Executive summary
|
|
|||
|
This research paper analyzes the regional and global background to the Israeli-Syria dialogue since the 1991 Madrid Conference. Its chapters describe the dialogue between the two countries, their thinking and interests, and their assessments of the influence a peace agreement might have on them. There is also an attempt to examine the world views of the two leaders, Prime Minister Ehud Barak and President Hafez al-Asad, and to assess the likelihood of negotiations being resumed and their chances of success if they are. The general conclusion is that Israel and Syria are now riper than ever for a breakthrough in the political process. The experience and ripeness of their political leaders could lead to a determined effort to move towards a peace agreement, which would provide both with domestic, regional and international gains. Though mutual suspicion, disputed issues and wide gaps between the parties remain, the problems are soluble if they can create a win-win negotiating situation -- to replace the zero sum game mentality in which every gain by one side is seen by the other as its loss -- and if the United States, in its superpower capacity, undertakes a major role in helping to bridge the gaps and underpin the peace. The Israeli-Syrian march towards peace will reflect their analysis of the alternatives and their view of the long-term processes that might serve their interests. It seems to me that Israel and Syria have already gone a long way towards a peace arrangement. The main understandings between them can be summarized as follows:
But gaps between the parties should not be ignored:
Despite the difficulties on both sides, both have a basic interest in carrying the negotiations forward. Indeed, they see no alternatives to continuation of the process. Military confrontation seems remote and pointless, because it does not guarantee the attainment of objectives or interests by the initiating side, more probably Syria, which stands to gain more from negotiations than from a military move, the outcome of which could be disastrous. It seems to me that in Israel, too, there is a heightened awareness of the limits of power. Moreover, allowing the negotiations to drag on would hurt both sides:
Neither side wants to be blamed (again) for missing the chance for peace. The new circumstances created after the election of Ehud Barak in Israel provide a "second chance" for the process. Both sides have learned from previous negotiations, and the main challenge today is to create conditions for peace based on convergent interests in regional stability, regional development and diversion of resources from defense to the domestic challenges faced by each country. Israel and Syria will need intensive American help in conducting negotiations. From the American point of view, an Israel-Syrian agreement will clearly be seen as an achievement of the highest order. It could contribute to the weakening and isolation of the radical Arab-Moslem states (Iran and Iraq), promote regional stability, bring a lull to the Lebanese theater and reduce terror. It would also strengthen the American position in the regional periphery, with the emphasis on the Gulf. To achieve practical results in the negotiations, the parties need active American involvement, including at the highest, presidential level. This entails playing an active role in structuring the agreement, establishing the connections between the various key elements, eliciting flexibility from the parties, helping in the implementation of the security arrangements and establishing a new relationship with the two countries. Both Israel and Syria have great expectations. The stature of the leaders and their ability to make critical and difficult decisions -- and especially to influence their own people -- is critical. Israel’s Prime Minister Barak and Syrian President Asad will face difficult tests of leadership. It is up to them to achieve a "peace breakthrough." An examination of their backgrounds, their characters and their public statements leads to the conclusion that Barak and Asad are capable of blazing a new direction for the peoples of the region. They will be able to conduct tenacious, persistent and continuous negotiations, and sign a peace treaty between their two countries. It won’t be easy. Both sides stands firm on what they regard as their vital interests. The domestic ground on both sides will have to prepared. Nevertheless, it seems to me that both leaders have the character to take brave decisions and on the Syrian side, Asad is also motivated by a sense of urgency and a desire not to miss another chance for an agreement. In my view, with the renewal of talks, both Barak and Asad will strive to lead and to shape the historical process, and they will make a supreme effort to reach an agreement. Practically speaking, a series of steps needs to be taken in the next few months to create favorable conditions for a resumption of talks and for progress to be made in them. These include the creation of a positive atmosphere in the media, a renewed understanding in principle on the main components of the deal, agreement to put Lebanon near the top of the negotiating agenda (as part of an agreement in principle on the Golan Heights), with the aim of ending terror there and implementing a Lebanese security arrangement as a first stage in the implementation of agreements with Syria. The two countries will need to produce practical solutions for the water and border issues, jettisoning the legalistic positions that breed intransigence. In the final analysis, renewed Israel-Syrian negotiations hold the promise of a breakthrough. The global and regional conditions are ripe, and both countries are waiting for tickets for the journey to peace. But it take great resolve from both of them, because the journey is one-way. |
|||
|

