CHARACTERISTICS OF THE GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENT
The end of the Cold War, and the Gulf War of 1991
that followed, established the United States as the world’s only
superpower. The U.S. today is the globe’s central military, political,
technological and economic power – spreading the message of free
markets, liberalization, private enterprise and democracy. It has no
equal ideological or global adversary, nor does it face any hostile
alliance.
Moreover, most of the other economic powers (with
high per capita Gross Domestic Products), like Japan and Germany, are
U.S. allies. Even during the Cold War, the United States built an
alliance with Western European and East Asian nations, on the security
front via NATO, and economically through the G-7. Most of those
countries, together with the new East European states, are also
adherents of the twin principles of democracy and the free market.
The disintegration of the former Soviet Union
left Russia as the principal East European state. But even though it
retains its strategic weapons, it no longer has the political power to
use them. Russia is not regarded as a great power -- not even in the
Middle East. Its GDP is in constant decline, and its military power has
decreased along with its ability to project power. As Russia turned
inward to concentrate on its own problems, its influence on Middle
Eastern regional developments declined markedly.
Today, Moscow is absorbed by its own mainly
economic problems, while at the same time protecting principally those
vital interests close to its borders, in its "near abroad." That
includes the improvement of relations with the new states of the former
Soviet Union (CIS), which were once connected to her by their umbilical
cords. Economic interests in Europe, Central Asia and other areas
including the Middle East -- which include military exports -- have
been assigned priority.
Despite the objections they have voiced to the
expansion of NATO, it seems that the Russians have accepted, for lack
of any other choice, the tightening of security ties between the United
States and Europe, and the states of Eastern Europe -- as well as
NATO’s role in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, as exemplified by the
intervention in the Kosovo crisis.
NATO, indeed, has been strengthened as a
political-defense organization, and as the cornerstone of European
relations. Its existence as an organic structure with traditions and
accepted procedures enabled organizational cooperation with the new
East European states, seeking a defense "umbrella" to assure their
stability after cutting themselves off from Moscow. The alliance’s
military intervention in the states of the former Yugoslavia, including
air attacks on Serbia, and before that the military pressure on Iraq,
based on the power of the NATO member states, demonstrated that NATO
still has a role in Europe, the Balkans and regional crisis spots.
There was also a concomitant strengthening of the trans-Atlantic
connection between the U.S. and Europe. The Jubilee Conference and
NATO’s "new strategic concept" created a new framework for cooperation
and enlargement that will ensure that NATO remains the world’s most
important defense and political alliance on the eve of the
21st Century.
Europe’s main objective today is progress in the
Eastern European process of democratic and economic reform, together
with the preservation of stability and the prevention of
national-ethnic conflicts in its close periphery. Development of mutual
trust and cooperation with Russia is a European interest, together with
a strengthening of the economic and trade frameworks. Friction with the
United States, on political and economic issues, still exists, but it
appears that American dominance and its predominant global role are
also fait accompli to Europe.
In the Far East, the United States has preserved
its close ties with Japan, seeing it as a partner in progress towards
stability in Asian crisis areas as well as in the Middle East. At the
same time, the U.S. economy has demonstrated its stability and its
resistance to the crises affecting U.S.-oriented Asian economies.
China’s rising economic and military might, its impressive growth rates
and burgeoning technology, may put it in a position, uniquely perhaps,
to challenge American global domination, although it currently has no
ambitions in that direction. On the other hand, there are centrifugal
forces in China, and it needs both American technology and access to
the U.S. market. The central question, looking ahead, is this: Will
China realize its potential to become a strategic adversary of the
United States, or will the economic processes lead it towards more
democratization and international cooperation? It appears to me that in
the coming years, at least, economic considerations will continue to
dominate Chinese foreign policy.
Finally, the following conclusions stem from a
strategic view of the international situation:
a. The United States will not turn inward or give
up its position of global leadership. It has not chosen to share that
role or its global undertakings with other centers of power like
Europe, Japan or Russia.
b. On the contrary, despite pressures on
resources and budgets, U.S. administrations (Bush and Clinton) have
deepened their determination to play a leading role in shaping the
international system, while recognizing U.S. responsibility for peace
and stability.
c. As a result, the United States succeeded in
dictating to the international community and to key regional players a
set of objectives and an agenda based largely on its own foreign-policy
interests: progress on global political and economic stability,
democratization, non-proliferation of unconventional, missile and
nuclear weaponry (especially from Russia and some Asian countries), the
war against terror, and isolation of radical regimes.
d. In order to attain these objectives, the
Americans have taken steps to preserve their military and technological
superiority, and the U.S.’s ability to fight two regional wars
simultaneously. This declared policy, together with an American
readiness to use force against radical regimes (rogue states) like
Iraq, Sudan, Afghanistan and recently Serbia, has reinforced the U.S.
deterrent against threats to the world order.
e. The lack of a balancing power has increased
America’s "independence" and room for maneuver in regional crises. Even
though this does not guarantee success (against the Saddam Hussein
regime in Iraq, the India-Pakistan nuclear arms race, or Iranian
acquisition of sophisticated armaments), there is no doubt that the
relative freedom of movement (including neutralization of the U.N.)
eases the U.S. decision-making process in dealing with international
crises, and to a great extent also imposes a significant constraint on
regional players seeking to realize their interests at America’s
expense.
HOW HAVE GLOBAL CHANGES INFLUENCED THE MIDDLE
EAST?
GENERAL
The end of the Cold War, and the 1991 Gulf War,
sparked positive processes in the Middle East, principally, the
speeding up of the regional political process, which blunted the
Israeli-Arab conflict and led to formal agreements on peace and
regional economic cooperation. Still, with the approach of the year
2000, the Middle East retains its potential for instability, because of
the fragility of these processes, the economic difficulties in key
countries affected by growing Islamic radicalism, terror and the
proliferation of non-conventional weapons. The weakness of democracy in
the region is another cause for concern, because war-and-peace
decisions are concentrated in the hands of a few. There are, however,
some advantages to the concentration of power and authority in small
elite groups. When Arab leaders are ready for a change in political
direction, they have the power and authority to make it.
It is important to observe, at least in a general
way, the deep significance the international changes have had for the
Middle East, and for Israel and Syria in particular. These changes will
affect the character of the Israeli-Syrian dialogue, its pace and the
directions in which it develops. In other words, the way in which the
regional players interpret the global processes, their assessments of
how these processes affect their interests and their regional standing
will affect their behavior in the process, a subject I will discuss in
greater detail later in this paper.
THE ARAB ENVIRONMENT
In the Arab environment, international changes
have produced the following:
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a. A sense of shock and confusion following the
collapse of the Soviet Union, which was the main source of support for
the Arab states and backed them in previous Israeli-Arab crises.
b. Increasing Arab recognition of the power and
technological prowess of the United States, and the military advantages
Israel derives from its special relationship with the U.S.
c. An awareness of the futility of the "force
option" against Israel, as a lever for attaining political objectives.
Pan-Arab ideology, which saw a military victory over Israel as the cure
for the ills of the Arab world, has lost ground. (The Israelis have
undergone a similar change in their understanding of the limits of
power. This subject will be discussed later.)
d. An increase in particularistic Arab interests,
reflected in the lack of Arab unity, inter-Arab conflicts and the
different attitudes of Arab players with regard to the political
process with Israel. Israel is no longer the focal point of the Arab
consensus. The ideology of hostility towards Israel has been balanced
by the need for political pragmatism to attain Arab objectives.
e. As a result, there has been a greater
willingness to accept Israel’s existence, to sign separate agreements
with Israel and to accept Israel’s integration in the region. But there
remains a fear of Israeli hegemony, stemming from Jerusalem’s close
ties with Washington and from Israel’s distinctive character in the
Middle East.
f. The Arab states and the Palestinians see a
more pressing need to improve relations with the United States, in an
effort to "balance" in some way what is for them a disconcerting
equation. Declaration of willingness to engage in the political process
with Israel and consideration for America’s regional interests are
aimed at upgrading relations with Washington, as part of a strategic
effort to balance the U.S.’s Middle Eastern attitudes.
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But, ironically, the global changes also exposed
difficulties in the Arab world, and the gap between it and the dynamic
changes talking place outside the region:
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a. The relatively closed nature of Arab society
and the difficulty it has responding to global changes of openness and
internal liberalization were exposed. The notion of political democracy
failed to permeate most of the Arab states, or more accurately, it
advanced at a much slower, more cautious pace. The main centers of
power remained in the hands of the security services and the political
elites clustered around the regime.
b. Economic weakness remains a main defining
characteristic. The Arab economies are in dire straits, (with slow
growth, large external debt, problems of unemployment, accelerated
population growth, lack of water resources, and lack of development)
and find it difficult to adapt to the world trend towards
globalization. They are not attractive to new capital and investment,
and their private sectors are small and insignificant. Economic
progress is slow, particularly in Syria, which is at pains not to
"slide" into political democracy. In the Arab countries, the weakness
of civil society and of the middle class is apparent. In any event, it
seems that the economic factor (as well as others) can be characterized
as slowing down anything pertaining to relations with Israel or the use
of military force against her.
c. Radical Islam, operating in Arab countries as
a religious-nationalist-social-cultural movement in opposition to the
secular regimes, militates against the penetration of the West, its
culture and values, and the improvement of relations with Israel. Other
more pragmatic ideologies, such as "Middle-Easternism," are confined to
minority elites. They do not have a power base or foothold among the
masses, while radical Islamic terror undermines the Arab regimes and
their ability to move forward consistently, without crises in the
political process. Islamic opposition elements, in almost every Arab
state, present themselves as an alternative to the pragmatic approach
towards Israel, should it fail.
d. Still, there is an effort to acquire military
equipment to reduce the imbalance vis-a-vis Israel. Iran, Iraq and
Syria continue to acquire non-conventional weaponry, designed to
bolster their regional standing and to narrow what is seen as the
qualitative-technological gap with Israel. (Against these efforts, the
United States is a blocking and moderating force.)
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Along with the attempt to find common
denominators among the Arab states, it should be emphasized that today
it is difficult to speak of a coherent, unified Arab system. On the
contrary:
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a. The global changes have had less influence on
the pro-Western Arab states, like Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the
Gulf States, which where in any case in the American super-power orbit.
On the other hand, radical states (like Syria and Iraq) absorbed a much
greater shock, and their world views were irrevocably undermined.
b. Among the Arab players, a race developed
around relations with Israel, with the Palestinians, Jordan and Syria
giving priority to their own particular interests. The Arab consensus,
or the notion of comprehensive peace, has become an amorphous idea,
used by each country in a different way, without it interfering in its
bilateral negotiations with Israel.
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With regard to the peace process, it is clear
that global developments accentuated the positive incentives for the
Arab states and the Palestinians, who expected progress on the peace
front to lead to a change in their relations with the U.S. and to
economic dividends. But they also raised suspicions and fears that the
process carried with it internal challenges, like those in Eastern
Europe, and could lead to a loosening of the bonds of centralization
and the break-down of the delicate balances in Arab societies,
especially the more closed ones, like Syria.
In summary, the way the global changes were
absorbed in Arab world depended on the nature of each local regime.
Still, the following generalizations can be made:
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a. The standing of the U.S. and its Arab allies
was strengthened.
b. Radical Arab regimes were weakened and
isolated.
c. The Middle East peace process gained momentum,
registered significant achievements, and demonstrated that Arab states
attain more through political means than by the use of military
force.
d. A positive change took place in the relations
between most Arab states and Israel, the ideological approach was
weakened to the extent that there is no longer any "Grand Design"
vis-a-vis Israel. In its stead, policies that serve individual state
interests have evolved.
e. The nature of the threats against peace and
stability has changed. The emergence of radical Islam as an adversary
of the Arab regimes revealed, at least indirectly, a mutual interest
between Israel and some Arab states.
f. The fragmentation of the Arab world was
accelerated.
g. Most Arab states took a defensive position
against the wave of change that swept the world, fearing that it would
permeate the region, and have a negative impact on the stability of
their regimes.
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THE VIEW FROM JERUSALEM
In its democracy, stability, resilience, military
power and technological-economic superiority, Israel is an exceptional
Middle Eastern state. To a large extent, it holds the key to future
regional development.
The global changes affecting the region worked to
Israel’s advantage, and reinforced the impression in the international
community that the peace process strengthens Israel, its regional and
international standing. The West sees continuation of the process as
essential in preventing a retreat into radicalism and instability,
which could spread beyond the boundaries of the Middle East. Such a
deterioration would, of course, threaten Western interests (the
preservation of pro-Western regimes, protection of the oil routes and
halting the spread of radical Islam). Consequently, the international
community tends to regard Israel as responsible for the nature of
regional developments, for better or for worse.
From the Israeli point of view, too, the global
developments served its interests. The historic American "victory" in
the Cold War brought with it an increased sense of security in Israel,
one of the principal (and democratic) allies of the winning side. The
projection of American power in the Middle East through the Gulf War,
as well as the intimacy of Israel’s bilateral ties with Washington,
provided a positive lever for Israel in its efforts to advance the
peace process with the Arab states.
THE POSITIVE CONSEQUENCES
For most of the past decade, Israel has sought to
take advantage of the global changes to achieve a number of important
goals.
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a. The political dimension - Israel was
the determining force in setting the pace on the various negotiating
tracks. In the days of Rabin and Peres, the freedom of maneuver and
"play" between the tracks enabled Israel to reach a breakthrough on the
Palestinian track, peace with Jordan and phased normalization in its
relations with Arab states in the Gulf and North Africa. Over the last
three years, under the right-wing Netanyahu government, the process
floundered. Still, it still emerged that:
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- The Arab world was divided and fragmented, and found it difficult
to maintain a coherent position vis-a-vis Israel. The Palestinians
continued to negotiate with Israel, while the Syrians insisted they
would only return to the negotiations from the point where they were
stopped, which, they claimed, included an Israeli commitment to
withdraw from the entire Golan Heights.
- The process of normalization was frozen, but relations with Arab
states (i.e. Jordan) continued, and Israel even succeeded in developing
relations with an important Moslem state, like Turkey, thereby
reinforcing its regional standing, (even if this development was
frowned upon by most Arab states).
- It became clear that the Arab players had no strategic option but
to continue the dialogue and the peace process, albeit at a much slower
pace.
- Despite some hiccups in U.S.-Israel relations, the close security
relationship between the two countries was maintained. In practice,
this underlined the fact that Arab hopes for an "imposed American
solution" were futile. With few exceptions, there were no Americans in
power who advocated imposing a solution on Israel against its
will.
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b. The security dimension -
Israel’s special defense relationship with the United States, together
with the preservation of Israeli military superiority vis-a-vis radical
Arab states and the disappearance of superpower support for them from
the Soviet Union, brought about a change in the order of threats
against Israel and to an increasing sense of security. In this context,
the following should be emphasized:
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- The option of a general Arab-Israeli war is no longer on the
agenda. The focus shifted to parameters of confrontation between the
peace camp and radical Arab opponents of peace, who sought to undermine
the political process (particularly by terror from Lebanon, with
Iranian and Syrian backing, and by Palestinian opposition organizations
in the territories.)
- At the end of the Cold War, the U.S. and its allies saw the
proliferation of missiles and non-conventional weaponry as a real
threat to the west. The Iraqi arms program and Iran’s nuclear efforts
created a global awareness of the threat posed to Israel. In recent
years, the international community exhibited greater cooperation and
coordination (under American leadership) toward containment and
improving the response to missiles and non-conventional weapons - even
though there are differences, principally regarding the approach to
Iran. It is worth noting in this context, that at about the same time
as the Wye River Agreements with the Palestinians, in October 1998,
Israel and the United States signed a Memorandum of Understanding
involving increased cooperation against missile and non-conventional
weaponry. This understanding was reinforced during the new Israeli
prime minister’s visit to Washington at the start of his term in July
1999.
- Israel has developed and broadened its relations on the
internationa arena. Extensive ties have been developed (including in
the security-military field) with important nations like Russia, China
and India, lifting the sense of isolation and siege that for years hung
over Israeli decision-makers.
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c. The economic dimension -
Israel is, justifiably, seen as the Middle Eastern country most
prepared for integration in the emerging globalized economy, while most
Arab states find it difficult to adjust to developments in globalized
trade, the spread of high-tech, the rise of the private sector and the
process of liberalization. The peace process, the weakening of the Arab
boycott and the recognition of Israel’s technological and human
resources have made Israel an attractive target for investment and
international operations.
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PROBLEM AREAS
Along with the positive consequences, problems
from Israel’s point of view concerning its regional environment have
also emerged:
- Breakthroughs in the peace process remain only partial. On the
Palestinian track, there have still been no negotiations on the most
sensitive, difficult problems on the final-status agenda, while on the
Syrian front, the difficulties caused by differences on territorial and
security issues and Syria’s digging-in on its opening positions have
come to the fore.
- Arab states continue to view the normalization issue as a hostage
to extract additional Israeli concessions. Since late 1995, the
multinational negotiations have been effectively frozen, with the
parties (including Egypt) conditioning their resumption on progress in
the bilateral arena.
- The Israeli view of peace has not penetrated the broad masses of
the Arab peoples. Expressions of hostility and incitement against
Israel in most Arab countries persist.
- Terror and violence are still seen as a legitimate weapon against
Israel, to be used to balance the Jewish state’s strategic superiority.
A terrorist infrastructure still exists in the territory of the
Palestinian Authority, while Syria, like most Arab states,
distinguishes between opposition to terror and support of the
legitimate right of peoples to fight for liberation from occupation,
and Damascus uses the terror card in Lebanon to pressure Israel on the
Golan Heights issue. Syrian and other Arab states continue efforts to
arm themselves with non-conventional weapons, which are seen as a
partial, "poor-man’s" answer to Israel’s sophisticated
capabilities.
- The position taken by Arab states reflects a narrow view of peace
with Israel. Most would like to see Israel, in the peace era, downsized
in territory (returning to the 1967 borders), with weakened defense
assets. Normalization is also seen in a narrow, minimalist sense, as a
necessary concession to Israel. The clear impression is that even after
peace, there will remain a substantive debate in the Arab world on the
substance of post-peace relations with Israel. It is reasonable to
assume that the Arab world will continue to see Israel as a strategic
adversary, which must be prevented from achieving regional hegemony,
which would be at the Arab states’ expense.
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS
It seems to me that the internal Israeli
political system has undergone a series of dramatic changes over the
past decade, which could be defined by the term "awakening." Israeli
society today:
- Is less "ideological" on questions of foreign affairs and defense,
with most of the major social rifts and political divisions over
domestic issues, (social and religious). Subconsciously, it appears --
if it is possible to speak this way about the "collective I" of the
nation -- that Israeli society has effectively ended the argument over
national borders and wants to look inward. In this context, there is no
doubt that the "legitimization" that the Netanyahu-led Likud government
gave to the Oslo Agreements led to an acceptance of the view that the
historic land of Israel will be divided in the future. The Golan
Heights are not seen as part of the "historic homeland," and in my view
most of the settlers will be able to accept a significant withdrawal
from the Golan.
- Is more focused on questions of economics and technology, and it
clearly senses that that the strength of a country and its national
security are more accurately measured on an economic and technological
scale, than simply by its defense investments. The clear current
Israeli preference is to seek political solutions and to devote
national resources and attention to socio-economic development.
Military solutions to problems of security and foreign affairs hold
less appeal than they did in the past. In my view, though, despite the
change in priorities, no one should doubt the spirit of volunteering
and mobilization in Israel in an emergency, when its security and vital
interests are threatened. Even today, the level of volunteering for
elite units in the Israel Defense Forces is high.
- Has a diminished fixation on power and military strength. The Yom
Kippur War of 1973, Operation Peace for the Galilee (the 1982 Lebanese
War), and the Palestinian Intifada have demonstrated the limits of
Israeli power. What is now sought is no longer "historic justice," but
pragmatic solutions that include an understanding of the aspirations
and legitimate needs of the Arab side.
- Is much more mature with regard to the concept of "regional peace."
There is a retreat from the notion of a "New Middle East" that
prevailed in the early 1990s, and the current view of regional
cooperation is more modest. The assumption is still that progress on
peace will have a positive influence on the nations of the region, but
subject to several fundamental conditions being fulfilled: diversion of
investment and resources from defense to economic and social needs,
development of human resources, stability that will attract large
investments, development of the private sector and regional
infrastructure projects, like water desalination. All of these
projects, however, will take time, and will only come to the fore in
the long run. In other words, Israel seeks peace first, and only
afterwards will it probe more deeply into its content.
- Still, it seems to me, that the Israeli public yearns for a
substantial change in its relations with the Arab states, particularly
with Syria. To get support (in the referendum to which the prime
minister is committed) for a withdrawal from the Golan, the public will
have to be convinced that, over and above security, Israel has achieved
reconciliation with the Syrians. In addition to the paper on which the
peace treaty is written, there will have to tangible signs of what Asad
calls "natural relations," which is in effect what is meant by
normalization. Looking at it this way, from Israel’s point of view,
normalization is security at its deepest level.
SIGNIFICANCE TO ISRAEL
From an examination of regional and international
developments, it seems to me that Israel can safely conclude that in
the coming years, the gap between it and its neighbors will not
diminish. The contrasting character of the economies makes it difficult
to envision economic and trade cooperation between Israel and the Arab
states, other than, perhaps, between Israel and Jordan and the
Palestinian Authority. The Israeli economy will continue to turn to
Western markets.
Therefore from the start of the year 2000 and for
several years after that, Israel can make the following working
assumptions:
- The Middle East will remain non-homogenous, and not fully stable.
Opposing views -- in politics, culture and religion -- will remain
prominent. Although global and regional trends led to a near-acceptance
of Israel’s existence, the common denominator in almost all Arab
states, with the exception of Jordan, is a desire to see an Israel that
is weakened in terms of its territorial dimensions, its strategic
assets and its international relationships.
- Given this approach, the Arab interest is to prevent Israeli
hegemony and domination in an era of peace. The fear of an Israeli
takeover, whether by strategic military power or by economic,
technological, political or even cultural means, runs through the Arab
world. In other words, no Arab country wants Israel to be the key state
in the region.
- Israel will continue (certainly during the few years of peace) to
face strategic threats, including those from far-away states like Iran
and Iraq. The significance: Relations of peace will not in themselves
eradicate strategic threats, but may create a framework and an
atmosphere to limit or prevent such threats from being carried out. For
Israel, security considerations will continue to be given the highest
priority in any future negotiation.
- The preservation of Israel’s independent deterrent capacity and
decisive military edge, coupled with the ongoing special relationship
with the United States, plays a decisive role in the strengthening of
regional stability. This is the basis of Israel’s current defense
doctrine, and will remain equally valid under conditions of peace.
- The implications of the peace process for the economics of the
region are still unclear. Foreign capital has not flowed into the
region, economic and political problems persist and military spending
still occupies a prominent (albeit not exclusive) place in Arab
national investment and thinking. Problems of demographics and water,
and competition over resources, are likely to produce future disputes
and tensions.
- In the coming years, Israel will remain a unique Middle Eastern
state due to its democracy, its stability, its economic potential and
high level of human capital. Although this will enhance her economic
and political standing in the region and internationally, it will also
give her a threatening image in the Arab world.
- Israel does not regard itself as threatening any state in the
region. Nevertheless, many countries in the region regard Israel as a
threat to their security and vital interests. These perceptions
complicate Israel’s security considerations. Perhaps comprehensive
peace will change that.
- Peace with the Arab states may assume a different character,
depending on the nature of the regimes in the Arab countries, and their
positive contact with Israel. It is doubtful that Israel will reach
peace with all Arab states. It is preferable to seek "good peace" (from
a strategic-security point of view) than to insist on imposed elements
of normalization, which may well be of little benefit to the Israeli
people.
- Attaining peace will allow Israel to reorder its domestic
priorities, to reduce its defense spending and to raise the standard of
living - a trend in keeping with the change in Israeli society, from
collective values to greater individualism and self-realization.
- In a state of peace, Israel will be able, if asked, to share with
Arab states its experience and know-how to help improve living
standards. This element of investment in its neighbors’ welfare is a
clear Israeli interest with security and strategic significance.
THE VIEW FROM DAMASCUS
A decade after the disintegration of the Soviet
Union and the end of the Gulf War, the regime of President Hafiz
al-Asad finds itself at a point of distinct weakness. Even if Syria
continues to see itself as a key regional player, as the Syrians speak
of themselves, it seems that the global and regional trends have not
been to its advantage. From Damascus’s point of view, there has been a
string of developments that are problematic:
- The disappearance of the Soviet Union as Syria’s strategic
superpower prop, which always supported Damascus at any sign of crisis
in the past. It is a telling fact that President Asad made his first
visit to Moscow in July 1999, almost a decade after the collapse of the
U.S.S.R.
- The collapse of the threat of the "Eastern Front" against Israel,
after Iraq’s defeat in the Gulf War. This development effectively
eliminated the idea of "strategic parity" which Syria sought to
establish, with the aid of its Arab allies, vis-a-vis Israeli power.
Today, Syria is concerned at the U.S. effort to bring about a change of
the regime in Iraq. Though there is no love lost between the world’s
two Ba’ath party regimes, the establishment of a pro-Western Iraqi
regime in Baghdad is anathema to Syria.(1)
- Reinforcement of America’s standing in the Middle East, where
Damascus justifiably sees Washington as an historic ally of Israel,
Syria’s main "enemy." On many occasions, Asad has expressed his strong
reservations about the "new world order" with one superpower, while
expressing his hopes for the establishment of a "multi-polar" world
order.(2) The United States still regards Syria as a terror-supporting
state (and therefore precluded from receiving U.S. aid.)
- Agreements between Israel and the Palestinians, the
Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty (and before that, the Israeli-Egyptian
peace), together with the progress in the multilateral negotiations (in
which Syrian did not participate) have highlighted the divisions in the
Arab camp, Syria’s isolation and the decline in its power to prevent
processes it opposes. Asad’s statement, in March 1999, that "peace with
Israel will not be reached, unless there is peace among the Arabs
themselves," reflects, in my view, Syrian pessimism over its ability to
set up a united front against Israel in the future.(3)
- In addition, Israel’s improving relations with Turkey, and what
Damascus sees as tripartite Israeli-Turkish-Jordanian strategic
cooperation, with American back-up, deepens Syrian fears of being
"surrounded" by military alliances directed against "Arabic-Moslem
solidarity" in general, and Syria in particular.(4)
To these developments, whose significance is a
political and military weakening of Syria and a widening strategic gap
in Israel’s favor, can be added Syria’s economic and domestic
weaknesses that gathered momentum during the course of the 1990s:
- The current state of the Syrian economy, particularly over the last
two or three years, is not good! There is a severe recession, exports
have declined by 20 percent, drought has hurt agriculture, there is a
shortage of water, oil resources are depleting and foreign investments,
including those from the Gulf, have declined significantly.
- Today, the Syrian economy is in drastic need of structural reform,
to equip it for growth -- by encouraging the private sector, increasing
efficiency and fighting corruption -- at the expense of the public
sector. I think Asad understands this very well. It explains the Syrian
effort (since May 1997) (5) to improve its relations with the World
Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and with European states, as
well as its desire to encourage foreign investment in the Syrian
economy. But militating against progress is the Syrian fear of a policy
of rapid economic reform, which might force political reforms that
could endanger the regime.
- There is also the increasingly acute question of Asad’s successor.
The president’s life expectancy is not high, prompting him to make
efforts to assure the smooth transition of power, preferably to his son
Bashaar. Much of this is taking place in the military, which in the
recent past has undergone a number of personnel changes whose objective
is to bring in fresh blood, from Bashaar’s generation.
- It seems to me that Asad must have a sense of ongoing strategic
failure, regarding his inability to retrieve lost Syrian honor and
prominence by regaining the Golan Heights, by a combination of military
and diplomatic efforts. It’s not clear to him whether his son will be
able to do so in the future, because at least during the initial
period, he will have to devote most of his attention to steadying his
regime internally. In other words, there is a perceived need to move
quickly to attain this key Syrian strategic objective (return of the
Golan.)
- Beyond that, the great disappointment of the Asad regime over the
past decade appears to be the stagnation in its relations with the
United States. Neither the Madrid process nor Syrian participation in
the Gulf War, at the side of the United States, opened strategic doors
for Asad in Washington. At most, it enabled an opening whose size was
dependent on the state of Israeli-Syrian negotiations.
Therefore, since the freezing of the
Syrian-Israeli dialogue in the mid-1990s, there have been no
significant developments in Syrian-U.S. relations. The Syrians were
disappointed and frustrated by the level of American involvement and by
the lack of willingness, in their view, to apply pressure on Israel. In
addition, Syria remained on the list of "terror states," despite its
diplomatic efforts to be removed. (the most Syria was able to extract
from the United States was removal from the drug list in 1997). The
main significance of Syria’s being on the list of states supporting
terror was the damage it did to the Syrian image, and the limitations
it put on development of economic and trade relations between the U.S.
and Syria, since it precluded American companies from doing business
with Syria.
In Syrian eyes, the aggressive U.S. policy on
proliferation (Iraq) and terror (Sudan, Afghanistan), which included
use of force against those states, was designed to serve Israeli
interests and to weaken the Arab states. The Syrians repeatedly
criticized what they saw as America’s biased policy in the region, and
opposed what was seen as America’s encouragement of regional axes
hostile to Syria (like Turkey-Israel) and the attempt to bring about
the partition of Iraq.
The Syrian frustration with the United States
increased as Syria realized that while American-Israeli relations
remained stable over the years, the image of Syria in the U.S. Congress
and in the wider American public remained low and problematic, against
the background of Syria’s formal inclusion in the list of
terror-supporting states (also from Lebanon), and its being regarded as
non-democratic and as undermining U.S. interests in the Middle East.
Damascus blames the pro-Israel lobby in the United States for playing a
major role in the besmirching of Syria’s name in the U.S.
A mark of the tenseness of the relationship can
be seen in Asad’s complaint that, in its second term, the Clinton
administration had become "ineffective" in the political process.
Against the background of the American use of force against Iraq in
late 1998, a crisis developed over protest demonstrations in Damascus,
during which U.S. flags were burned and the U.S. embassy in the Syrian
capital was seriously damaged.(6) The U.S. stance in the Turkish-Syrian
crisis, where Washington sided with Turkish demands on terror
(elimination of the PKK camps in Syria) further fueled the tension and
suspicion.
In the final analysis, it seems to me that over
the last few years, the Syrian sense of friction with the United States
has grown more acute. The Syrian expectation that, during his second
term, Clinton would be relieved of election pressures and would push
for progress on the Syrian track, at Damascus’s whim, failed to
materialize. The Syrians were also sidetracked by the attention paid to
the Palestinian issue. Against this background, Asad adopted a policy
that reflected two aspects of his relations with the United States: on
the one hand, less consideration of American regional interests, and,
on the other, a parallel effort to emphasize that without Syria there
would be no regional peace. On the other hand, Asad understands that he
must not push things too far. The United States is still the superpower
with the key to progress in the peace process.(7) The Syrian hope,
based on past experience: a breakthrough in the peace process is likely
to bring an improvement in Syrian-U.S. relations.
LIGHTS IN THE FOG
So far, we have surveyed the shadows and problems
surrounding the Syrian view of global and regional developments. Still,
in my view, the Syrian assessment contains positive points, even if
they attach less weight to them.
First and foremost, Asad can take heart at his
success in establishing (with the United States, Israel and the
international community) his concept that there can be no peace unless
Israel withdraws completely from the Golan Heights. The acceptance of
this position enables Asad to maintain a "steadfast stance" vis-a-vis
the various players. In retrospect, it is possible to determine that
the beginning of the political process reflected "the strategic Syrian
decision" to make peace with Israel - but on its terms. Syria stuck to
its familiar positions, first of all to its demand for an Israeli
withdrawal to the lines of June 4, 1967, and to equal, balanced and
mutual security arrangements, while waiting for flexibility from
Israel.
The operative significance of this is that in the
Syrian view, despite its difficulties in negotiations with Israel, its
isolation, weakness and disadvantage on the regional and domestic
fronts, that at least on the question of a peace arrangement with
Israel, Syria stood its ground and did not show weakness. That is to
say on the territorial issue. The argument, in the Syrian view, would
be over the nature of peace, its form and conditions, but not over
basic assumption that the Golan Heights would be returned to Syria.
So Asad can expect positive developments in
U.S.-Syrian relations to stem from the resumption of the negotiations.
It should be recalled that during the years of Israeli-Syrian talks in
1991-95, a relatively close dialogue developed between the Syrians and
the Americans. It was expressed through dozens of visits of the U.S.
secretary of state and the U.S. peace team to Damascus, when Syria was
recognized as a senior, central player in efforts to carve out a
regional agreement. It became clear to the Syrians that from the point
of view of the Americans (and Israel), Damascus held the key to an
overall settlement, including a solution to the Lebanese issue. This
period was also utilized for Syrian-American discussions on
economic-political cooperation. in the event of a new era in relations
between the two countries (this subject is discussed in a separate
chapter).
Asad can draw encouragement from the following
additional developments:
- A reduction in Syrian-Turkish tensions after the two countries’
agreement on the issue of the PKK, even if the reservoirs of hostility
and suspicion remain deep. In addition, the Israeli-Turkish
relationship had a worrying disadvantage from Israel’s point of view:
it was perceived by Arab states as a policy designed to "divide and
rule" in the Arab-Moslem world.
- Developments in Jordan (the passing of King Hussein, and his
replacement by King Abdullah) which prompted a Syrian attempt to "pull"
Jordan towards Damascus, and to distance the Hashemite Kingdom from
Israel and Turkey.(8)
- Continued deadlock on the multilateral track and in the process of
normalization between Israel and the Arab world - although, in my view,
Damascus fears the deadlock is only temporary and that things will
improve during the Barak government’s term.
- Israel’s distress in Lebanon, where playing the "terror card" has
aided Syrian efforts to link Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon
(Syria fears a unilateral Israeli pullback) to withdrawal from the
Golan Heights. Over the past decade, Syria has also strengthened its
hold on Lebanese as a client state and as a "card" to be used in future
negotiations with Israel. Today it is almost universally accepted that
a deal in Lebanon depends on the negotiations over the Golan
Heights.
- Despite the absence of a military-strategic balance between Israel
and Syria, Syrian military capabilities -- including chemical weapons –
cannot be lightly disregarded, and allow Asad to present Syria as a
buffer against Israel’s ambitions for regional hegemony and potential
for regional "adventurism."
Still, together with the internal weakness
expressed in the decline in the preparedness of the Syrian army and its
inferiority vis-as-vis Israel, the failing economy, demographic
problems and diminishing natural resources, Asad can point to internal
stability as an achievement. He has a firm grip on Syria and on its
centers of power, despite his advanced age and the periodic reports of
his frail health. If there were fears in Damascus that global trends
would affect internal affairs and the future of the Alawi regime, they
have, to a great extent, faded. Still, it is crystal clear that peace
with Israel, seen as a totally Western state, will create a sense of
threat to Syrian domestic stability as it exists today.
THE OVERALL BALANCE IN SYRIAN EYES
It appears to me that from Asad’s point of view,
at the pinnacle of the ruling pyramid in Damascus, Syria stands at a
crossroads with regard to its development in the 21st century. The main
challenges facing Asad are:
- To guarantee the stability of the Syrian regime, and with it the
existence of Syria as a secular state, able to carry out, even in
careful stages, economic reforms, as part of an effort to adjust to
global changes. In this connection, the regime has a clear interest in
investment and growth accelerated by external aid. But Asad must take
into account possible negative effects on the Sunni Moslem economic and
cultural elite, which sees itself threatened by liberalizing trends,
which could expose it to competition.
- To move the peace process with Israel forward in an effort to make
Syrian gains on the Golan, in Lebanon and in the regional and
international spheres. All this, without peace bringing about internal
shocks, which could upset the delicate balances in Syrian society,
where the minority Alawites are at the political-military apex. Asad
must be convinced, therefore, that peace will promote the preservation
of the Alawite regime, (keeping it in his family’s hands,) and not pose
a threat to its survival..
- To create a key regional role for Syria, so that, even after peace
with Israel, it is not relegated to the margins of regional politics,
compared to more central countries like Egypt and Israel. The element
of prestige and honor will come into play here. In other words: Syria
will make efforts to ensure that peace does not lead to a diminution of
its importance, particularly in American eyes. The key question is
whether Syria will be able to present itself to Washington as a
contributor to regional stability, and if the U.S. will assign Damascus
regional tasks to strengthen its standing in internal Arab politics.
Israel could make a contribution here in persuading the U.S. of the
need to compensate Syria financially for making peace with Israel, as
was the case with Egypt.
- And finally, a decisive question from the Syrian point of view is
its place in the queue for a dialogue and a breakthrough with Israel.
The Syrian interest is to reach agreement with Israel before the
Palestinians do. Then Damascus will be able to emphasize its key role
in the area, and will be relieved of the fear that resolution of
Palestinian final-status issues will weaken the Syrian bargaining
position. The central question: To what extent will Syria be willing to
make real efforts to get an agreement with Israel in the face of
competing activity on the Palestinian track.
The bottom line is this: When the Syrian
president considers the best way of attaining this complex of
objectives, he increasingly sees a peace agreement with Israel as the
most suitable answer to the challenges faced by his country.(9)
At this stage, it seems appropriate to turn to a
brief analysis of the Israeli-Syrian dialogue, from the Madrid
conference of 1991 to the election of Israel’s new prime minister, Ehud
Barak, in May 1999, to examine the agreements and differences, and
assess to what extent they are capable of reaching an agreement.
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