CHAPTER FIVE

On the verge of the millennium, Israel and Syria are facing a new stage in the peace process. Even though the past decade failed to produce a breakthrough in the process, it has led to better mutual understanding of the limits of power and both countries are interested in achieving a political settlement that will help them achieve their national goals.

An atmosphere of trust between Israel and Syria has yet to be created and mutual suspicion is still high. Nevertheless, the lessons of the previous negotiations before they broke off in March 1996 and a reduction in the intensity of that mutual suspicion indicates that Israel and Syria will be able to hold serious negotiations, jointly examine practical solutions and even take into account each others specific problems. (30)

In my view, Syria and Israel are ready for a new stage in the process -- a stage in which the leaders will have to display political wisdom in the effort to reach a settlement. While there are weighty, complicated issues on the table, they are soluble, on condition that the leaders are guided by the principle that other side’s gain could be their gain too. This process will require maturity, mutual trust and the leaders’ sense that their peoples are ready to exploit the peace process to promote national interests, with the emphasis on socio-economic resilience.

How can the sides move forward? Based on lessons learned from the previous negotiations, a number of parameters should be set that will improve the chances of success in future talks:

1. There is a need for the two leaders to reach a strategic understanding whereby they are both determined to renew negotiations and to agree upon as brief a timetable as possible for reaching a settlement. This will also require them to prepare their respective peoples for the possibility of an agreement.
2. An atmosphere of mutual trust between the leaders will also be crucial. The sides should not insist on reaching agreement over the point at which the negotiations were broken off, and when talks do restart, openness, informality and chemistry between the negotiating teams will be essential. To this end there is a need to substantially reduce the mutual expressions of animosity in the media so as to allow for the negotiations to take place in as comfortable and businesslike a fashion as possible.
3. A new understanding has to be reached between the two sides regarding the major elements of an agreement. This must include the price that each side will have to pay, including the following components:

1. An Israeli withdrawal on the Golan Heights.
2. Security arrangements that will guarantee the peace.
3. Reciprocal, but not equal, demilitarized zones on both sides of the border, as well as limited forces zones. A third type of zone in which both countries’ offensive options are limited.
4. Full and normal diplomatic relations between the two countries, at the least along the lines of the Egyptian model. All the components related to normalization, though, do not have to be included in the treaty that will be signed, but can be concluded later in the framework of bilateral talks.
5. Placing Lebanon at the top of the list of issues to be dealt with in the negotiations with the aim of ending terror, of renewing talks between Israel and Lebanon, and of incorporating a settlement in Lebanon into the time-line of the Israel-Syria track. A breakthrough on the Syrian track will allow for the implementation of the Lebanon settlement as the first stage of an agreement between Jerusalem and Damascus. In this context, it is important that Asad understand the pressures that Barak faces at home with regard to security and peace issues, while it is equally important that Israel understand the constraints Asad faces with regard to the Golan Heights.
6. It will also be advisable for the two sides to reach practical solutions regarding the issues of water and borders, rather than legalistic solutions that may well result in the two sides getting locked in inflexible, formalistic positions.
7. Getting Syrian understanding for the fact that Israel will continue to face distant threats and will therefore need to maintain sufficient military force to defend itself. The aim of this component is to satisfy Israel’s need to maintain its strategic capability (which will not be aimed at Syria which would be at peace with it) and to convince other countries to join the circle of peace.

Time is moving fast, especially with regard to Asad. If the Syrian leader hopes to reach an agreement with Israel and to prepare the ground for his son to succeed him, he will have to accelerate the slow decision-making process he is accustomed to and which has characterized him in the past. The time frame in which an agreement can most likely be achieved is not unlimited. It will run until the middle of the year 2000. The time frame is related to a number of factors:

1. May 2000: The European Union’s Berlin declaration set a target of one year for conclusion of the permanent status talks between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. The intention was a year from the renewal of talks, with the assumption being that they would begin immediately after the Israeli elections in May 1999. Although the target date may well be shifted from May 2000, if it approaches with no discernible progress on the Israeli-Syrian axis, Israel and the U.S. will inevitably make a more substantive investment in the negotiations with the Palestinians, which would become the main negotiating channel. Conversely, progress on the Israeli-Syrian track could defer a permanent settlement with the Palestinians.
2. November 2000: This is the date for the U.S. presidential elections. The cut-off point with regard to American involvement in the process may, however, be several months earlier, especially if President Clinton comes to the conclusion that there are serious differences over key issues in the negotiations. In such a scenario, he is likely to distance himself from the peace process, as it will not provide him with any major achievement to wave in front of the American public to boost the Democratic party’s election prospects.
3. Summer 2000: Barak’s declared intention to withdraw from Lebanon by July 2000 will also affect the timetable for negotiations with Syria. Paralysis on the Syrian track is likely to increase the calls in Israel for a unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon -- a move that would weaken one of Syria’s strongest negotiating cards.

U.S. involvement is vital if the process is to move forward. The Americans will have to invest energy and thought, both in dealing with the time factor as well as with the leaders involved in the negotiations. Its tasks will be multiple and complicated:

1. To guide the parties toward renewing talks, on the basis of agreed understandings between them.
2. To promote confidence building measures between the two sides.
3. To assist in building a framework for an agreement.
4. To make suggestions to help bridge differences.
5. To help Israel with the supply and financing of its security needs. The U. S. will have to compensate Israel, as Syria will gaining territory, while Israel will giving up territory and will have to finance the cost of withdrawal.
6. To offer Syria economic incentives.
7. To rally regional and international support -- both diplomatic and economic for an agreement. The Europeans along with the Japanese and world financial bodies, can play a central role in this sphere.
8. To be ready to play role in the supervisory and verification arrangements.

To effectively fulfill this role, the Americans will have to show great sensitivity to the interests of both sides, but especially to Israel’s positions and to give them preference wherever definitions of security needs are involved. They will have to be involved in the negotiations at the most detailed level. They will also have to be ready to push the two sides into taking tough decisions by presenting hypothetical questions, as well as their own ideas, and by assembling possible package deals. At the same time the U.S. will have to keep an eye on the Palestinians to ensure they do not become frustrated and begin taking steps that undermine the Syria-Israel track.

The load on the Americans will be heavy. In my view they will be ready to take it on because of the fact that a settlement between Israel and Syria will clearly serve their fundamental interests. Still, the Americans will want to see a readiness on both sides to make compromises. The U.S. will not impose a solution on the parties, and no-one should expect any crisis in U.S.-Israel relations over the negotiations -- especially on the eve of elections in the U.S., and against the backdrop of America’s longtime commitment to Israel’s security. The bottom line: The Americans still see the Israelis and the Syrians as the two players ultimately responsible for the success or failure of the process.

A few comments on the negotiating framework:

1. The smaller the negotiating teams, the greater the chance that the talks will be businesslike and informal, and that the necessary chemistry between the participants will be created. Large negotiating teams tend to make secrecy difficult, reduce intimacy and encourage the sides to take hard-line, rigid positions.
2. Still, it is advisable that the negotiating teams include the right mix of political, security and economic delegates -- something which will assist in putting together a well-integrated agreement. The heads of the negotiating teams must have the experience and skill that will enable them to build a package deal.
3. The heads of the negotiating teams have to be directly connected to the two leaders, Barak and Asad. This will underline the importance that the leaders attach to the negotiations and will speed up the talks themselves.
4. The first stages of the talks should be held in a limited "core group" that will determine the general framework for the negotiations. Afterwards, the teams dealing with specific issues like security, borders and diplomatic relations should begin their work. It will also be advisable for legal teams to begin formulating a draft of the agreement.
5. Alongside the work of the various negotiating teams, there will be a need for a secret channel which will allow the two leaders to make major decisions that will push the process forward.
6. Every effort must be made to ensure that the talks run continuously so as not to lose momentum.

In conclusion, the negotiations between Israel and Syria, when they are renewed, present a historical opportunity to change the relations between the two countries. The conditions are ripe from a global and regional perspective, and there is a desire on both sides to move forward. In my view, both sides are ready to begin the journey down the path to peace. Both Barak and Asad will have to show determination as they traverse this path, if they are to achieve their ultimate aim of peace and security for their peoples.