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Executive summary

Working Papers

The Israeli-Syrian Dialogue: A One-Way Ticket To Peace?
October 1999
Uri Sagie

This research paper analyzes the regional and global background to the Israeli-Syria dialogue since the 1991 Madrid Conference. Its chapters describe the dialogue between the two countries, their thinking and interests, and their assessments of the influence a peace agreement might have on them. There is also an attempt to examine the world views of the two leaders, Prime Minister Ehud Barak and President Hafez al-Asad, and to assess the likelihood of negotiations being resumed and their chances of success if they are.

The general conclusion is that Israel and Syria are now riper than ever for a breakthrough in the political process. The experience and ripeness of their political leaders could lead to a determined effort to move towards a peace agreement, which would provide both with domestic, regional and international gains. Though mutual suspicion, disputed issues and wide gaps between the parties remain, the problems are soluble if they can create a win-win negotiating situation -- to replace the zero sum game mentality in which every gain by one side is seen by the other as its loss -- and if the United States, in its superpower capacity, undertakes a major role in helping to bridge the gaps and underpin the peace. The Israeli-Syrian march towards peace will reflect their analysis of the alternatives and their view of the long-term processes that might serve their interests.

It seems to me that Israel and Syria have already gone a long way towards a peace arrangement. The main understandings between them can be summarized as follows:

a. Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights: The Syrians understood correctly that Israel made a commitment to withdraw from most of the Golan, if its requirements on security and the nature of peace are satisfied.

b. Normalization: Syria agreed to include most of the normalization clauses requested by Israel in the peace treaty, including full diplomatic relations and resident ambassadors, economic cooperation, trade, transport and tourism.

c. The comprehensiveness of the agreement: The parties agreed that accord with Syria would include a peace deal with Lebanon, that it would not be dependent on other agreements (for example, a final status agreement with the Palestinians) and that it would be accompanied by regional cooperation and reconciliation.

d. The American role: Israel and Syria agreed to active American involvement in the negotiations, to American backing for the security arrangements (including the possible involvement of U.S. forces, or American operation of an early-warning station on Mt. Hermon) and to American leadership in assembling an international economic package for regional and bilateral projects.

e. Water: Discussions between the parties reflected a joint interest in finding practical solutions to the water shortage, including a wider regional solution.

f. Security arrangements: A document of understanding ("Non-Paper") was formulated in May 1995, and a structured discussion begun on various security issues, with an emphasis on demilitarized zones and areas of limited forces, to assuage mutual fears.

But gaps between the parties should not be ignored:

a. The extent of the withdrawal: Israel is not prepared to pull back to the June 4, 1967 line, and the key question is whether agreement can be reached on the demarcation of an agreed border.

b. Security arrangements: The gaps are still wide. Israel wants a reduction of forces and the distancing of offensive units (tank divisions) from the border areas.

c. Ongoing terror from Lebanon: Syria sees this as a bargaining chip, and it could make the atmosphere for negotiations difficult.

d. Normalization: Syria’s position still reflects a notion of limited cooperation and bilateral links with Israel, partly because of its concern over the possible impact of peace on the stability of the regime, and partly because of what it sees as a clear interest in preventing Israel from attaining regional hegemony in an era of peace.

Despite the difficulties on both sides, both have a basic interest in carrying the negotiations forward. Indeed, they see no alternatives to continuation of the process. Military confrontation seems remote and pointless, because it does not guarantee the attainment of objectives or interests by the initiating side, more probably Syria, which stands to gain more from negotiations than from a military move, the outcome of which could be disastrous. It seems to me that in Israel, too, there is a heightened awareness of the limits of power. Moreover, allowing the negotiations to drag on would hurt both sides:

a. For Israel, peace with Syria would entail a solution of the Lebanese problem, foster ties with the entire Arab world, and strengthen its position on the Palestinian track.

b. For Syria, peace would entail the achievement of key objectives: return of the Golan Heights, restoration of wounded national pride, improvement of relations with the United States and de jure recognition (by Israel and the United States too) of Syria’s control in Lebanon. It is a clear Syrian interest to complete a peace treaty with Israel before the solution of the Palestinian problem. Furthermore, Syria needs to reap the fruits of peace as soon as possible, given its deteriorating economic situation.

c. The U.S. elections in November 2000 put time pressure on the parties to capitalize on the willingness of President Clinton and his administration to devote time and energy to the process.

Neither side wants to be blamed (again) for missing the chance for peace. The new circumstances created after the election of Ehud Barak in Israel provide a "second chance" for the process. Both sides have learned from previous negotiations, and the main challenge today is to create conditions for peace based on convergent interests in regional stability, regional development and diversion of resources from defense to the domestic challenges faced by each country.

Israel and Syria will need intensive American help in conducting negotiations. From the American point of view, an Israel-Syrian agreement will clearly be seen as an achievement of the highest order. It could contribute to the weakening and isolation of the radical Arab-Moslem states (Iran and Iraq), promote regional stability, bring a lull to the Lebanese theater and reduce terror. It would also strengthen the American position in the regional periphery, with the emphasis on the Gulf.

To achieve practical results in the negotiations, the parties need active American involvement, including at the highest, presidential level. This entails playing an active role in structuring the agreement, establishing the connections between the various key elements, eliciting flexibility from the parties, helping in the implementation of the security arrangements and establishing a new relationship with the two countries. Both Israel and Syria have great expectations.

The stature of the leaders and their ability to make critical and difficult decisions -- and especially to influence their own people -- is critical. Israel’s Prime Minister Barak and Syrian President Asad will face difficult tests of leadership. It is up to them to achieve a "peace breakthrough." An examination of their backgrounds, their characters and their public statements leads to the conclusion that Barak and Asad are capable of blazing a new direction for the peoples of the region. They will be able to conduct tenacious, persistent and continuous negotiations, and sign a peace treaty between their two countries. It won’t be easy. Both sides stands firm on what they regard as their vital interests. The domestic ground on both sides will have to prepared. Nevertheless, it seems to me that both leaders have the character to take brave decisions and on the Syrian side, Asad is also motivated by a sense of urgency and a desire not to miss another chance for an agreement. In my view, with the renewal of talks, both Barak and Asad will strive to lead and to shape the historical process, and they will make a supreme effort to reach an agreement.

Practically speaking, a series of steps needs to be taken in the next few months to create favorable conditions for a resumption of talks and for progress to be made in them. These include the creation of a positive atmosphere in the media, a renewed understanding in principle on the main components of the deal, agreement to put Lebanon near the top of the negotiating agenda (as part of an agreement in principle on the Golan Heights), with the aim of ending terror there and implementing a Lebanese security arrangement as a first stage in the implementation of agreements with Syria. The two countries will need to produce practical solutions for the water and border issues, jettisoning the legalistic positions that breed intransigence.

In the final analysis, renewed Israel-Syrian negotiations hold the promise of a breakthrough. The global and regional conditions are ripe, and both countries are waiting for tickets for the journey to peace. But it take great resolve from both of them, because the journey is one-way.

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