97)
DSP500D2		1.42***
		(0.53)
DGoldD2		2.11***
		(0.47)
DUS10yrD2		-23.13
		(51.47)
DPMID2		-17.83**
		(8.01)
R ²	0.33	0.39
Adj. R ²	0.32	0.38
Num. obs.	566	566

Saudi Production Responses 2

	Prod Detail 3 (8-16 months)	Prod Detail 4 (16-32 months)	Prod Detail 5 (32-64 months)
DWTID3	11.72***		
	(4.20)		
DSP500 <i>D</i> 3	0.53		
	(0.61)		
DGold <i>D</i> 3	3.22***		
	(0.39)		
DUS10yrD3	-46.47		
	(53.79)		
DPMI <i>D</i> 3	-5.40		
	(7.66)		
DWTID4		5.13	
		(3.72)	
DSP500 <i>D</i> 4		0.99	
		(0.63)	
DGold <i>D</i> 4		3.23***	
		(0.45)	
DUS10yrD4		149.40***	
		(50.59)	
DPMI <i>D</i> 4		-31.46***	
		(5.32)	
DWTI <i>D</i> 5			40.52***
			(5.18)
DSP500 <i>D</i> 5			-1.06***
			(0.37)
DGold <i>D</i> 5			2.42***
			(0.37)
DUS10yrD5			202.59***
			(29.30)
DPMI <i>D</i> 5			14.11***
			(□) (d 15)) (E)

Libyan Production Responses 1

		Prod Detail 1 (2-4 months)	Prod Detail 2 (4-8 months)
DWTID1		-1.09	
		(2.52)	
DSP500D1		0.04	
		(0.20)	
DGoldD1		0.07	
		(0.17)	
DUS10yrD1		24.17	
		(24.45)	
DPMID1		-4.39*	
		(2.64)	
DWTID2			-1.15
			(1.86)
DSP500D2			0.30*
			(0.17)
DGoldD2			-0.31**
			(0.15)
DUS10yrD2			10.29
			(16.00)
DPMID2			-6.86***
			(2.49)
R ²	0.90	0.01	0.03
Adj. R ²	0.90	0.00	0.02
Num. obs.	566	566	566

Libyan Production Responses 2


		Prod Detail 3 (8-16 months)	Prod Detail 4 (16-32 months)	Prod Detail 5 (32-64 months)
DWTID	3	-0.89		
DSP500.	D3	(1.29) 0.58*** (0.19)		
DGoldD	3	-0.20 (0.12)		
DUS10y	r <i>D</i> 3	-74.35*** (16.56)		
DPMI <i>D</i> 3	3	12.69*** (2.36)		
DWTID	4	(2.50)	4.30*** (0.96)	
DSP500	D4		-1.07*** (0.16)	
DGoldD	4		-0.46*** (0.12)	
DUS10y	r <i>D</i> 4		-136.43*** (13.04)	
DPMI <i>D</i> -	4		19.12***	
DWTI <i>D</i>	5		(1.57)	2.63*
DSP500	D5			(1.54) -0.82***
1531 5001	0)			(0.11)
DGoldD	15			0.04
DUS10y	rD5			(0.11) 10.90
D0010y	10)			(8.72)
DPMID:	5			19.58***
				4 □ ▶ 4 🗗 ▶ (1.23) ▶ 4 🗏 ▶

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
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Iran: Regime Change Leading to Disruption






Iraq: Boom, then War, then War, then Boom




Libya: Boom, then Regime Change, then Regime Insanity






UK: Technical Advance + Economics






Brazil: Technical Advance + Economics




Angola: Technical Advance + Economics






Mexico: Economics, Technical Advance, or Both?






Saudi Arabia: Responding to Economics (Mexico & UK?)





Kuwait: Responding to Economics (Mexico & UK?) + War





Venezuela: Boom (1970s), Plateau \Rightarrow Regime Change (1999)!

