

Between Euroland and Abendland?
Opportunities and Challenges for German Foreign Policy Since Unification

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This paper re-appraises German foreign policy since unification. A re-examination of the catalysts that helped produce German unity illuminates new opportunities and challenges that have arisen in the intervening twenty years. Exploring the salience of three identity complexes, *trans-Atlantia*, *Euroland*, and *Abendland*, highlights important opportunities and challenges to German foreign policy as well. Germany remains anchored in the interstate and trans-national relationships that enabled unification, but the balance has shifted: *trans-Atlantia* remains intact but has been weakened. The impulse to deepen the European integration movement continues to thrive, with Germany remaining its engine. German foreign policy leadership has had some troubled moments but has largely remained a stabilizing factor in post-Cold War Europe, while the role of Russia twenty years on has changed significantly. One of the most important challenges to German foreign and domestic policy, however, is one that was barely visible in 1989: Germany's and Europe's relationship to the *Morgenland*, or cultures of what has been alternatively called the Orient, the Levant, and the Near and Middle East. *Morgenland* is contrasted with *Abendland*, or evening land, which means the west, and usually the Christian west. In short, Germany and Europe face civilizational challenges that have become contentious policy and identity issues.

The Historical Background

The rehabilitation of West Germany after the Second World War was one of the most successful narratives of modern history. With much help from the U.S., the West and the institutionalized

international order, West Germany was rapidly integrated into the West and took its place as great power. West German leaders skillfully steered a foreign policy course that anchored the country in western institutions, enhanced West German influence, and worked as best they could with the division of Germany. The so-called German question that haunted many inside and outside of West Germany appeared to be resolved. Then, the two Germany structure that both underwrote and reflected the Cold War rapidly dissolved in 1989.

German unification in 1989 remains a singularly awe-inspiring event, and represents a watershed moment. Not only was it accomplished peacefully, against the preferences of critical German allies and key international players, it re-confirmed a half century of democratic community building in the West led mainly by the U.S., and the European integration movement of which Germany had become the engine. German unification therefore proceeded while anchored in an unthreatening environment. The unprecedented peaceful process was driven by innovative and trusted German foreign policy leadership, and was dependent on a reforming Russia. Therefore, although there were challenges to the project of uniting Germany, German foreign policy-makers succeeded by availing themselves of rich opportunities, and by creating some themselves.

Aside from specific policies, the road to unification can be understood by examining a number of identity complexes as well. As I have argued elsewhere, the trans-Atlantic relationship formed the anchor for the western community of democracies and was the incubator within which democratic West Germany developed. The trans-Atlantic security relationship was then critical for German unification, as it was the Bush Administration that admonished the community of western democracies to support a uniting democratic Germany. Through the 1980s, this relationship, which I have called trans-Atlantia, ran parallel to the European identity complex that was emerging through the various West European institutions. Thus, while West Germany

was often torn in its foreign policy between supporting the U.S. and/or aligning itself with France, the two identity complexes did not directly challenge each other. The European identity complex would eventually evolve into what I call Euroland, and has since been in tension more often with trans-Atlantia. The third identity complex dealt with in this paper, *Abendland*, was barely perceptible at this time. Here I discuss the emerging challenges that have merged for German and European foreign and domestic policies and identities regarding the inclusion or exclusion of what are perceived as non-western cultures.

In the timeframe leading up to German unification and in the years afterward, German foreign policy leadership was pivotal in helping integrate Europe and legitimize NATO. Chancellor Kohl took the lead in moving toward unification, although U.S. and Russian foreign policy were also critical. Kohl's persistence helped steer Europe and especially the Germans toward acceptance of the euro and his government was an important advocate for Polish accession to NATO. The Kohl government was also pivotal in forging cooperative relations with Russia bilaterally and through NATO. Economic and financial investment in Russia was promoted and the German hand was present in the penning of the NATO-Russia Charter in 1997.

That said, German and American leaders began to revise the trans-Atlantic understanding by the turn of the millennium. Indeed, until Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder criticized and rejected U.S. military intervention in Iraq during the German federal election in 2003, the public rebuke of U.S. foreign policy by a serving German Chancellor in the midst of a federal election was unprecedented in postwar history. While the moment was singular, and German-U.S. relations were revived and repaired with under Chancellor Angela Merkel's leadership, the event did symbolize the growing German identification as EU European, and the concomitant weakening of identification as NATO European.

The Success of *Euroland*

The most important German foreign policy accomplishment since 1989 has been support and leadership in the sustained forward momentum in European integration. As Elizabeth Pond observes, Europe has responded to challenges to integration by “fleeing forward” .¹ Germany has played the most critical role, beginning with Helmut Kohl’s relentless drive to unify Germany in an integrating Europe. Indeed, the desire to embed emerging Germany in a more deeply integrated EU was widespread. Progress emerged quickly, with visible effects. The European Union was officially proclaimed with Maastricht in 1992 whereupon the tasks of deeper integration were immediately addressed. During the 1990s, a whirlwind of integration-related agreements were debated and agreed upon: the Single European Act, the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Treaty of Nice. Success was greater in the realms of economic and financial integration than in the more difficult task of bringing EU Europe together under an integrated foreign and defense policy, which I discuss below.

The introduction of the euro was probably singular in signaling to European publics and the rest of the world that European integration was deepening and was a reality. The creation of the euro zone, or Euroland, demanded bold leadership. Kohl withstood tremendous domestic pressure in moving forward with the euro; public opinion was against it, and the deutschmark had become the symbol of German success and identity. By maintaining an unwavering position on the introduction of the euro, Kohl confirmed his commitment to embedding united Germany firmly within an institutionalized and integrated Europe. Kohl averred, “The introduction of the euro is not only an important decision for the European Union; it is an important turning point in

¹ Elizabeth Pond, *The Rebirth of Europe*.

European history ... The single European currency has made European integration irreversible."² Thus, Euroland has come to symbolize the integrating Europe. I take it as an identity complex, of which the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and architecture is a significant, yet very incomplete part.

ESDP: The Idea of Europe and Security Culture Re-defined:

Elsewhere I have compared emerging European foundational security beliefs to those of the U.S., and argued that different historical experiences with war have produced profoundly different security cultures. The foundational beliefs in the U.S. concerning the nature of threat and the legitimacy of war are more typical of traditional nation states, where nationalism and a sense of Providence combine to demonize threat and to legitimize the use of force to counter the threat. For Europe, the link between Providence and the nation was broken through two devastating world wars, both of which were based initially in most of the warring great power states on beliefs about being providentially chosen. Indeed, the American proclivity to define threats in terms of the battle between good and evil is not just seen as off-putting to many Europeans: it is seen as irrational and reflective of flawed democracy.³ Dominique Moisi, a leading European public intellectual has observed that to Europeans, “the combination of religion and nationalism in America is frightening. We feel betrayed by God and nationalism”.⁴

Interestingly, the security culture of Europe that has been evolving slowly since the end of the Second World War revolves around a long standing “idea of Europe”, the centuries old evocation that Europe’s identity in the world should be: peaceful and civilized. Thus, “the idea of

² Helmut Kohl, *Der Euro und die Zukunft Europas*, Center for European Integration Studies, University of Bonn, ZEI: Europa Forums (2002), 3-4.

³ For an examination of U.S. and European security cultures, see Mary N. Hampton, *Angels, Mortals, Demons: Comparing U.S. and European Security Foundational Beliefs*, manuscript under review.

⁴ Dominique Moisi, quoted in “In the World of Good and Evil”, *The Economist*, September 14, 2006.

Europe” was fundamentally forged out of war weary dreams of unity: postwar Europe was always the venue for ripening cosmopolitan and unification models. In the post war environment of 1648; in the postwar environment of 1919; and in the postwar environment of 1945, it was Jean Monnet, Robert Schumann, Konrad Adenauer and others who helped forge the latest idea of Europe that took hold. The “idea of Europe” was thus born in the shadows of hard fought competitive wars, most often after wars that were fought among the European states, or great power wars. The core is therefore a yearning for peace and the conditions under which such a state of relations might be forged.

In short, the historical processes of war devastation, secularization and post-Westphalian integration have produced in Europe a very different set of beliefs about the nature of threat and the legitimacy of war-fighting than exist in the U.S. and in much of the world. Underlying European beliefs about the nature of threat and the acceptability of war fighting have therefore been radically altered over the last half century. This uniquely European security culture ripened in the shade of the U.S. security umbrella for fifty years, or within Trans-Atlantia.

German Power Projection ‘lite’: a Key to Understanding European Security Culture:

The true engine of the emerging European security culture has been Germany. Germany still diverges from other European national security cultures in important ways, but forms the bedrock of the emerging European security culture. Because of its singular experience with great power war, loss, and moral shame, West Germany developed a unique security culture after the Second World War that held for over a half century. The rejection of power projection and military interventionism developed into what many have called the “culture of reticence” in West Germany. West Germans were resistant to projecting German power abroad in any way that

would be perceived as militaristic or threatening. Thus, the Germans evolving self-identity developed concepts that presented West Germany as a “civilian power”, as the first “post-national” state, and as a true believer in non-aggression. Indeed, the term “never again” for West Germans was two pronged: never again war from German soil, and never again support for undemocratic demagogues like Hitler. As has been the case with U.S. security culture, this West German culture of reticence was always contested, and most often by more traditional understandings of security culture.

In the end, the culture of reticence helped define the set of rules, beliefs, and norms that underwrote German security culture through the 1990s and into the 21st century. Germany’s approach, what I have previously termed power projection ‘lite’, forms the core of the European approach to security. Former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder reflected the approach succinctly in an April 2001 interview with the German weekly, *Die Zeit*: “Military skills and strength are featuring less and less prominently in 21st century European security programs.” He further averred: “The question of security cannot be left to the military.”⁵ In a similar fashion, Egon Bahr, the main architect of the SPD’s former Chancellor Willi Brandt’s path breaking foreign policy, *Ostpolitik*, argues: “To create stability through binding relationships, in which the power of the military plays an increasingly smaller role, that is the European way.”⁶

The EU and Security Governance:

⁵ Gerhard Schroeder, quoted in *Die Zeit*, April 2002.

⁶ Egon Bahr, “Das Thema: Europa muss erwachsen werden”, *Die Welt* online, 06.04.2002; <http://www.welt.de/daten/2002/04/06/0406au324335.htx>.

Peter Katzenstein's claim that the EU has taken on the features of a German approach to the internationalization of national interests is confirmed, where the tools of security governance are first political, economic, and diplomatic and are military only as a last resort.⁷

For the EU security blueprint, or the security governance model, the traditional reliance on military capabilities among great powers is increasingly relinquished in favor of those associated with soft power: diplomacy, economics, and information. EU troops are to be deployable in situations that were spelled out as the Petersberg Tasks in 1997 in Amsterdam. The tasks include humanitarian assistance, peace keeping operations (PKO), crisis management and prevention, and peace enforcement operations. The tasks also advocate that the military instrument must be pursued only as a last resort, and only as one piece of a broader approach to security that includes political, economic, and environmental concerns.

While the so-called Headline goals set an agenda for the lite projection of EU power abroad, what constitutes a threat to the European homeland? The EU is beginning to produce security documents that define threats and recommend responses to them. For example, the 2003 document, *A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy*, lists a number of threats to which the EU must respond: among others, terrorism WMD, and weak and failing states. For all of these it is recommended that EU members act in concert. What is also abundantly clear is that these are interpreted as posing no potentially existential threats. The document states that: "In contrast to the massive visible threat in the cold war, none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled with purely military means." In line with the

⁷ Katzenstein, *The Culture of National Security*. (Columbia University Press, 1996).

Petersburg Tasks, and with the Headline Goals, each threat needs the mixed response for which, (t)he European Union is particularly well equipped to respond.”⁸

The 2003 document is reaffirmed in the 2008 Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy. Security governance is reaffirmed as are the successes of power projection lite: “Over the last decade, the European Security and Defense Policy, as an integral part of our Common Foreign and Security Policy, has grown in experience and capability, with over 20 missions deployed in response to crises, ranging from post-tsunami peace building in Aceh to protecting refugees in Chad.” These successes are viewed as, “the results of a distinctive European approach to foreign and security policy.”⁹ Indeed, they are the successes of security governance and power projection lite, or security German style.

The limitations of Power Projection Lite:

While the unique features of postwar West German security culture came to form the foundation for the emerging EU European security culture, they actually hamper the emergence of an effective German or European strategic culture. It has been difficult to arrive at an agreement on when military combat intervention as a last resort would be legitimate. The German case reveals through various polls that over time war fighting has been basically de-legitimized. As I discuss below, more traditional German power projection has emerged under the auspices of NATO, or *Trans-Atlantia*. Yet, that very fact has also brought NATO under increasing criticism in Germany, and has led to widespread dissatisfaction with the ongoing ISAF/NATO intervention in Afghanistan, which represents the clearest manifestation of German war-fighting in the

⁸ *A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy*, (Brussels, 2003), p. 7.

⁹ *Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy—Providing Security in a Changing World*, (Brussels, 2008), p. 2.

traditional sense. I will also discuss the examples of bold German leadership in guiding Germany away from reticence and toward an active military role done “in concert” with its NATO allies.

In sum, Germany has been the leading light in establishing *Euroland*. German leadership was critical in pushing the introduction of the euro, in promulgating the “ever closer union” through EU wide acceptance of a constitution, and finally, in establishing through practice the tenets of ESDP, the latter being a mixed blessing. Below I deal with the shortfalls of *Euroland* in the discussion of *Trans-Atlantia* and *Abendland*.

Whither Trans-Atlantia?

Trans-Atlantia has not fared as well as *Euroland* in the years since unification. NATO, the flagship institution of trans-Atlantic cooperation and democratic community, has managed to stay in business, but it has often been close to foreclosure. The fact that NATO survived at all in the wake of Soviet collapse was an historic accomplishment. As I have argued elsewhere, NATO was always more than a traditional collective defense alliance. Its origins reflected the beliefs of postwar American Wilsonian foreign policy makers who were instrumental in constructing the post war international order. NATO was consciously conceived of as a core institution in the American blueprint for a democratic community of nations with U.S. leadership at its center.¹⁰ As John Foster Dulles stated in the formative years of the postwar era, there needed to be a focus in the Alliance on, “cooperation for something rather than merely against something.”¹¹ Re-affirming that commitment, former U.S. Secretary of State James Baker delivered a famous speech in Berlin in 1989 at the end of the Cold War in which he encouraged NATO to turn to its

¹⁰ See Mary N. Hampton, “The Wilsonian Impulse: *Security Studies* 1995. On the US and postwar order, see especially G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars* (Princeton University Press, 2001).

¹¹ John Foster Dulles, quoted in Mary N. Hampton, *The Wilsonian Impulse: U.S. Foreign Policy, the Alliance, and German Unification* (Paeger, 1995), p.21.

political purpose of political community building in the face of a diminished Soviet security threat. Baker stated: “Today, NATO is working in Vienna to build a new security structure for Europe, one in which the military component is reduced and the political is enhanced. This is NATO's first new mission.”¹²

That united Germany joined NATO helped stabilize the historic event and calm those allies and neighbors potentially worried about emerging German power. Indeed, Germany only achieved full sovereignty upon unification, opening the door to concerns both domestically and abroad regarding how unity and sovereignty might influence German foreign policy proclivities. Kohl's foreign policy was masterful in insisting that united Germany remain integrated in the West. In return, the integration of Germany into NATO also helped legitimize NATO's existence. Over the next decade, German leadership would be pivotal in ensuring that *Trans-Atlantia* continued to flourish. The Kohl government would enhance German influence while continuing to anchor it in *Euroland*, as discussed above, and in *Trans-Atlantia*. On the defining issues of NATO enlargement, NATO-Russian cooperation, and NATO intervention into the Balkans, Germany played a key role. That said, NATO's intervention in the Balkans and the subsequent NATO debacle after the attacks on the U.S. on September 11, 2001, undermined the cohesion of the trans-Atlantic community. While it has been somewhat restored over the last few years, German leadership has become much less proactive on the issues of enlargement, NATO relations with Russia, and NATO intervention in Afghanistan.

Germany and NATO Enlargement in the 1990s:

¹² James Baker, quoted in *The New York Times*, “Upheaval in the East; Excerpts from Baker's Speech on Berlin and U.S. Role in Europe's Future”, December 13, 1989.

Incorporating united Germany was NATO's first step in the emerging post Cold War order toward democratic enlargement on the continent. The inclusion of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary by decade's end continued the trend. The democratic enlargement process affirmed both Article X of the NATO Charter, which recommends that alliance membership be open to those European states, "in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area",¹³ and gave new focus to Germany's successful postwar democratic experience. Just as American policy makers believed at the end of the Second World War that the historical European balance of power system needed an overhaul, so German policy makers now sought to help actively reconstruct a more democratic order throughout Europe.

Again, German foreign policy was a key player in achieving the successful enlargement policy, and developed its own position independent from the push for enlargement emanating from the Clinton White House by 1994. First, NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner was one of the first NATO officials to advocate behind the scenes and then publically for NATO opening its doors to democratizing European states in East and Central Europe. Woerner reflected the beliefs of many West German elites in revealing his sense of historic obligation to hopeful members in East and Central Europe. This view was evident already in 1990 through speeches he gave.

Michael Ruehle writes of Woerner's conviction:

In 1990, during a visit to the Polish city of Gdansk, the crowd had welcomed him by cheering "NATO, Solidarnosc, NATO . . .". For Woerner, with his vision of a Euro-Atlantic community, it was inevitable that the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe would ultimately join the Alliance. Accordingly, Woerner worked actively to hasten that end.¹⁴

¹³ *North Atlantic Charter*, Article X.

¹⁴ Michael Ruehle, "Preface: Manfred Woerner's Legacy and NATO", in Anton A. Bebler, ed. *Civil-Military Relations in Post-Communist States: Central and Eastern Europe in Transition*. (Westport: Praeger, 1997), pp. iv-xvi; quotation on p. xiv, and quoted in Mary N. Hampton, "Borne Ceaselessly Into the Past? Poland, Germany, and NATO Enlargement Policy", in *German Comments*.

Again, in a speech from 1993 at the International Institute of Strategic Studies in Brussels,

Woerner stated:

NATO is not a closed society. We have always said that the option for membership is open. My view is that the time has come for us to offer a concrete perspective to the countries of central and eastern Europe who want to join NATO, and whom we regard as possible candidates for future membership.¹⁵

The Kohl government, led by Defense Minister Volker Ruehe, and especially Parliamentarians like Friedrich Pflueger, thereafter carved an important role for Germany as the advocate for accession, especially in the case of Poland. By 1994, Pflueger was on board with Ruehe in enthusiastically supporting Polish membership in NATO and the EU.¹⁶ This was Germany's moment to be generous and extend the hand of NATO inclusion to democratizing European states, as was done for it in 1954. It was therefore also a moment in which Germany could hold itself up as a successful model of democracy.

Germany, NATO, and Military Intervention:

NATO reached its zenith and nadir with the military interventions into the Balkans, beginning with Operation Deliberate Force in Bosnia, and climaxing with Operation Allied Force in Kosovo in 1999. The latter was truly a landmark occasion in many ways. It was the first time Germany intervened abroad militarily in combat since the Second World War, and the German policy was driven by a left-of-center coalition government led by the SPD and Greens. It was

¹⁵Manfred Woerner, "Wir handeln 'Out of Area' und sind sehr wohl 'in business'", in Manfred Woerner, Fuer Frieden in Freiheit: Reden und Aufsätze. (Berlin: edition q, 1995), pp. 280-292; quotation on p. 289.

¹⁶ See my discussion of German advocacy for Polish accession in, "Borne Ceaselessly Into the Past? Poland, Germany, and NATO Enlargement Policy", in *German Comments*.

also the first time NATO intervened in a war since its inception in 1949. The fact that the Allied intervention succeeded in forcing Milošević to capitulate was a crowning moment in Allied history: the community of Western democracies hung together to intervene and halt a clear case of human rights abuse and ethnic cleansing. The success in Bosnia and then Kosovo represented NATO's zenith and Germany's Rubicon.¹⁷

The German position of abstinence in the U.S.-led Gulf War in 1991 reflected the culture of reticence. That said, while German political elites and the public were unwilling to contribute militarily in the conflict, there was wide-ranging debate inside Germany concerning the justification of use of force in that instance. In fact, the domestic consensus of reticence would be modified, and Kohl's leadership on the issue paved the way for the German military intervention in OAF that would occur less than a decade later. The German government was criticized openly and widely abroad for its hesitation to act in solidarity with its allies during the Gulf War. The Kohl government therefore challenged the domestic consensus by obligating Germany to participate in United Nations peacekeeping operations (UN PKO) in the early 1990s. The reform was challenged constitutionally by the Free Democratic Party (FDP) and the opposition Social Democratic Party (SPD). They submitted a query regarding German military intervention to the German Constitutional Court.¹⁸

The 1994 constitutional finding of 1994 permitted German military deployment outside the national borders in the pursuit of "safeguarding peace", and as long as German military forces were part of "peacekeeping troops, and peace-securing measures" in the context of the UN

¹⁷ Joschka Fischer, the Foreign Minister, referred to German intervention in the Balkans as Germany's Rubicon. See Mary N. Hampton, "Fischer and Wilsonianism", in Mareika Koenig and Matthias Schulz, eds., *Bundesrepublik Deutschland und die europäische Einigung* (Fritz Steiner, 2004).

¹⁸ See Stein, "Germany's Constitution", p. 36.

system of collective security, and in conjunction with its allies.¹⁹ The court offered no more specifics in identifying how German military power could be projected. The ruling enabled German participation in peacekeeping operations in the framework of international institutions and multilateralism, it also interpreted existing constitutional law as containing, “sufficient constitutional basis for Germany’s participation in military operations led or authorized by the UN, and that no other provision in the Basic Law . . . could be interpreted as forbidding such participation.”²⁰ The ruling also allowed for German participation in multilateral operations through international organizations other than the UN, so long as the “system of mutual security” was upheld.²¹

The way was paved for German military projection lite. Germany’s participation in the Balkan wars of the 1990s contributed to a “normalization” of German foreign policy. The Allied military intervention in Kosovo fit within the parameters of the newly emerging German domestic consensus of permitting limited military intervention as long as it was done in concert with Germany’s democratic allies and pursued in the name of community values rather than narrow self interest. Wolfgang Ischinger, the future German Ambassador to the U.S., and a top Foreign Office official in the Kohl government, argued that the Kosovo intervention represented a break with past European wars that were based on *realpolitik* considerations. In his view, the

¹⁹ Collective security is basically defined as the multilateral pursuit of security objectives that include community interests and values, as opposed to national security, where traditional narrow national interests are pursued. Today’s usage of collective security largely reflects its Wilsonian heritage in combination with the regional security dynamics that have emerged in Europe, especially since the end of the cold war. For a discussion of current uses of the term, see David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s New Role in International Security*. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1998), esp. chs. 1,2 and 5. For an in-depth discussion of traditional understandings of collective security, see the classic by Inis Claude, Jr., *Power and International Relations*. (New York: Random House, 1962), esp. ch. 4.

²⁰ Stein, “Germany’s Constitution”, p. 37. See also Ralph Thiele, “Winning War and Peace”, in Lily Gardner Feldman, ed. *Cooperation or Conflict? American, European Union and German Policies in the Balkans* (Washington, D.C.: American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, 2001), 238-273.

²¹ Stein, “Germany’s Constitution”, p. 37.

multilateral military intervention in Kosovo was focused on, “the need to avert a humanitarian catastrophe. . . . Instead of national interests, the international community pursued the goal of implementing the basic principles of law and humanity.”²² Allied Force and the follow-on peace keeping mission therefore validated the new German approach to international power projection: it was multilateral and waged under the NATO flag; it was executed in the name of democratic community objectives; it revealed that Germany was now willing to assume an active role alongside its democratic allies to stop ethnic cleansing.

On the other hand, OAF also diminished NATO. For the first time, the technology gap between the US and NATO Europe became an active source of resentment. Many in the US military resented that they bore the brunt of the military burden, and many in Europe resented the fact that the US withheld important intelligence concerning air operations, and that European military backwardness was so glaring. For the first time, the British were driven to join the French at St Malo in 1998 in seeking an autonomous European security and defense architecture. Further, the fact that NATO’s war in Kosovo was executed without a UN mandate became increasingly problematical for Germany. In fact, in Germany, many read the 1994 constitutional court ruling as making UN mandates necessary ingredients for Germany’s participation in PKO and other collective security policies. While the worry revealed more political sensibilities than constitutional directives, German leaders have since repeatedly made clear their demand that Germany only participate in PKO and other missions that have a UN mandate. NATO’s experience therefore represented something of a breach in trans-Atlantic relations and

²² Wolfgang Ischinger, “Kosovo: Germany Considers the Past and Looks to the Future”, in Wolfgang-Uwe Friedrich, ed. *The Legacy of Kosovo: German Politics and Policies in the Balkans*. German Issues 22. (Washington, D.C.: American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, 2000), pp. 27-50; quotation on p. 27.

encouraged greater European cooperation and integration in the security and defense fields. Indeed, the EU agreements and accords reached at St. Malo in 1999 and subsequently were discussed above in the context of *Euroland*. Indeed, the trans-Atlantic relationship approached the precipice as relations soured further between the Schroeder and Bush Administrations, especially over the issue of military intervention in Iraq. The Bush Administration's military intervention followed soon after the publication in Germany of Jorg Friedrich's book, *Der Brand*. The book examined and questioned the morality of the Anglo-American air campaign against Dresden and the Third Reich in WWII and helped renew public debate about the use of force in international politics. Friedrich and other public intellectuals engaged in numerous debates about the *Bombenkrieg* of the German experience and the potential Iraqi experience. As Friedrich commented, a deep-seated German historical memory "situates the Germans always under the bomb and never in the bomber."²³

Germany and Afghanistan: Another Test of Changing German Culture:

Chancellor Merkel remarked in April at a NATO summit she co-hosted in Strasbourg that, "Afghanistan is a litmus test for us all". The test results are not looking good. In 2003 NATO took over ISAF, thereby ensuring the UN mandate remained in effect. That situation has defined Afghan operations since. ISAF/NATO has conducted security and stability operations, helping the Afghan government create a stable environment and helping in the nation building process. U.S. forces participate in that, but the U.S. counter insurgency war has until recently continued separately. The problem for ISAF, but especially Germany, is that the expanding area of

²³ For a discussion of this episode, see Mary N. Hampton and Douglas Peifer, "Reordering German Identity: Memory Sites and German Foreign Policy", *German Studies Review*, Vol XXX, No. 2 (May 2007).

operation for ISAF, and the deteriorating security environment in Afghanistan have forced the ISAF mission to move toward traditional military operations.

From Rumsfeld's public remark in 2003 that German Special Forces were participating in Afghanistan, a remark made before Schroeder had informed the Germans, to the scandal in 2006 involving German soldiers in Afghanistan insulted local culture by desecrating Afghani skulls, to the increased combat deaths of German soldiers in Afghanistan, to the recent controversy involving a German General on the ground in Afghanistan who ordered a NATO air strike that turned out to kill dozens of civilians: these are all incidents that have continuously stoke the public preference for an exit from Afghanistan. The latter incident was particularly repugnant to the public, as it was the largest number of deaths in a wartime incident since the Second World War. Further, the episode occurred toward the end of the recent federal election, and there was momentary conjecture about whether or not the 2009 election might not turn at the last moment on the issue of foreign policy, as happened in 2002 when Schroeder squeaked out his victory in some measure by criticizing publicly Washington's military intervention into Iraq.²⁴

"The Germans may not have gone to war, but now the war has come to them."²⁵ Stefan Pauley's observation is insightful. Since the inception of Germany's military participation in Afghanistan operations, the German government has spoken only of peace keeping and humanitarian assistance. It is becoming clearer to the German public, of whom a majority has never supported participation in ISAF operations, that its soldiers are indeed fighting a war on the ground. The German mission originally involved more peace keeping and stability and reconstruction because the German troops were deployed in Northern Afghanistan, which had been one of the more

²⁴ Nicholas Kulish, "Merkel Warns of 'Premature Judgments' of Afghan Raid", *New York Times* (September 9, 2009).

²⁵ Stefan Pauley, "German Limits on War Are Facing Reality in Afghanistan", *New York Times*, (October 26, 2009).

peaceful areas of the country. That has recently changed as the resurgent Taliban has returned to the region. Increasingly, then, the German military has become involved in a shooting war, and has engaged the Taliban in offensive operations. This is of huge consequence to Germany and is pushing on the limits of power projection for a cause that Germans are not wound up about. For some time, approximately two thirds of Germans have been against the Afghanistan mission.

All negative signs emanating from Germany regarding the Afghanistan mission notwithstanding, Merkel has resisted public pressure, countered political opposition, and held firm to the line of supporting the NATO/ISAF mission in Afghanistan since she was elected in 2005. Under her guidance, the German Parliament renewed its commitment in Afghanistan in 2007. That support has recently shown signs of fraying, as has the support of other EU members. In September 2009 Merkel was among the EU chorus calling for the development of an exit strategy from Afghanistan. At this writing, the response of the Obama Administration has yet to be determined, which does not help Merkel's position much. While he campaigned on the promise of enhancing military operations in Afghanistan and General McChrystal continues to call for 40,000 more troops, the Obama team has not made a final decision on how to proceed in Afghanistan. Thus, while the Obama Administration has returned to the rhetoric and posture of trans-Atlantic community, the reality of NATO policy in Afghanistan borders on failure.

In sum, Merkel has re-affirmed the centrality of the trans-Atlantic relationship for German security. For example, the 2006 *White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr* places *Trans-Atlantia* as the cornerstone of German security and reaffirms the western community of values. The U.S.-German troubles of 2001-2005 are absent, but so too is a hard headed assessment of alterations in the relationship as they pertain to changes in the

political and strategic environment. The real limitations of the relationship have become glaring through the Afghanistan experience. Globalized NATO seems less suited to German security culture than does *Euroland*.

Finally, NATO shares a problem with the EU in having no clarified policy toward Russia. While Germany continues to develop its bilateral relationship with Russia, especially in the areas of investment and the purchase of natural gas, Berlin plays no particular leadership role in either NATO or the EU in attempting to craft a multilateral approach. Both NATO and the EU had robust rules of engagement with Russia in the 1990s, and German leadership was critical. However, both institutional policy frames revolved around slowly integrating Russia westward as Europe enlarged eastward. Russian foreign policy under Putin demoted westernization from the foreign policy agenda. Instead, Russian foreign policy has flummoxed EU and NATO members in the last few years with aggressive military and economic policies toward Georgia, Estonia, and a number of East European states.

Abendland and German Foreign Policy:

Abendland historically is a provocative term, but it is useful in helping to conceptualize the identity boundaries that are emerging in Europe. In the past, *Abendland*, or evening land, was a phrase used to denote the west, usually the Christian west, which was juxtaposed to *Morgenland*, or morning land, the cultures of the east, meaning the Orient, the Levant, the lands of Islam. The religious and civilizational undertones are obvious. Today, civilizational and religious patterns of identity are once again emerging in EU European culture, and Germany's role in the process is pivotal. As German identity becomes more embedded in *Euroland*, the process of culturally identifying member and non-member accelerates.

While the U.S. is a member of *Trans-Atlantia*, which signifies the western democratic community, that identity complex is being overshadowed by the emerging distinct European identity. While EU Europe is still culturally Christian, it is distinctly secular. Europeans today generally believe that America's religiosity makes it exceptional and very different.²⁶ EU Europe's distinctive culture—its Christian secularism, is emerging increasingly in contrast not just to the U.S., but even more so in contrast to the immigrant populations of the Levant, the Near and Middle East who have been migrating to EU states in growing numbers. While the most excessive reactions can be dismissed, the demographic and cultural trends do create political, social and economic issues that will have to be addressed.

The necessity in addressing the growing cultural issues is great and problematical for Germany. The historical burden of the Second World War, and especially the Holocaust, created a number of taboos for West Germany with which united Germany must still contend. Aside from the policy of compensation to and reconciliation with Israel developed early on by Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's government, and that is still in place, Bonn also developed very liberal asylum and religious freedom policies that would broadcast openness and fairness to the world and educate its own citizenry. The episodic debates that challenged taboos and raised doubts regarding the question of collective guilt, the historic placement of the Holocaust, and the responsibility of West Germans on issues regarding minorities, religion, and ethnic groups illuminated the constraints under which postwar West Germany lived.

A recurring thorny theme for West Germany was the issue of citizenship. West Germany's citizenship laws were based on *jus sanguinus*, the law of blood. This policy was introduced in

²⁶ See my discussion in *Angels, Mortals, Demons: Comparing U.S. and European Foundational Security Beliefs*. Manuscript under review. Also see Peter Berger's persuasive argument that it is actually Europe that is exceptional in its secularism. Peter Berger, et al, *Religious America, Secular Europe?* (Ashgate, 2008).

1913 and was based on German ethnicity. It had a dubious history under National Socialism, used to enact and execute many of the Nazis' most atrocious ethnicity-based policies. While Bonn rapidly liberalized most aspects of West German politics and policies, this citizenship law remained intact and drew domestic and foreign criticism. Yet, the West German government kept it in place in order to achieve two goals:

First, hundreds of thousands of 'ethnic Germans' scattered around Eastern Europe (Aussiedler) were facing significant post-war recriminations, and allowing them to return to Germany was considered a basic and fundamental human rights issue. Second, East German citizens who managed to leave communist East Germany (Übersiedler), either voluntarily or by expulsion, were automatically granted West German citizenship upon arrival in the FRG.²⁷

Tensions mounted surrounding the period of unification regarding the application of citizenship laws to foreign "guest workers" who may have spent their lives in West Germany, but were not of German origin. A Turk who lived and worked in West Germany for thirty years remained a guest worker, while a newly arriving ethnic German from the diaspora, perhaps from the former Soviet Union, could be conferred immediate citizenship status, as occurred more frequently as the Cold War collapsed. The exclusion of the guest workers continued to cause domestic problems and draw negative international publicity. Pressure mounted to change the law, especially after unification. The numbers of unintegrated Turks became a real problem, and their ghetto-ization in Germany has not been completely erased, even after the citizenship law was finally changed with passage of the German Nationality Act of 2000.

Passage of the new citizenship law enhanced Germany's reputation and was a first step toward developing a workable way to integrate the growing numbers of culturally different groups. That said, the issue of cultural integration of Turks remains a real issue for German domestic policy,

²⁷ Marc Morje Howard, "The Causes and Consequences of Germany's New Citizenship Law", *German Politics*, Vol 17, No. 1 (March 2008), 41-62; quotation on p. 42.

and influences German foreign policy as well. Recently a newly appointed Board member of Germany's Central Bank stated publicly: "Turks are conquering Germany...with a strong birth rate" He opined further that, "a great many Arabs and Turks in this city, whose numbers have grown because of the wrong policies, have no productive function other than as fruit and vegetable sellers." While the episode created a media and public relations storm, a public opinion poll taken afterward reveal that a majority of Germans agreed with the statements. The poll, taken by the respected Emnid for the German newspaper, *Bild am Sonntag*, found 51 percent of Germans agreeing with the comments, and 39 percent disagreeing.²⁸ Beyond that, 69% of those polled found that the debate surrounding his comments was useful. The episode illuminates the tensions and problems that continue in German society concerning the integration of Germany's 2.5 million Turks, who represent over two percent of the total population. The Turks are the largest and according to many indicators, the least successful immigrant group in Germany. For example, only about 30% of Turks finish school, compared to 50% for other immigrant groups.

Abendland and the EU:

Germany's struggle with integrating the Turkish minority successfully is reflective of the EU experience generally. There is growing concern and fear in Europe about how to manage the issue of Muslim integration and/or assimilation. While immigration into EU countries from the Maghreb, Northern Africa, Turkey, and elsewhere has been proceeding for decades, it is only since the 1980s that the issue of Islam and Europe has really taken hold. Beginning in the 1990s, alarm bells have been periodically sounded from various quarters in EU Europe concerning the

²⁸ Thilo Sarrazin, former Finance Minister for Berlin, and a recent member of the Bundesbank Board of Directors, made the comments mostly as a criticism of the left and left-of-center politics influential in Berlin. Yet, as the Emnid results show, his words have resonance in German society.

coming “revolution in Europe” caused by the influx of Muslims.²⁹ Based partly on current and future demographic trends, some predictions identify around 9% of the EU as Muslim by the year 2060. These predictions are based on current trends. The Muslim populations of many EU countries have grown rapidly over the last couple of decades. Overall, about 3.5% of the EU European population is Muslim, or about 16 million. France has the largest population of Muslims, about five million, followed by Germany and Great Britain. While European birthrates are decreasing, birthrates among Muslim immigrant groups are increasing.

While some of the rhetoric and argumentation is alarmist, it is clear that EU Europe has a political and cultural issue that continues to smolder. Interestingly, the responses to Muslim integration have so far been carried out at the national level, despite the fact that there are many experts that encourage the EU to develop EU wide policies and practices.³⁰ The issue of Turkish accession to the EU illuminates the problem. Positions vary greatly in the EU regarding this extremely important unresolved question. The German position has fluctuated on this topic that strikes deep cultural nerves in Turkey and the Islamic world. While the Red-Green coalition foreign policy team led by Schroeder and Fischer publicly supported Turkey’s accession to the EU, the Merkel government has pronounced against it. With this posture, Merkel joins French President Sarkozy, who has come out publicly in rigorous opposition to Turkish accession to the EU. That said, Germany is not seeking a leadership role on this issue. As discussed above, this is partly due to the legacy of the German past. More than that consideration is the fact that

²⁹ The words in quotations, “the revolution in Europe”, refers to a new book by Christopher Caldwell on the topic, *Reflections on the Revolution in Europe: Immigration, Islam, and the West* (Doubleday, 2009). In the book, Caldwell takes the pessimist view shared by many concerning the demographic trend in Europe, where European birthrates are collapsing while those of Muslim immigrant groups are slightly increasing and immigrants continue to arrive.

³⁰ See Samir Amghar et al, *Islam in Europe: Challenges for Society and Public Policy*. Center for European Policy Studies (CEPS) (Brussels, 2007).

Germany's role, like that of other EU countries has a significant domestic political, as well as foreign policy and reputational consequences.

Conclusion

Germany necessarily plays a central leadership role in the forward momentum of European integration. That said, innovative German leadership was most clearly on display before, during and just after the momentous event of German unification. While the successful completion of German unification required inspired U.S. and permissive Russian leadership, it was really Kohl's innovative foreign policy that drove the process of unification through western integration to completion. Through his foreign policy, Kohl drove innovation in both the *Euroland* and *Trans-Atlantia* identity complexes. Inspired, innovative, and assertive German foreign policy is needed today to help re-define the trans-Atlantic relationship, and to enable the EU address the emerging policy dilemmas resulting re-assertive Russia and the integration of immigrant cultures.