CHAPTER TWO

GENERAL

The shock and confusion in Syria following the regional and global developments of the early 1990s, especially the recognition of American technological and military supremacy and the consequent difficulty of achieving strategic balance with Israel, led to a strategic decision in Damascus to seek accommodation with the Jewish state. Of course, it would have to be on Syria’s terms: Israeli withdrawal to the June 4, 1967 lines; a relatively rapid timetable for withdrawal; minimal security arrangements; and strictly limited normalization, both in substance and in the pace of its development.

Therefore, virtually no Syrian "confidence building measures" (CBM) towards Israel were taken. The few that were, allowing Syrian Jews to leave, an interview Syria’s foreign minister granted to Israel Television in 1995 and talks in 1994 and 1995 between the chiefs of staff of the two armies, made little impression on Israeli public opinion. In 1994, there was an attempt at military CBM (clearing the Syrian limited forces zone of infringements) but it was not done in a political context and was not exploited by the Syrians to develop the CBM dimension so necessary for creating a positive negotiating atmosphere. On the contrary, Israelis remained concerned at Syria’s policy of operating terrorist organizations in Lebanon by "remote control," and by its attempts to undermine moves in the Arab world towards normalization with Israel. Moreover, the Syrian regime was seen as not doing nearly enough to prepare public opinion at home for a possible peace with Israel.

Complicating matters further, negotiations between Israel and Syria were intermittent and dogged by extreme caution. Throughout, Syria exhibited "strategic steadfastness" - which, in practice, meant waiting for flexibility on the Israeli side. For its part, Israel refused to clarify its position on withdrawal from the Golan Heights, and insisted on a wide-ranging security approach.. Still, at various times during Rabin’s term (August 1993 and November 1994), and when Peres was prime minister (late 1995 and early 1996), there seemed to be progress. But, it was never translated into the basis of an agreement.

The negotiation after Rabin’s assassination in November 1995, took place at the Wye Plantation near Washington, with the Syrians under the impression that an eventual Israeli withdrawal from the Golan was the basic premise under which the talks were being held. They therefore agreed to modify their position in a number of areas: normalization; comprehensiveness of the agreement, (that it would mean peace between Israel and all the other Arab states including Lebanon, and that it would not be dependent on any other accord, for example, agreement with the Palestinians); economic issues, (especially a parallel international economic package to facilitate bilateral development and economic cooperation). But there were still deep differences on security issues, where the Syrians favored a limited security regime, both with regard to the area it would cover, and with minimal real or perceived infringements of Syrian sovereignty. The water issue was not dealt with in depth, and there was still sufficient residual vagueness about the Golan withdrawal to make a breakthrough difficult.

Still, the final rounds of negotiation in 1995 and 1996 helped to pinpoint the differences and contributed to a better understanding of each side’s positions. Moreover, the nature of the talks was open and businesslike. The lack of progress was partly explained by the fact that the parties were awaiting the results of the Israeli election set for June 1996, in the hope that afterwards the talks would swing into top gear.

But after Netanyahu’s election, the opposite occurred, and the talks were suspended. The deadlock was over the point from which negotiations should be resumed, with the Syrians demanding that they be renewed on the basis of understandings already reached, and not from a new starting point. The Israelis argued that understandings reached with the Rabin and Peres governments had never been committed to paper and that the new government was not bound by them.

MAIN STAGES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS

I do not intend in this chapter to attempt a detailed description of the Israel-Syria negotiations since Madrid.(10) But it is important to summarize the main developments so that we can ascertain at what point the talks were broken off, learn from past experience and establish a basis for future dialogue.

It is important to point out that Asad negotiated with no less than three Israeli prime ministers, Shamir, Rabin and Peres, and that Ehud Barak will be the fourth to hold a public dialogue with the Syrian leader. It will therefore be instructive to look at the negotiations from the different personal standpoints of the various leaders, especially on the Israeli side.

The bilateral talks began in Madrid on November 3, 1991, with the first face to face meeting between Israeli and Syrian delegations, albeit in the presence of a third party. The talks went ahead despite a vehement Syrian attack on Israel’s Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir at the gala opening of the conference, in which Syrian Foreign Minster Farouk Al-Shar‘a denigrated Shamir as a "terrorist."

During the Shamir period (November 1991 - 30 April 1992) there were 21 meetings between the delegations. The negotiations were based on the letter of invitation to the Madrid conference by the American and Soviet co-sponsors, who expressed their readiness to help the parties achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace through direct negotiations, based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and with the ultimate goal of achieving "real peace."

The letter of invitation was backed by American "letters of assurances." In the letter to Israel, the U.S. emphasized concrete elements of peace and security, noting, for example, Israel’s right to secure and defensible borders, and reiterating President Ford’s 1975 commitment on the Golan Heights, which stated:

"The U.S. will give great weight to Israel’s position that any peace agreement with Syria must be predicated on Israel’s remaining on the Golan Heights."

In the letter of assurances to Syria, Washington stressed its support for the principle of "land for peace," adding that, in the American view, it applied to the Golan Heights as well. The Americans repeated their opposition to the application of Israeli law on the Golan, and promised to faithfully play the role of honest broker. On the other hand, in his Madrid Conference address, Bush used the term "territorial compromise," which upset the Syrians.

But the talks during Shamir’s tenure (until May 1992), got nowhere for several reasons:

1. There were wide gaps in the fundamental views and opening positions of the parties. This was further exacerbated by ill-humored verbal clashes between the negotiating teams.
2. Israel sought primarily to keep up the appearance of negotiations to avert a crisis which might impact negatively on the parallel Jordanian and Palestinian tracks. Shamir’s formula was "peace for peace," whereas the Syrians, brandishing Resolution 242, tried to focus the debate on Israeli withdrawal.
3. The Americans kept a very low profile and were happy just to see the talks continuing. The differences were too deep for them to make bridging proposals.
4. The talks were open and well-reported, with the emphasis on form rather than substance.

As the talks evolved, working documents touching on the notion of a peace treaty were exchanged. But the two sides stuck to their basic positions: Syria saw the negotiations as talks about withdrawal, and argued that the pull-back would in itself create a peace dynamic, whereas Israel insisted on first negotiating the terms of peace and normalization in fine detail.

During Rabin’s term as prime minister, there were a number of significant developments:

1. Between August 92 and September 93, Israel and Syria tried to draft a joint Declaration of Principles. Israel announced that it accepted in principle that Resolution 242 applied to the Golan, and undertook to detail the extent of the ensuing withdrawal after receiving clarifications from Syria on the nature of the peace. Israel insisted that agreement with Syria not be dependent on other tracks and that its security needs be guaranteed. The Syrians insisted on full withdrawal. In any event, the signing in August 1993 of a Declaration of Principles (D.O.P.) between Israel and the PLO left the Syrian track high and dry with no breakthrough in sight.
2. Between the Spring of 1994 and the Summer of 1995, an intensive mutual effort was made, with American assistance, to break the deadlock. It was during this period that Rabin put forward his "4 legs of the table" theory, that the negotiations should focus and progress simultaneously on four key, inter-related issues.

In April 1994, Rabin presented a practical proposal to the Americans. He said he was ready to commit to withdrawal in stages, over a period of a few years, with the first stage a token pullback from the Druze villages on the Golan. The Syrians were urged to respond with commitments of their own, and to start implementing the process of normalization after the first Israeli withdrawal. There were several relevant issues on the normalization and security agendas: Exchange of ambassadors, free movement of tourists, air, sea, trade and cultural links, demilitarization of the entire Golan and beyond (up to the approaches to Damascus), the creation of further limited forces areas, securing the supply of water to Israel from the Golan, and the prevention of terror from Lebanon.

In the ensuing dialogue, held under American auspices, the Syrians demanded an Israeli commitment to withdraw to the June 4, 1967 lines. According to various reports, Rabin expressed readiness to the Americans to consider withdrawal from the Golan, if Israeli security needs and normalization demands were met. Israeli sources say he was deliberately vague, and expressed his position in terms of a conditional hypothesis for American consumption only. The Americans, however, passed it on to Asad without Rabin’s approval. When he learned what had happened, he was furious.

The Syrians argued later that Israel had conveyed its readiness to withdraw to the June 4 lines to the Americans as a kind of deposit (11), which, in fact, made the continuation of negotiations between Israel and Syria possible, and paved the way for the meetings of the chiefs of staff in Washington, as well as the "Non-Paper" drafted by the US and which reflected agreements on security issues.

There were two rounds of talks between the chiefs of staff, the first in December 1994, (Barak-Shihabi), and the second in June 1995 (Shachak-Shihabi). The first ended with the parties deeply divided over security issues, after the Israelis argued for a significant demilitarization as well as an Israeli presence on the Golan. The second meeting also focused on security arrangements, but the atmosphere was better. Shihabi declared that the ratio of demilitarization on both sides of the border would be 10:6 in Israel’s favor, which constituted a softening of the Syrian position, after their initial insistence on absolute symmetry in the security arrangements.

It was between these two meetings that the Non-Paper was drafted with American assistance. Entitled "A paper of understandings on the issue of security arrangements," it was made up of two elements: Aims and Principles. The aims were to reduce to a minimum the threat of surprise attack, to prevent daily friction along the border and to minimize the risk of wider conflagration or all-out war.

As to the principles, it was agreed that security of one side would not be at the expense of the other, that the security arrangements would be equal, mutual and reciprocal, and that if, during the negotiations, it became clear that implementation of the equality principle in a specific case was difficult or impossible for topographical reasons, experts from both sides would discuss the problem and solve it. It was also agreed that the arrangements would have to be compatible with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both sides, and be limited to "relevant areas" on both sides of the border.(12)

In the meantime, staff work on security conducted in Israel interpreted and fleshed out the Non-Paper. The results were summarized in June 1995 in the so-called "Shtauber Document," (named for the Brigadier-General, who headed strategic planning in the IDF’s planning division) which, although leaked to the press, reflected an objective, professional and not a political assessment, (it was not meant for publication) and hence its special importance. The "Shtauber Document" was published in its entirety in the Israeli press (Yediot Aharonot, June 29, 1995) and it enumerated the Israeli principles and components of security arrangements as follows:

1. The need for a "package" of security arrangements, which would include a demilitarized buffer zone, limited forces zones, and elements of verification and supervision (including a predominant American element), the aim of which would be to place political obstacles in the way of any decision to advance military forces to the Golan.
2. Any change in one or more of the above components would have to be compensated for by others. The document emphasized that if Israel were to be satisfied on the question of retaining its early warning and intelligence capabilities on the Golan, (by implication through its early warning station on Mount Hermon), it would be able to be more flexible on the question of the limited forces zones. In reference to the Hermon station, the document argued that the IDF must continue to get information that can only be received through its present Hermon deployment, and that it would necessary to discuss the various possibilities for doing so.
3. The security arrangements must guarantee that there would be no advantage to be gained by the side starting a war over the side defending itself, and allow enough time for Israel to mobilize its reserves. The operative conclusion would be keeping the large concentrations of both armies far apart from each other, or alternatively, or as a supplement, reducing their battle readiness, increasing transparency and creating relations of trust between the armies.
4. Prohibiting hostile military cooperation against one of the parties to the agreement, for example, through hostile military alliances or calling in foreign expeditionary forces.
5. Isolating and withholding aid from elements conducting hostile activities against the other side and/or against the peace process. (The reference is to the terrorist elements to which Syria grants safe haven).

In any event, this paper is the only mutually agreed written document produced by the parties since Madrid. But although it created a basis for discussion, the interpretations given it by the two sides were vastly different. The Syrians preferred to cite mainly to the principles, and less the aims. They argued that the security arrangements were only applicable to the "relevant areas," (that is to two thin and equal strips of land on each side of the 1967 border). Israel, on the other hand, wanted several demilitarized or thinned out strips, deep in Syrian territory.

In general, we can say that during Rabin’s tenure, the negotiations with Syria were conducted slowly and cautiously, and that, during this time, Israel made far more progress on other tracks. It signed a peace treaty with Jordan (October 1994), and another interim agreement with the Palestinians (September 1995). Nevertheless:

THE NEGOTIATIONS DURING PERES’S TERM; DECEMBER ’95 - MARCH ‘96

Between December 95 and March 96, Israeli and Syrian delegations conducted three rounds of negotiations at the Wye Plantation in Maryland. There were bilateral sessions, trilateral sessions with the US, and private meetings between members of the delegations. The Israeli delegation was headed by Foreign Ministry Director General Uri Savir and the Syrian by their Ambassador to Washington, Walid Mu’allim. Dennis Ross co-ordinated the American team.

The focus was on a new approach that the Israelis put to the Syrians. (13) They presented a new, extensive Peres-inspired package, which deviated from the old land for peace framework. It was designed to inject an element of potential profit for both Israel and Syria, which would result from a convergence of bilateral interests, through regional arrangements and an international aid package.

The new Israeli ideas meant raising the American profile, holding the talks in Washington for longer periods and adding new elements to Rabin’s "four legs of the table." The main additions were the comprehensiveness and regional nature of the agreement, the international package to underpin it, the focus on economic development, the search for a regional solution to the water issue, and having the solutions to each problem spread over a time axis.

There were signs of progress on a number of key issues:

1. Normalization - the Syrians were ready to make progress on 12 of the 18 areas of normalization proposed by Israel, including postal, air, trade and investment links, and the opening of embassies. But they shied away from anything that might involve an active development of ties, for example cultural and agricultural ties, arguing that they had no such agreements with any other state.
2. Comprehensiveness of the agreement - the Israelis maintained that an Israeli - Syrian peace should be part of a comprehensive regional arrangement, heralding the end of the Israeli-Arab conflict (and, of course, the end of Israel’s conflict with Lebanon), and that it should not be dependent on other agreements, such as permanent settlement with the Palestinians. The Syrians endorsed this position, and expressed satisfaction at the recognition of Syria’s pivotal role in the Arab world.
3. The regional system - for the first time in the long history of negotiations between them, the parties exchanged views on the regional system and common regional interests, like the containment of fundamentalism. The Syrians promised to help advance Israel’s relations with the Arab world.
4. International aid package - Israel urged that the two countries work together for an international package which would include bilateral and multilateral projects for developing the Golan Heights, as well as foreign aid for Syria, including debt waiving, with the Americans slated to lead the international effort. Indeed, the Americans started promoting the international economic effort as part of an international commitment to the prosperity of the countries of the region.
5. Water - The problem was dealt with in a very general way, and it was agreed that the U.S. would raise the issue with other parties in the region, mainly Turkey, on the assumption that they should seek ways to meet both Israeli and Syrian needs. The initial feelers drew strong reservations in Ankara, with the Turks coming out strongly against any linkage between the dispute over the waters of the Euphrates and peace in the Middle East. The Turkish Foreign Ministry even released a statement to the effect that no contribution to peace in the Middle East could come at Turkey’s expense, and that "the waters of the Euphrates are not up for discussion in the peace process."(14) Today, however, things have changed, and the Turkish attitude to the problem of water in the regional context is more positive.
6. Borders - The question of borders and withdrawal was not discussed in the talks although the Syrians asserted that in their view the talks were being held under the working hypothesis of a full Israeli withdrawal. Ambassador Mu’allim even claimed later that "Rabin’s commitment to a full Israeli withdrawal was confirmed by Peres."(15)

During the Wye talks a businesslike discussion on a range of security issues was launched. The negotiating teams included senior officers, with the focus of the debate on the "relevant areas," as defined in the 1995 non-paper. The Syrians argued that their view of the concept meant limited demilitarized zones on both sides of the border and limited forces zones (in the Kuneitra and Sefad areas only). They sought to marginalize the security arrangements, and stressed the notions of equality and symmetry. Their main message was "peace is security." Israel, as in the past, argued for far more extensive limited forces areas. There was an agreement in principle on a demilitarized zone, with only policemen and no military personnel, and a deeper limited forces zone in which the deployment of armed forces would be restricted. Israel proposed adding a "third zone," in which the offensive capacities of the armies would be limited, but the Syrians ignored this. The Syrian press complained that Israel was "exaggerating" its security concerns for domestic reasons, and ignoring its nuclear capability.(16)

Both delegations also conducted negotiations with the Americans, in which the Syrians expressed their desire for improved ties with Washington, and for future American economic and military assistance. In parallel, Israel and the U.S. conducted initial talks on raising the level of strategic cooperation between them, in the context of an Israel- Syria peace, and the Israeli side made clear its expectation of extensive American aid. The talks, however, were broken off in March 1996 after a string of terrorist attacks in Israel, and were not resumed after the Israeli elections in May that year. Since then, there have been no substantive negotiations between Israel and Syria.

DEVELOPMENTS SINCE WYE AND THE ARGUMENT OVER THE POINT AT WHICH THE NEGOTIATIONS WERE STOPPED

Netanyahu’s victory in May 1996, and the emergence of a right wing government in Israel created a new situation with regard to the political process with Syria. The Netanyahu government maintained that Israel was not committed to past understandings, promises, summaries or interpretations. According to press reports, Israel even managed to get a letter from Secretary of State Christopher (at the start of 1997), in which he confirmed Israel’s claim that the Non-Paper was not binding by international law. These reports took the Syrians by surprise, and evoked an angry Syrian response.

Given the deep differences between Israel and Syria, the Syrians made an uncharacteristically strenuous effort to present their view of the point at which the talks were broken off to get international backing for their position. In a series of interviews between 1996 and 1998, by Asad, Al-Shara, and Mu’allim, the following points were stressed:

The Syrians seem to have held out some hope that the Likud government would be able to create a domestic consensus in Israel for peace moves that would entail an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan. Thus, Mu’allim expressed the hope after the Hebron accord with the Palestinians in January 1997, that Netanyahu, as the leader of the right, might be able to get wide support in Israel for an agreement with Syria. As time went by, however, the Syrian refrain grew increasingly pessimistic, and their comments on the Netanyahu government increasingly acrimonious.

After his election defeat in May 1999, Netanyahu confirmed press reports on secret contacts between Israel and Syria during his term, which, according to him, "did not bear fruit because of differences over withdrawal from the Golan Heights and where the permanent border line would run." Netanyahu hinted that the contacts, which were conducted through the Omanis, European envoy Moratinos and "private" mediators, produced gains for Israel, especially in the security package. According to Netanyahu, the Syrians had agreed to Israeli teams manning the early warning station on the Hermon for a few years. The press in Israel quoted Israeli sources to the effect that Netanyahu had agreed to a significant withdrawal, but had refused to outline its exact dimensions.(19)

AT WHAT POINT WERE THE NEGOTIATIONS STOPPED?

Syrian Foreign Minister Al-Shara declared in April 1999 that during the Labor government’s term, there were clear signs of progress, with the U.S. help, on the question of full Israeli withdrawal to the June 4, 1967 lines, and on the security Non-Paper. That, Al-Shar‘a claimed, "constituted 80 percent of a peace treaty."(20)

It is safe to assume that Al-Shar‘a’s comments, released on the eve of elections in Israel, reflected hope for a change in government in Israel, which might lead to a change in Israel’s negotiating position. I believe the intention was to signal to a new government that the Syrian track was ripe, and that it would be better to deal with it early - that is, give it precedence over the Palestinian track.

The course of the negotiations as described above can give a pretty accurate picture of the point at which the talks were broken off. I would not go as far as to say that 80 percent of an agreement had been wrapped up; but I believe the parties had indeed made significant progress, and, with hard work and a creative touch, it would have been possible to conclude a signed peace treaty within a relatively short space of time. Still, it is clear that significant differences remained on substantive issues; above all, on the border and the security arrangements.

The main understandings between Israel and Syria can be summarized as follows:

1. Withdrawal - the Syrians understood that Israel had committed itself to a significant withdrawal, but not to a specific line, and that this readiness was subject to its demands on security and the nature of peace being met. In an appearance before the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee in August 1994, I said that if I were the Syrian head of intelligence I would infer from Israeli statements that Israel understood the imperative of giving up the Golan in return for acceptance of its demands on security, water, and normalization.
2. Normalization - Syria accepted most of the normalization categories raised by Israel, including full diplomatic relations, resident ambassadors, economic cooperation, trade, transport and tourism. But there was no agreement on cultural exchanges, health or agriculture, and the Syrians intimated that they would prefer to minimize references to normalization in the peace treaty itself. For Syria, the preferred terminology was "normal peace relations," the main elements of which are mutual recognition, agreed borders and diplomatic relations. In an interview with a-Safir (November 1995) Foreign Minister a-Sha’ara said "we don’t like the term normalization, and prefer to use the phrase normal peace relations."
3. Comprehensiveness of the agreement - Israel and Syria agreed on the overall concept, the main points of which were that an accord with Syria would include a peace treaty with Lebanon; that it would be independent of any other agreements; that it would be accompanied by regional reconciliation; and that it would have an extensive economic dimension based on regional cooperation.
4. The international economic package - Israel and Syria agreed on American leadership of a move in which governments and the private sector would promote regional and bilateral projects under the heading "Economic Partnership for Peace." The Americans got Saudi agreement in principle to back this effort.
5. Security arrangements - the Non-Paper of May 1995 heralded the beginning of a structured debate on the various security issues, focusing on demilitarized and limited forces zones, and facilitating a mapping of the differences, with each side presenting its approach and needs in a frank and businesslike manner.

But residual differences between the parties should not be underestimated:

1. The extent of the withdrawal - Israel is not prepared to withdraw to the June 4, 1967 lines, because it believes there is a good legal case for the international border of 1923. Agreement on the border is obviously one of the keys to a deal. (21) Asad’s Syria, however, may well continue to insist on a greater territorial return than Egypt got, if only to justify the 20 year-long delay after the signing of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty.
2. Security arrangements - the parties have not yet engaged in detailed discussions, and the differences are still wide, especially over the depth of the "relevant areas." The Syrians argue that "peace provides security" since it destroys the roots of conflict, and they thereby seek to minimize the significance of the security regime. Israel, on the contrary, argues that nurturing Israel - Syria ties will take time, and that deep and stable security arrangements to prevent surprise attack or war are necessary, as stated in the Non-Paper’s aims. Israel seeks a peace time limitation of forces, a distancing of offensive units (armor divisions) from the border areas, backed up by reliable monitoring and early warning systems.
3. The water issue - Israel, arguing that water has existential significance, seeks practical arrangements based on current usage, while the Syrians will certainly seek to control the water sources. Discussions on a water regime and allocations remain to be concluded.
4. The Lebanese problem - Israel and Syria have yet to discuss this issue in depth, but it contains seeds of potential friction. There could be a clash between Israel’s interest in conducting negotiations in a positive atmosphere without terror attacks from Lebanon and Syria’s role in Lebanon and perceived responsibility for maintaining peace and stability there. My conclusion is that in peacetime, however, the Syrian presence in Lebanon gives Israel a strategic advantage, if only from the point of view of preventing terror.
5. The nature of the peace - the Syrians still see peace as a situation in which Israel is cut down to its "natural size," with limited bilateral relations between the two countries, and Israel prevented from using the peace to establish a position of regional superiority.

Israel’s strategic power constitutes a problem for Syria and the Syrians are likely to raise the issue (even as messengers for Egypt) as a subject for discussion and to demand that Israel dismantle its alleged nuclear capability, which they believe gives it regional supremacy. I do not, however, think that demand, if it is made, will be a deal-breaker, assuming the Syrians are satisfied on the Golan issue.

THE SIGNIFICANCE AND LESSONS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS

In October 1994, in a speech to the Knesset, Israel’s then Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, outlined his conception of peace with Syria and the future of the Israeli settlement on the Golan. He promised that he would submit any agreement with the Syrians to a referendum, and, it seems to me in retrospect, that this speech accurately reflects Rabin’s Golan legacy. This is what he said:

"As long as Syria refused to recognize Israel’s right to exist and live in peace there was no room for dialogue. As long as Damascus rejected our hand extended in friendship, we continued to strengthen our military and civilian hold on the Golan Heights, a few dozen kilometers from Damascus... But there are signs of change that point to Syria’s readiness to be a partner in a journey to peace. The road is still long, there is still a lot of work to do, peace with Syria is still distant. But we have no intention of ignoring the signs. We will not go back to the days of ‘there is no one to talk to;’ we won’t go back to the days of ‘we are waiting for a phone call;’ we are going forward!"(22)

As for the Syrians, in the years preceding negotiations and in the years of stalemate too, the leadership took pains to point out that for Syria peace was a "strategic choice," and kept channels of communication with Israel open. In early 1996 (at the breaking of the fast towards the end of the Ramadan), Asad declared: "The peace process has not advanced so far, but we in Syria will continue to favor peace, no matter how difficult the conditions ... we want to establish friendship with all people on the basis of our national interests and our rights."(23)

I believe we can sum up the significance of the negotiations that have been conducted up till now on an optimistic note:

In this context, the following should be stressed: